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Race Trials
Anthony V. Alfieri*
"I told Mister Washington / You couldn'tfind a white man / With
his name.
-Yusef Komunyakaa
Introduction
This Article is the third in a series devoted to the study of race,
lawyers, and ethics in American law. The opening work of the series
explored the rhetoric of race in cases of black-on-white racially motivated
violence, citing the defense of Damian Williams and Henry Watson on
charges of beating Reginald Denny and others during the 1992 South
Central Los Angeles riots.2 The next work probed racial rhetoric in cases
of white-on-black racially incited violence, noting the civil and criminal
trial of the Ku Klux Klan in the 1981 lynching of Michael Donald.3 The
work at hand analyzes the rhetorical meaning of race in the recent "double
* Professor of Law and Director, Center for Ethics and Public Service, University of Miami
School of Law. Earlier versions of this Article were presented at Boston College Law School, the Mid-
Atlantic Clinical Theory and Practice Workshop, Temple University School of Law, and the Working
Group on Law, Culture, and Humanities. I am grateful to the participants in those workshops and to
David Abraham, Adrian Barker, William Childs, Wes Daniels, John Ely, Martha Fineman, Michael
Fischl, Clark Freshman, Ellen Grant, Patrick Gudridge, Phil Heymann, Amelia Hope, Lisa Iglesias,
Sharon Keller, Ann Kleinfelter, Don Jones, Peter Margulies, Clare Membiela, Michael Perlin, Susan
Stefan, Sam Thompson, and Frank Valdes for their comments and support. I am also grateful to the
Office of the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York for its generosity in this
matter and, equally important, for its gracious acceptance of disagreement. It honors the best traditions
of public service when an agency of the United States government opens itself for review and criticism
in good faith and with good grace. I additionally wish to thank Bill Bradford, Jennifer McCloskey,
Monique McKenna, Christina Prkic, Tim Ravich, Shana Stephens, and the University of Miami School
of Law library staff for their research assistance. This Article is dedicated to Astrid Johnson and
Barbara Vollmer.
1. YUSEF KOMUNYAKAA, A Good Memory, in NEON VERNACULAR 14, 15 (1993).
2. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1301 (1995).
3. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Lynching Ethics: Toward a Theory of Racialized Defenses, 95 MICH.
L. REv. 1063 (1997). On the culture and defense of lynching, see also Anne S. Emanuel, Lynching
and the Law in Georgia Circa 1931: A Chapter in the Legal Career of Judge Elbert Tuttle, 5 WM. &
MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 215 (1996); Barbara Holden-Smith, Lynching, Federalism, and the Intersection
of Race and Gender in the Progressive Era, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 31 (1996).
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trial"4 of Lemrick Nelson growing out of four days of interracial violence
in the Crown Heights section of Brooklyn, New York in 1991. This analy-
sis serves three purposes: first, to augment the still-evolving definition of
race trials; second, to broaden the discursive map of "race talk" in legal
advocacy; and third, to determine whether the practice of race talk in
advocacy meets current ethical standards of representation or warrants
alternative regulatory standards. No doubt the size of the Nelson trial
record and the weight of the literature brought to bear in this case counsels
a more tentative, and perhaps gingerly, approach to the subject of race
trials than may be found here. The instant approach admittedly over-
reaches both in its descriptive breadth and prescriptive scope. My hope is
that a sustained course of study will in time cure these deficiencies. The
challenge in this Article, and in others to come, is to cast descriptively and
to recast prescriptively our understanding of race trials toward a renewed
vision of racial dignity and community in American law and society.
The Article is divided into seven Parts. Part I traces the genealogy of
the project under way. Part II scrutinizes race trials in the context of the
prosecution and defense of racially motivated violence. Part III describes
the double trial of Lemrick Nelson. Part IV surveys the current regulation
of race trials under ABA rules.' Part V proposes alternative race-
conscious regulation based on the teachings of Critical Race Theory. Part
VI enumerates objections to this proposed race-conscious regulatory
scheme. Part VII concludes in an attempt to reconfigure race trials by
reconstructing racial identity, reimagining racialized narrative, and
reforming race-neutral representation.
The vision of practice underlying this larger inquiry rests on a Critical
Race Theory-inspired ethic of good lawyering. The ethic adopts a race-
conscious jurisprudence to guide the conduct of lawyers and judges6 when
confronting matters of race. From the outset, that jurisprudence abandons
the pretense of a colorblind canon of race neutrality. At the same time, it
4. By "double trial," I mean trial proceedings involving successive criminal and civil rights
prosecutions in state and federal courts. On the legitimacy of successive prosecutions, see Akhil Reed
Amar & Jonathan L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law After Rodney King, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1995);
Susan N. Herman, Reconstructing the Bill of Rights: A Reply to Amar and Marcus's Triple Play on
Double Jeopardy, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1090 (1995); Susan N. Herman, Double Jeopardy All Over
Again: Dual Sovereignty, Rodney King, andthe ACLU, 41 UCLA L. REV. 609 (1994) (all arguing for
the complete or partial elimination of the dual sovereignty exception to double jeopardy doctrine).
5. The survey draws on three ABA rule clusters: the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY (1980); the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1997); and the STANDARDS
RELATING TO THE ADMIN. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1992).
6. The judicial regulation of race comes under statute and rule. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(5)-(6) (1990). Regulatory authority declares the adjudicative
responsibility to perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice and to require lawyers to refrain from
acts of bias or prejudice, except when warranted by the demands of legitimate advocacy. See id. A
full account of that regulatory scheme will be undertaken in an upcoming project.
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rejects the color-coded claims of racial partisanship and prejudice. Instead,
it seeks to develop a color-conscious, pluralist approach to advocacy that
honors the integrity of diverse individual and collective racial identities
without sacrificing effective representation. Critical Race Theory sketches
an analytic framework suitable to that approach. The double trial of
Lemrick Nelson furnishes a case study in which to pursue it.
I. A Genealogy of Method
The starting point of the instant project is race, specifically the role of
race within the lawyering process. That process engages the complex labor
of advocacy ranging from interviewing and counseling to trial and appellate
practice.7 Typically, American law schools consign the teaching of the
lawyering process and the ethics of lawyering to the margins of the
curriculum. Likewise, law schools generally relegate research on the
process and law of lawyering to the periphery of scholarship. Both tenden-
cies impoverish legal education. To an extent, the emergence of the theo-
retics of practice movement," coupled with the methodological shift in
ethics across other disciplines,9 promises to alleviate somewhat the
destitution of the legal academy in developing an integrated theory and
practice, indeed a praxis, of advocacy.'"
Ending the intellectual poverty of lawyering praxis in contemporary
legal education requires the assimilation of interdisciplinary materials
spanning literature, history, jurisprudence, and more. Literature in
particular holds special significance to many scholars of the lawyering
7. For broad exposition of the lawyering process, see generally GARY BELLOW & BEA MOULTON,
THE LAWYERING PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY (1978); HOWARD
LESNICK, BEING A LAWYER: INDIVIDUAL CHOICE AND RESPONSIBILITY IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW
(1992); JAMES E. MOLITERNO & JOHN M. LEVY, ETHICS OF THE LAWYER'S WORK (1993); THOMAS
L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (1994).
8. The theoretics of practice movement encompasses clinical and interdisciplinary research. For
useful surveys, see Symposium, Lawyering Theory: Thinking Through the Legal Culture, 37 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 1 (1992); Symposium, Political Lawyering: Conversations on Progressive Social Change,
31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 285 (1996); Symposium, Poveny Law Scholarship, 48 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 983 (1994); Symposium, Theoretics of Practice: The Integration of Progressive Thought and
Action, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 717 (1992).
The recent emergence of field study-based clinical law journals contributes to this research. See,
e.g., Stephen Ellmann et al., Foreword: Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-Journal?, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 1
(1994); From the Editors, 1 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. at vii (1997).
9. The methodological embrace of philosophy and literature signals this shift. See DAVID LUBAN,
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988); THOMAS L. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS
(1985) (both utilizing philosophical approaches in examining legal ethics); see also David B. Wilkins,
Redefining the "Professional" in Professional Ethics: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Teaching
Professionalism, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 1995, at 241 (discussing Harvard's inter-
disciplinary legal ethics program).
10. Ultimately, the promise of theory-practice integration within the legal academy is likely to go
unfulfilled. The disdain of theoreticians for practice and the antipathy of practitioners toward theory
virtually condemns the enterprise of integration.
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process. Captivated by the law and literature movement," these scholars
borrow from the analysis of the "law as literature" and from the investiga-
tion of the "law in literature." 2 The study of the law as literature
inspects narrative and story in legal discourse. 3 The study of the law in
literature scans legal representations in literary texts. 4
Although both strands of the law and literature movement illuminate
the symbolic and rhetorical meaning of sociolegal discourse, the treatment
of the law as literature proves most useful to an analysis of narrative and
story in legal advocacy. That analysis goes beyond the instrumental,
outcome-oriented values engrafted on narrative and story to ponder the
intrinsic values motivating litigant speech and conduct. Frequently, the
intrinsic values of individual dignity and community integrity motivate
litigant behavior. 5
Consider the notion of individual dignity. Liberal theory champions
this notion, fostering a jurisprudence of dignitary rights in constitutional,
statutory, and common law arenas. Constitutional prohibitions against
unwarranted governmental intrusion on the private realm of the
individual 6 and the family 7 build from these rights. Legislative
enactments establishing protective procedures for the dissemination of state-
acquired information confer similar rights of privacy on individuals."
11. For helpful overviews of the law and literature movement, see STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT
COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL
STUDIES (1989); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND
LITERATURE (1990); RICHARD POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: POSSIBILITIES AND PERSPECTIVES: A
MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION (1988); IAN WARD, LAW AND LITERATURE: POSSIBILITIES AND
PERSPECTIVES (1995); ROBIN WEST, NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY, AND LAW (1993); JAMES BOYD WHITE,
ACTS OF HOPE: CREATING AUTHORITY IN LITERATURE, LAW, AND POLITICS (1994).
12. On the origins of this distinction, see Robert Weisberg, The Law-Literature Enterprise, 1 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (1988).
13. See L.H. LARUE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AS FICTION: NARRATIVE IN THE RHETORIC OF
AUTHORITY 2 (1995) (critiquing fictions in the law); NARRATIVE AND THE LEGAL DISCOURSE: A
READER IN STORYTELLING AND THE LAW 1 (David Ray Papke ed., 1991) (noting the presence of nar-
rative in all "things and activities we consider 'legal'").
14. See RICHARD H. WEISBERG, POETHICS: AND OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW AND LITERATURE
(1992); RICHARD H. WEISBERG, THE FAILURE OF THE WORD: THE PROTAGONIST AS LAWYER IN
MODERN FICTION (1984) (both discussing the frequent use of legal themes in fiction).
15. For discussions of intrinsic values in advocacy, see Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as
Translator, Representation as Text: Towards an Ethnography ofLegal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
1298, 1385, 1366-87 (1992) (explicating client race-based dignitary interests); Tanina Rostain, The
Company We Keep: Kronman 's The Lost Lawyer and the Development of Moral Imagination in the
Practice of Law, 21 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1017, 1020 (1997) (book review) (endorsing lawyer partici-
pation "in the articulation of public commitments embodied in the law").
16. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (invalidating statutes prohibiting the
use and distribution of contraceptives by married persons); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443
(1972) (invalidating statutes prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons).
17. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland. 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (striking down a municipal
zoning ordinance regulating household occupancy).
18. See Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994 & Supp. 111996), amended by 5 U.S.C.A.
§ 552a (Supp. 1997).
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Common law doctrine in the area of tort safeguards the same set of
rights.' 9 Whether tied in constitutional or common law bundles, dignitary
rights establish the freedom of individuals and groups to secure appropri-
ately tailored treatment from private and public legal agents as well as their
affiliated institutions. This settled line of rights stops short of establishing
the guarantee of community integrity.
Relative to individual dignity, the notion of community integrity seems
underdeveloped in liberal theory.2' Community integrity means some-
thing more than the physical geography of inclusion and exclusion exem-
plified by the concept of school or zoning districts. Integrity is not simply
about the power to define and to control racialized space.2' Rather, it is
about the collective norms governing that space, especially their meaning
and imagery.' Community integrity in this way recalls Robert Cover's
notion of a nomos.' To Cover, a nomos signifies a "present world" con-
stituted by community values.24 Existing in tension, these values draw
from "an extant state of affairs" and from "visions of alternative
futures."'
In race cases, community integrity reflects the tension between the
reality of racial subordination expressed in cultural inferiority, socioeco-
nomic inequality, and political disenfranchisement, and a vision of racial
transcendence in cultural aesthetic, socioeconomic opportunity, and politi-
cal empowerment. 6 Both the present reality and future vision of commu-
nity integrity are identifiable in constitutional, statutory, and common law
realms. Constitutional recognition of state public nuisance statutory
abatement schemes ratifies a sense, albeit narrow, of community integrity
founded on collective social welfare and moral opprobrium.' Legislation
creating local community development programs with participatory
19. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REv. 737, 740 (1989).
20. One example of an underdeveloped strand of community integrity in liberal theory is the con-
stitutional doctrine of associational rights in matters of intimacy and politics. See, e.g., Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (contemplating whether homosexual activity constitutes protected
association); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (considering the claim of associational pro-
tection of a membership list). See generally Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom ofIntimate Association,
89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980).
21. See Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis,
107 HARV. L. REv. 1841 (1994).
22. See generally AVIAM SOIFER, LAW AND THE COMPANY WE KEEP (1995).
23. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REv. 4 (1983).
24. Id. at 9.
25. Id.
26. On the interplay of racial aesthetics, see John M. Kang, Deconstructing the Ideology of White
Aesthetics, 2 MICH. J. RACE & L. 283 (1997) (discussing white-dominated aesthetic paradigms and
their reflection of racial interplay in culture and society).
27. See, e.g., Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996) (upholding Michigan's public nuisance
abatement scheme).
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mandates amplifies that sense of integrity.' Common law rooted racially
restrictive covenants reaffirm community integrity, lamentably in an odious
fashion. 9
The intrinsic values of individual dignity and community integrity
conflict in procedural and substantive contexts. Out of this conflict,
procedural safeguards may preserve individual dignity but undercut com-
munity integrity. The doctrine of federal intervention illustrates this clash.
Cast in broadly permissive terms, the doctrine permits a nonlitigant appli-
cant to join an action when he establishes an interest relating to the
property or transaction at issue that in his absence may go unprotected or
when the applicant's claim of interest and the main action enjoy a question
of law or fact in common. 31 In Martin v. Wilks,3' a district court order
below denying intervention thwarted a group of white firefighters in their
collateral attack on consent decrees mandating municipal affirmative-action
plans. 32  The denial stemmed from application of the "impermissible
collateral attack" rule.33 Previously, this majority rule precluded collat-
eral attacks on consent decrees by nonparties. Rejecting an implied rule
of mandatory intervention, the Supreme Court held that the attribution of
preclusive effect to a failure to intervene was inconsistent with federal rules
of joinder and intervention. 4 The Court reasoned that historic traditions
of adequate notice, knowledge, and representation protected the "rights of
strangers" against deprivation in prior proceedings when the opportunity
to intervene was unfairly burdened.3 ' The fact that these third party
participatory rights violated the integrity of community racial judgments on
affirmative action held little consequence.
Likewise, substantive protections afforded individuals may offend
community integrity. Court decrees ordering the deinstitutionalization and
reintegration of people with mental disabilities in local settings, for
example, may provoke community opposition.36 Typically, such opposi-
28. See generally PETER MARRIS & MARTIN REIN, DILEMMAS OF SOCIAL REFORM: POVERTY AND
COMMUNITY ACTION IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1973); DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, MAXIMUM
FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING: COMMUNITY ACTION IN THE WAR ON POVERTY (1969).
29. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (invalidating state common law enforcement
of racially restrictive covenants under the Equal Protection Clause).
30. See FED. R. CiV. P. 24(a), (b).
31. 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
32. See United States v. Jefferson County, 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1834 (N.D. Ala.
1981), aft'd, 720 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1983).
33. Wilks, 490 U.S. at 760-61. For a thoughtful discussion of the normative underpinningsof the
rule in Wilks, see Owen M. Fiss, The Allure of Individualism, 78 IOWA L. REV. 965 (1993); see also
Douglas Laycock, Due Process of Law in Trilateral Disputes, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1011 (1993); Susan
P. Sturm, The Promise of Participation, 78 IOwA L. REV. 981 (1993).
34. See Wilks, 490 U.S. at 765.
35. See id. at 762.
36. See Michael L. Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization, and Homelessness: A Story of
Marginalization, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 63, 80-112 (1991).
1298 [Vol. 76:1293
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tion gains ground for protest under municipal zoning ordinances 37 and
common law property rules.38 Motivated by fear of increased crime and
decreased property values, 39 these forms of statutory and common law
protest seek to override the dignity-based participatory rights of the
disabled.
Moreover, intrinsic values collide against instrumental calculations in
advocacy. The collisions occur over the competing claims to narrative
privilege asserted among lawyers, clients, and judges. Acts of privilege
dictate the form, content, and order of narrative-elevating some, degrad-
ing and extinguishing others. Clients privilege narratives in their lawyer
communications, pretrial disclosures, and courtroom testimonies. Lawyers
privilege narratives as well, inscribing their preferences in the body of
pleadings, motions, and briefs. They reiterate that privilege in negotiation,
at trial, and on appeal. Judges privilege narratives in their evidentiary
rulings, findings of facts, and conclusions of law.
In race trials, lawyers as well as clients and judges compete to control
the racialized form and content of narrative. Because of its material impor-
tance to claims of legal status and entitlement, race informs the structure
of narratives and the telling of stories in criminal as well as in civil actions.
As a result, race bears directly on claims of sociolegal identity and truth
in the courtroom.' Robin West remarks that "legal and political stories
often constitute, not just symbolize, legal or moral truth."4'
The pursuit of historical truth occupies an important place in the
work of lawyering practice scholars, especially in affording insight into
the cruel dynamics of court-sanctioned racial subordination. Recent
studies documenting the private law of slavery chart the interlocking
development of advocacy and adjudication in the history of racial status
designation.42 This research, sometimes pursued under the rubric of the
37. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (overturning
a city ordinance requiring a special permit for homes for the mentally ill under the Equal Protection
Clause).
38. See, e.g., Mehta v. Surles, 720 F. Supp. 324 (1989), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 905
F.2d 595 (2d Cir. 1990) (upholding the use of a preexisting easement by a community residence for
mentally disabled persons).
39. See Peter Margulies, Building Communities of Virtue: Political Theory, Land Use Policy, and
the "Not in My Backyard" Syndrome, 43 SYRACUSE L. REv. 945, 957 (1992).
40. The notion of character is bound up in the construction of identity. At trial, racial character
may be constructed and contested through narrative. For a careful examination of the racialized con-
struction of character at trial, see Ariela Gross, Pandora's Box: Slave Character on Trial in the
Antebellum Deep South, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 267 (1995).
41. Robin West, Constitutional Fictions and Meritocratic Success Stories, 53 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 995, 1009 (1996).
42. For illuminating studies tracking the development of the private law of slavery through pro-
perty rights advocacy and adjudication, see Andrew Kull, The Enforceability After Emancipation of
Debts Contractedfor the Purchase of Slaves, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 493 (1994); Thomas D. Russell,
A New Image of the Slave Auction: An Empirical Look at the Role of Law in Slave Sales and a
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New Historicism,43 defines law broadly to encompass legal texts,
instruments, rituals, and discourses.' It treats texts and constructs as
situated cultural artifacts that are "historically contingent and perpetually
contested and renegotiated."' Adherents of the New Historicism discover
little coherence or unity in local cultural contexts. Instead, they find a
rhetorical struggle for discursive power cloaking a material struggle for
political dominance.'
Additionally, the politics of jurisprudence play an integral part in
framing the lawyering process critique of racial status. A rough union
of movements shape the post-Realist methodology of practice
jurisprudence, including Critical Legal Studies,' feminism,' and
Critical Race Theory.4 9 Of these movements, only Critical Race Theory
interrogates the construction of racial identity and hierarchy in American
law. Combining cultural and social criticism, Critical Race theorists
track the political, societal, and economic forces sustaining racial status
hierarchies under the legal precept of racial inferiority." Unfortunately,
their collective account5' suffers from a lack of thick description regarding
the contextually situated advocacy practices that mold hierarchy.'
Conceptual Reevaluation of Slave Property, 18 CARDOZO L. REv. 473 (1996); see also Mark Tushnet,
New Histories of the Private Law of Slavery, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 301 (1996) (exploring the use of
legal materials to explain the ideology of slavery).
43. On the genealogy of the New Historicism, see William W. Fisher I1, Texts and Contexts: The
Application to American Legal History of the Methodologies of Intellectual History, 49 STAN. L. REV.
1065, 1070-72, 1084-86 (1997).
44. See Robert W. Gordon, Foreword: The Arrival of Critical Historicism, 49 STAN. L. REV.
1023, 1029 (1997).
45. 1d.
46. See Fisher, supra note 43, at 1072.
47. For an early assessment of CLS theory and practice, see generally Ed Sparer, Fundamental
Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social Struggle: A Friendly Critique of the Critical Legal
Studies Movement, 36 STAN. L. REV. 509 (1984).
48. On feminist theory and practice, see generally Naomi R. Cahn, Styles of Lawyering, 43
HASTINGS L.J. 1039 (1992); Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and
Clinical Education, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1599 (1991); Ann Shalleck, The Feminist Transformation of
Lawyering: A Response to Naomi Cahn, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1071 (1992).
49. For a sweeping account of Critical Race Theory and practice, see generally Eric K.
Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political Lawyering Practice in Post-Civil Rights
America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 821 (1997).
50. On the historical inception of the precept of racial inferiority, see generally A. LEON
HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN
LEGAL PROCESS (1996).
51. For comprehensive surveys of the literature of Critical Race Theory, see generally CRrICAL
RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado ed., 1995); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY
WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberl6 Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); for a feminist per-
spective on Critical Race Theory, see CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 1997).
52. Borrowed from cultural anthropology, the notion of thick description has gained wide currency
in the legal scholarship of practice. See generally, e.g., LAW STORIES (Gary Bellow & Martha Minow
eds., 1996) (rendering participant-observer accounts of the law and legal advocacy to enrich the socio-
legal understanding of practice contexts). Accordingly, the absence of situated advocacy analysis from
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Pressing for an enriched jurisprudential account of the lawyering
process in race cases through the study of civil and criminal trials may
strike some as frivolous. Advocacy, they may assert, is a practical voca-
tion of limited jurisprudential respectability. Certainly, for advocates,
results denote the measure of success, not aesthetics. On this yardstick,
endeavoring to combine disparate jurisprudential movements already
freighted with incommensurable norms and methods ostensibly to acquire
the mien of respectability seems pointless.
Cries of pragmatic and interdisciplinary protest notwithstanding, the
risks of errant speculation seem justified in light of the reconstructive pur-
pose of this enterprise. Furthermore, given the prior works in this
series,5 3 it seems plain that the enterprise neither crudely misappropriates
the teachings of adjacent disciplines nor blithely advances a project of uto-
pian recovery. 4 Instead, the enterprise weaves multiple strands of the-
oretical and practical analysis into a broad investigation of the status of
race, racialized narrative, and race-neutral representation in law,
lawyering, and ethics.
To that end, the project focuses on the rhetoric of race or "race-talk"
in the prosecution and defense of racially motivated violence in civil and
criminal law proceedings. The contexts of civil and criminal law advocacy
contain a clutch of problematic assumptions about race. The first concerns
the uncontroversial absence of race from the training regimens and ethical
canons of advocacy. Standard skills training and ethics instructional
materials used in law school and in continuing legal education programs
routinely omit mention of race in discussions of lawyering and ethics.5
That omission usually passes without complaint. 6
The second assumption pertains to the colorblind form of advocacy
narratives employed in courtroom practice and in negotiation 7 Within
these contexts, advocacy narratives encompass not only legal rule and
the Critical Race Theory literature is noteworthy. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Black and White, 85 CAL.
L. REV. 1647 (1997), reprinted in 10 LA RAZA L.J. 561 (1998) (reviewing CRITICAL RACE THEORY:
THE CUTTING EDGE, supra note 51, and CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED
THE MOVEMENT, supra note 51).
53. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
54. Robert Gordon denotes a narrative of recovery as "one in which the legal system is seen as
ready to be guided to recover the purity of its original principles." Gordon, supra note 44, at 1023.
Hence, it is "often accompanied by a jeremiad lamenting recent lapses and corruptions." Id.
55. See, e.g., ROBERT P. BURNS ET AL., EXERCISES AND PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY (1994).
56. For an example of dissent, see Michelle S. Jacobs, People from the Footnotes: The Missing
Element in Client-Centered Counseling, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 345, 384-91 (1997).
57. Critical scholars attack the claim of colorblind negotiation. See, e.g., Richard Delgado et al.,
Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS.
L. REV. 1359, 1375-83 (examining theories of prejudice and its relation to alternative dispute resolu-
tion); Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545,
1579-81 (1991) (explicating subordinate status of black women in mediation proceedings).
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policy, but also factual guilt and innocence. The content of those narra-
tives may veer from the covert, color-coded expression of racial animus 8
to the overt race-conscious assertion of invidious stereotypes. 9
The third assumption refers to the neutral quality of adversarial
representation. Here, neutrality differs from nonpartisanship. By any
measure, partisanship and moral nonaccountability remain the twin bench-
marks of the adversarial system.6 Lawyers continue to serve as partisan
representatives of assumed causes, steadfast yet often unaccountable to
client, court, and public-at-large. Nonetheless, the qualities of neutrality
persist, adorning the adversarial process procedurally and spatially. Even
in hard fought court contests, lawyers strive to maintain a ritual pretense
of race-neutrality. The procedures governing trial and appellate practice-
pleadings, motions, hearings-encourage this pretense. The physical set-
ting of the courtroom-the symmetry of counsel tables and the umpireal
distance of the bench and jury box-spatially reinforces the image of even-
handed neutrality.
Each of the above assumptions carries a reasoned explanation that
rationalizes racialized modes of civil and criminal advocacy as either
natural or necessary. Several logics support the invocation of a naturalist
and a necessitarian justification for these assumptions. They include the
logic of objectivity, the logic of form, and the logic of process. Depending
on context, the logics may overlap or shift in emphasis as they play out in
lawyer argument, judicial reasoning, and media commentary.
The logic of objectivity ties racialized narrative to empirical fact. This
correlation suggests that a racialized narrative merely describes a naturally
racialized world. Description in this sense implies a value-neutral activity
undisturbed by the tricks of emotion or cognition. Coolly dispassionate
acts of description, it is said, render the world of race out there discover-
able and verifiable.
The logic of form equates racialized narrative with overt bias and
prejudice. The gravamen of this claim is discriminatory intent, deliberately
manifest and invidious. Without evidence of this requisite intent, there is
no bias. Forging a link between intentional discrimination and racialized
narrative limits the regulatory scope of lawyering and ethics standards to
only demonstrably conscious forms of bias and prejudice. To cabin the
58. Racial animus may animate expressions in the law and in the media. See Christo Lassiter, The
O.J. Simpson Verdict: A Lesson in Black and White, I MICH. J. RACE & L. 69, 69-83 (1996).
59. On the systematic use of negative racial stereotypes in the criminal justice system, see JODY
DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN
AMERICA 42-43 (1997).
60. See LUBAN, supra note 9, at 7, 12, 393-403 (examining the normative underpinnings of par-
tisanship and nonaccountability claims); see also Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and
Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV. 669, 673 (1978) (tracing moral nonaccountability claims
to the adversarial system).
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regulation of the lawyering process in this manner leaves unconscious or
uncorroborated forms of bias and prejudice wholly beyond the reach of
court supervision and sanction. The same equation precludes the recogni-
tion and regulation of unconscious bias or prejudice exhibited in racially
disparate policies and practices.
The logic of process associates racialized narrative with instrumental
forces outside the law and the adversarial system. According to this logic,
it is unruly external forces-politics, economics, culture, and society-that
intrude upon the neutrality of the law and the legal process, deforming the
field in search of certain racial end-results. The presumption at work here
is that the internal structure of the law-its rules, agents, and institutions-
harbors a race-free, or at least race-neutral, environment. The received
legitimacy of the rule of law under the regime of liberal legalism hinges on
the maintenance of that environment.
Having sorted out the logics of objectivity, form, and process, turn
now to their deployment under naturalist and necessitarian advocacy
rationales. A naturalistic justification of racialized advocacy relies heavily
on appeals to objectivity and form. For the naturalist, race and racial
hierarchy constitute incontrovertible facts of the sociolegal world.
Evidentiary assertion of "race facts" in the different forms of advocacy-
pleadings, trial arguments, appellate briefs-is not just warranted,
therefore, but compelled.
The command of competent representation fuels the sense of com-
pelled racialized advocacy. At the same time, it threatens zealous
overreaching. Prevention of incompetent or overzealous forms of advocacy
hangs on the purportedly self-correcting mechanisms of the adversarial
process.61 Among the mechanisms intended to safeguard the adversarial
process from excess and inadequacy, two stand out in abstract, formalist
terms: bar discipline and court sanction.6' Unsurprisingly, neither bar
disciplinary archives nor court sanction records evince a widespread
intolerance of racialized advocacy in concrete, everyday practice.63
61. For a critique of the institutional context of the adversarial process for failing to engender and
to enforce desirable ethical norms, see David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating Lanyers
After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1145 (1993); David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate
Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1992) [hereinafter Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?.
62. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 65-83 (1990).
63. For extensive discussion of the regulatory failure to deter racism, sexism, and ethnic bias in
the legal profession, see Andrew E. Taslitz & Sharon Styles-Anderson, Still Officers of the Court: Why
the First Amendment Is No Bar to Challenging Racism, Sexism and Ethnic Bias in the Legal Profession,
9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 781 (1996); see also Sheri Lynn Johnson, Racial Imagery in Criminal Cases,
67 TULANE L. REV. 1739, 1790-92 (1993) (finding meager evidence of professional discipline for
lawyer use of racial imagery and stereotypes in the courtroom). Compare Eva S. Nilsen, The Criminal
Defense Lawyer's Reliance on Bias and Prejudice, 8 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (1994) (defending
criminal lawyers' use of bias and prejudice as a legitimate form of aggressive advocacy).
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Disapproval of this sort would seem to defy the process-based mandate of
competent representation. Derived from a modernist sensibility,' the
naturalistic defense of racialized narratives springs from faith in the
condition of objectivity, the purity of form, and the perfectibility of
process.
A necessitarianjustification, by comparison, rests more extensively on
corrupted process values in defending racialized advocacy. Driven by the
imperatives of the adversarial system, those values harness the associated
logics of objectivity and form to advance the goals of representation, even
if the end goals suffer from race-infected motive. This harnessing corrupts
objectivity and reduces form to an instrumental function.
To the necessitarian, objectivity operates in a weak sense specific to
the legal system. This situated sense of objectivity initially comes from
rival proffers of and objections to evidence. Deficiencies in witness
recollection and record preservation, inconsistent rules of admission, and
the ad hoc determinations of local triers of fact all work to enhance the
sense of closed courtroom objectivity. Imbued by this sensibility, lawyers
rebuff claims of true objectivity, implicitly accepting the contingent nature
of evidentiary rulings and findings of fact.
Similarly, for the necessitarian, form fulfills a limited function
peculiar to the legal system. This performative function binds to racialized
narratives in order to carry out the substantive purposes of advocacy. At
no time do purposive advocates entertain the belief that narrative forms of
constitutional, statutory, or doctrinal law exist untainted by the racialized
norms of politics, culture, and society. To the contrary, they acknowledge
and exploit racialized norms to advance the chosen purposes of
representation. Rooted in a postmodern sensibility, the necessitarian just-
ification of racialized narratives emanates from a loss of faith in objective
judgment, ideal form, and fair process.65
Confronting the above sets of assumptions and rationales presents two
tasks. The threshold task is to demonstrate that the assumptions behind the
practices of colorblind and color-coded advocacy rest on a deeply contested
vision of racial harm and community. From there, the task is to show that
the explanations accompanying such assumptions prove too much, begging
hard questions about the proper place of racial identity and discourse in
advocacy. To an extent, the prior works in this series all square to take on
such tasks. Whether they rise to meet the challenges posed remains to be
64. On the modernist sensibility in lawyering, see Anthony V. Alfieri, Impoverished Practices,
81 GEO. L.J. 2567, 2590-2660 (1993) (providing a broad discussion of formalist and instrumentalist
visions of modem lawyering).
65. On the postmodemist stance in lawyering, see Anthony V. Alfieri, Stances, 77 CORNELL L.
REV. 1233, 1248-57 (1992).
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seen. The next Part seeks to establish the framework for assessing race
trials.
II. Race on Trial
This Part frames race trials in the context of the prosecution and
defense of racially motivated violence. The framework borrows from the
jurisprudence of Critical Race Theory, particularly the concepts of racial
identity, racialized narrative, and race-neutral representation. The
foundation for erecting this framework is American history.
The history of American law provides numerous examples of race
trials, as here oftentimes arising out of incidents of interracial violence.'
Indeed, race and law produce a volatile mix exemplified by the trials of
John Brown,67 the Scottsboro Boys ,68 and the Black Panthers .69
Although celebrated, these trials obscure the commonplace presence of race
in civil and criminal proceedings held daily in state and federal courts.
Searching the abundant field of American race-infected trial histories
leads to a confrontation with the juridical embodiments of racial identity,
racialized narrative, and race-neutral representation. Whether expressed
in word or deed, the presence of race at trial is alone insufficient for
purposes of racial demarcation. Race trials go beyond mere race talk. To
be sure, such talk is a necessary condition of race trials. An equally
important condition concerns the presence of racial status distinctions and
hierarchies. In race trials, those distinctions acquire moral relevance.
The cultural internalization of status distinctions and hierarchies, Jack
Balkin points out, "make traits morally relevant."7' The traits, he
explains, provide not only "signs of positive and negative associations" but
also "permissible proxies for inferences about character, honesty, ability,
and judgment."7 For Balkin, social and cultural "traits are morally
irrelevant only to persons not in the grip of that particular hierarchy. "I
66. See, e.g., JOHN WILLIAM SAYER, GHOST DANCING THE LAW: THE WOUNDED KNEE TRIALS
(1997).
67. See Robert A. Ferguson, Story and Transcription in the Trial of John Brown, 6 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 37 (1994) (describing Brown's trial for leading the 1859 slave revolt at Harper's Ferry).
68. See DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH (rev. ed. 1979);
JAMES GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO (1994).
69. See David N. Rosen, Rhetoric and Result in the Bobby Seale Trial, in LAW'S STORIES 110
(Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996).
70. J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2366 (1997) (emphasis in
original).
71. Id.
72. Id. Balkin adds:
A characteristic becomes "morally irrelevant" precisely when we understand the status
hierarchy it is based on to be unjust. Only then do we become embarrassed to use the
trait as a signifier of, or a proxy for, positive or negative associations. Our objection to
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Race trials highlight the moral and legal relevance of inferiority and
inferior status. To grasp this relevance, return again to Balkin's conception
of status hierarchy and its hold on "insular" low status groups.' To
Balkin, subordinate groups "suffer from any number of forms of exclusion
and separation that mark off social superiors from social inferiors-ranging
from housing patterns and membership in social organizations and family
alliances, to business contacts and the ability to form political
coalitions." 74  Within this wide range of social life, he notes, the
shared experience "is not geographical isolation, but forms of separation
and exclusion-in whatever sphere of life-that connote social
inferiority. '
By definition, then, race trials posit the moral relevance of status
hierarchy. Elaboration from this predicate requires the application of
Critical Race Theory to the practice contexts of law, legal institutions, and
sociolegal relations. Together, these contexts implicate procedural and sub-
stantive laws, judges and juries, parties, victims, and attorneys, and lastly
politics, culture, and society.
Several propositions are crucial to the application of Critical Race
Theory to practice. The first asserts the contested status of racial identity
in advocacy and in adjudication. The second points to the shifting charac-
ter of racialized narratives in the same settings. The third refers to the
competing nature of colorblind, color-coded, and color-stereotype claims
under the adversarial rubric of race-neutral representation. The next sub-
part considers the notion of racial identity.
A. Racial Identity
Law is embroiled in the politics of identity.76 It names parties,
defines their speech and conduct, and assigns their rights and duties. Its
judgments declare, enjoin, and award the tangible and the intangible
benefits of race and racial privilege. Legal judgments of identity originate
in constitutional norms, statutory standards, and common law rules,
gradually developing through case-by-case adjudication. Discourses of
the moral relevance of the characteristic is really our objection to the system of social
meanings and the hierarchy of social status that uses this trait as a criterion for judgment.
Id. at 2366-67.
73. See id. at 2372 (relating insularity "to the various and mutually supporting forms of social
division that simultaneously symbolize, enact, and reinforce social superiority and inferiority" (footnote
omitted)).
74. 1d.
75. Id.
76. On the politics of identity in advocacy and adjudication, see MARTHA MINOW, NOT ONLY FOR
MYSELF: IDENTITY, POLMCS, AND THE LAW (1997); Martha Minow, Not Only for Myself: Identity,
Politics, and Law, 75 OR. L. REV. 647 (1996).
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constitutionalism, legislation, and the common law construct identity in
terms of color and community.
The colors of black and white dominate liberal legal discourse.
Pronouncements of racial identity in law' and legal scholarship advert
not only to the colors of black and white but to the categories of blac-
kness and whiteness.78 Consolidated in the black-white dichotomy,79
those references flow from essentialist practices of social and cultural
construction.A0
The sociolegal construction of race is intimately tied to color.81
Symbolic of difference and hierarchy, color permits the "naturalization of
racial distinctions."' Nathaniel Gates addresses the "process of
differentiation" under the black-white dichotomy.' Citing the "binary
opposition" of color, he maintains that the counterposition of the "deviant
77. Juridical pronouncements of racial identity often take the form of classification. See, e.g.,
Gabriel J. Chin, The Plessy Myth: Justice Harlan and the Chinese Cases, 82 IOWA L. REV. 151, 173-
74 (1996); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Destabilizing Racial Classifications Based on Insights Gleaned from
Trademark Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 887, 895-903 (1996).
78. See ArielaJ. Gross, "Like Master, Like Man": Constructing Whiteness in the Commercial Law
of Slavery, 1800-1861, 18 CARDOZO L. REv. 263, 265-66 (1996); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as
Property, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1707 (1993). See generally CRITICAL WHITrE STUDIES: LOOKING
BEHIND THE MIRROR (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1997). Legal scholars allude
increasingly to racial identity in autobiography. See, e.g., JUDY SCALES-TRENT, NOTES OF A WHrrE
BLACK WOMAN (1995).
79. On the advent of the black-white paradigm, see Juan Perea, The Black-White Binary Paradigm
of Race: The "Normal Science" of American Racial Thought, 85 CAL. L. REV. 127 (1997); Francisco
Valdes, Latinafo Ethnicities, Critical Race Theory, and Post-Identity Politics in Postmodern Legal
Culture: From Practices to Possibilities, 9 LA RAZA L.J. 1, 5-7 (1996) (citing the exclusion of
Latina/o, Asian-American, and Native American experiences from Critical Race Theory).
80. On essentialist practices of social construction, see IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW
(1996); Paula C. Johnson, The Social Construction of Identity in Criminal Cases: Cinema Veritg and
the Pedagogy of Vincent Chin, I MICH. J. RACE & L. 347 (1996) (discussing the social construction
of Asian-Americans). On essentialist practices of cultural construction, see L. Amede Obiora, Bridges
and Barricades: Rethinking Polemics andIntransigence in the Campaign Against Female Circumcision,
47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 275,279, 292-98 (1997) (noting that "the individual's formation of a sense
of humanity, self, and identity is invariably contingent on a cultural context"); see also Leti Volpp,
(Mis)identfying Culture: Asian Women and the "Cultural Defense", 17 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57, 64-
73 (1994) (addressing legal construction of Asian-American women as the "other"); Colin Webster,
The Construction of British 'Asian' Criminality, 25 INT'L J. SOC. L. 65 (1997) (discussing popular dis-
cursive construction of young Asian masculine criminality in British localities).
81. See D. Marvin Jones, Darkness Made Visible: Law, Metaphor, and the Racial Self, 82 GEO.
L.J. 437, 471-78 (1993) (explicating the American lexicon of blackness); Nancy Shoemaker, How
Indians Got to Be Red, 102 AM. HIST. REV. 625, 643-44 (1997) (noting the cultural construction of
physical racial differences and categories under changing political and social alignments).
82. E. Nathaniel Gates, Estranged Fruit: The Reconstruction Amendments, Moral Slavery, and the
Rearticulation of Lesbian and Gay Identity, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 845, 854 (1996); see also id.
(remarking that in seventeenth and eighteenth century America "variations in culture, coloration, and
other physical attributes were progressively seized upon as a means of social differentiation between
what subsequently became the 'white' and 'black' populations" (footnotes omitted)).
83. Id. at 855.
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'black"' against the "normative 'white"' engenders "a sense of 'natural' or
inherent otherness."' For Gates, the naturalization of the racial
other in American history "served to justify an escalation of the degree of
dominion exercised over all persons of African extraction."' That
dominion continues in the identity judgment of inherent black criminality.
The judgment of black criminality stems from color-coded inferences
and color-conscious stereotypes about racial community. The inferences
and stereotypes join to effect a kind of "conceptual liquidation" of
identity. 6 Liquidation obliterates individual qualities in favor of general
group traits, promoting a conformity of expectation and behavior. The
notion of "conforming nonlitigants" put forward by Christopher Peters
elucidates this tendency.' , Peters explains that "[n]onlitigants who
conform to a court-created rule imagine themselves to be litigants who will
be bound by that rule."88 When blacks, particularly young black males,
conform to the norm of criminality, they do so precisely because they ima-
gine themselves one day to be defendants who will be bound by it. This
normatively bounded quality persists even though the norm itself spawns
contradictory "double narratives" of racial defiance and deviance.89
Those narratives and their corresponding imagery saturate the discourse of
racialized criminal court advocacy. Yet, here the norm at issue is not
merely court-created. It is a state-wide norm manufactured by the agents
and institutions of the criminal justice system. Conformity in this sense
implies nothing like a predisposition to commit criminal acts or even
historical evidence of such acts. Rather, conformity suggests that blacks
recognize and accommodate the norms of a criminal justice system
antagonistic to their rights and interests. Accommodation signifies both
white power and black resistance. The tensions accompanying the histori-
cal white-black accommodationist dynamic infect public policy, theology,
and education. The literature of Critical Race Theory attests to the com-
plex dynamic of power and resistance in circumstances of racial
accommodation.
84. Id. at 852; see also id. at 855 (commenting that the "notion of a 'natural' racial group rests
upon the ideological postulation that there are certain closed units, that are essentially endo-determined
and dissimilar to other social units").
85. Id. at 855; see also THE JUDICIAL ISOLATION OF THE "RACIALLY" OPPRESSED (E. Nathaniel
Gates ed., 1997).
86. See Lynette Seccombe Eastland, Defending Identity: Courage and Compromise in Radical
Right Contexts, in CASE STUDIES IN COMMUNICATION AND DISENFRANCHISEMENT: APPLICATIONS TO
SOCIAL HEALTH ISSUES 3, 13 n.2 (Eileen Berlin Ray ed., 1996) (describing the campaign of the con-
servative and religious right to define gay men and lesbians "out of existence").
87. Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 312, 372 (1997).
88. Id. (emphasis in original).
89. Alfieri, supra note 2, at 1309.
90. Accommodations obtained through minority strategies of resistance to white power may be
found in policies of immigration, religious exercise, and legal training. The strategies alternately
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Faced with individual and community strategies of racial
accommodation, identity judgments grow suspect. For individual litigants,
identity slips into a public-private dichotomy of the self.91 Under this
well-settled liberal dichotomy, the public self spills into controversy, while
the private self remains cloistered. Juridical pronouncements of identity
seem riven by this distinction. Issued by judges and lawyers, the
pronouncements suggest litigant nonintegration. The legal experience of
nonintegration is marked by the suspension or loss of self-identity, a loss
indicative of modern-postmodern turmoil over the subject.' Modernist
jurisprudence celebrates litigants as liberal subjects endowed with free will.
Postmodernist jurisprudence countenances a curtailed sense of free-
wheeling liberal subjectivity, citing the impediments of cognition,
discourse, and social structure.
The turmoil spawned by the law-induced splintering of the public-
private self clouds the meaning of individual and collective client identity
in advocacy. Consider the categories of identity at play in the law. Take,
for example, the core categories of race, gender, ethnicity, sexual
orientation, and disability. Each of these categories suffers from the
interpretive strain of public-private division. Lawyers impose this division
on clients to facilitate the pleading and proof of claims. For clients acting
out this logic in the civil or criminal justice system, the public self may
acknowledge guilt, while the private self may proclaim innocence.
Lost in this dichotomy is the multifaceted quality of litigant
identity. By all counts, identity entails a process of self-imagination
encompassing the above-mentioned multiple categories. The
categories overlap, combining gender and race;93 gender, race, and
acquiesce in, exploit, and oppose white power structures in law, politics, and society. See Gabriel J.
Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New Look at the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REV. 273,279-97 (1996); Allison M. Dussias, Ghost Dance and
Holy Ghost: The Echoes of Nineteenth-Century Christianization Policy in Twentieth-Century Native
American Free Exercise Cases, 49 STAN. L. REV. 773, 787-805 (1997); Gloria Valencia-Weber, Law
School Training of American Indians as Legal-Warriors, 20 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 5 (1995-1996).
91. See generally Symposium, The Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289 (1982).
92. Pierre Schlag nicely grasps this sense of turmoil. He writes:
Recent questioning of the identity and ontological status of the liberal individual subject-
what many of us call simply "the self"-has produced strong reactions in some quarters
of the American legal academy. Various poststructuralist arguments have been received
as threats to liquidate the autonomous individual subject. Indeed, poststructuralist
arguments are received as assaults not just on the idea, but on the very sense of self.
Pierre Schlag, Law as the Continuation of God by Other Means, 85 CAL. L. REV. 427, 434 (1997).
93. See Bethany Ruth Berger, After Pocahontas: Indian Women and the Law, 1830-1934,21 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 1 (1997); Cheryl I. Harris, Finding Sojourner's Truth: Race, Gender, and the
Institution of Property, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 309, 328, 328-43 (1996); Joan R. Tarpley, Blackwomen,
Sexual Myth, and Jurisprudence, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1343 (1996); Floyd D. Weatherspoon, Remedying
Employment Discrimination Against African-American Males: Stereotypical Biases Engender a Case
of Race Plus Sex Discrimination, 36 WASHBURN L.J. 23, 27-41 (1996).
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ethnicity; 4 gender, race, and class;' race and sexuality;96 race and
disability;' and, moreover, national origin.98  This overlap and
multiplicity discloses the ambiguity and slippage of identity classifications
in the law. 9  The contingent character of identity relates to the
indeterminacy of identity classifications. " Indeterminacy flourishes
under liberal regimes struggling against multiculturalism 0 l because the
boundary lines of identity categories shift continuously in response to the
emerging visibility of cultural difference'02  and the ensuing
negotiation0 3 and articulation 1"4 of the meaning of difference outside
94. SeeBertaEsperanzaHernandez-TruyolLasOlvidadas-GenderedinJustice/GenderedInustice:
Latinas, Fronteras and the Law, 1 J. GENDER, RACE & JUsTICE (forthcoming 1998); Margaret E.
Montoya, Mascaras, Trenzas, y Grenas: Un/Masking the Self While Un/Braiding Latina Stories and
Legal Discourse, 17 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 185 (1994) (describing the multiple identities of a Latina
lawyer).
95. See Patricia Hagler Minter, The Failure of Freedom: Class, Gender, and the Evolution of
Segregated Transit Law in the Nineteenth-Century South, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 993 (1995).
96. See Kenneth L. Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and Group Portraits of Race and Sexual
Orientation, 43 UCLA L. REv. 263, 282-322 (1995); Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Equal Protection
Analogies-Identity and "Passing": Race and Sexual Orientation, 13 HARV. BLACKLErrER J. 65, 69
(1997) (discerning the interrelationships of various types of oppression).
97. See Theresa Glennon, Race, Education, and the Construction of a Disabled Class, 1995 Wis.
L. REV. 1237, 1334 (contending that "[t]he formation of an identity as disabled is powerfully affected
by race"); see also Wendy E. Parmet & Daniel J. Jackson, No Longer Disabled: The Legal Impact of
the New Social Construction of HIV, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 9-12, 27-29 (1997) (describing the
popular construction of HIV-infected communities).
98. See Stephen Shie-Wei Fan, Immigration Law and the Promise of Critical Race Theory:
Opening the Academy to the Voices of Aliens and Immigrants, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1202, 1223-32
(1997) (exploring the interplay of racism and nativism); Adrien Katherine Wing, A Critical Race
Feminist Conceptualization of Violence: South African and Palestinian Women, 60 ALB. L. REV. 943,
954-65 (1997) (examining the effects of race, gender, and national origin on Palestinian and South
African women); see also Earl M. Maltz, Citizenship and the Constitution: A History and Critique of
the Supreme Court's Alienage Jurisprudence, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1135, 1148-62 (1996) (discussing
classical juridical construction of alien citizenship).
99. See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Equal Protection and the Special Relationship: The Case of Native
Hawaiians, 106 YALE L.J. 537, 569-71 (1996) (noting ambiguity in the definitional character of politi-
cal and racial classifications of Native Hawaiians).
100. Other disciplines find the contingent or indeterminate state of identity to be unsurprising.
See Morton Schoolman, Toward a Politics of Darkness: Individuality and Its Politics in Adorno's
Aesthetics, 25 POL. THEORY 57, 90 (1997) (explaining Adorno's concept of a contingent or indetermin-
ate state of identity).
101. See Robert J. Lipkin, Can Liberalism Justify Multiculturalism?, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 34
(1997) (describing the culture of liberalism and its production of an unguided "structure of choice").
102. See Juan F. Perea, Los Olvidados: On the Making of Invisible People, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV.
965 (1995) (describing the cultural construction of ethno-racial identity in response to shifting group
visibility and invisibility).
103. See Barbara Yngvesson, Negotiating Motherhood: Identity and Difference in "Open"
Adoptions, 31 L. & Soc'Y REv. 31 (1997).
104. Differences in sexual desire and orientation, for example, receive articulation outside law in
the queer culture of gay and lesbian communities, and inside law in restrictive adoption and sodomy
statutes. See David L. Chambers, What If? The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal Needs
of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REV. 447, 449-52 (1996) (discussing the social
construction of marriage); Richard R. Cornwall, Deconstructing Silence: The Queer Political Economy
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and inside law. Part of this fluctuation may be attributed to positive
law, part to historical circumstance. 15 Part also may be due to the
changing contours of narrative. The next subpart examines racialized
narrative.
B. Racialized Narrative
Racialized narratives are found in the decisional law of statutory1' 6
and constitutional texts."°  They inform social policy'08  and the
politics of law. 1 9  Despite a burgeoning of stories and narra-
tives in law,"10 turbulence persists over the meaning of race in
legal discourse,' and the place of racial voice,'' 2 story,'' 3
of the Social Articulation of Desire, 29 REV. RADICAL POL. ECON. 1, 66-80 (1997) (addressing the
cultural construction of homosexuality).
105. The history of same-sex marriage touches both elements. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.,
THE CASE FOR SAME SEX MARRIAGE 15-50 (1996) (tracing the history of same-sex unions and their
societal acceptance).
106. See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (3d rev. ed. 1974)
(cataloguing court-sanctioned statutory restrictions placed on African-Americans in the early twentieth
century); April L. Cherry, Social Contract Theory, Welfare Reform, Race, and the Male Sex-Right, 75
OR. L. REv. 1037, 1079-85 (1996) (identifying the increase of black women on AFDC as among the
factors responsible for punitive reforms); Gareth Davies & Martha Derthick, Race and Social Welfare
Policy: The Social Security Act of 1935, 112 POL. Sc!. Q. 217 (1997) (examining the connection of
race to the nationalization of Social Security); see also Paul Finkelman, "Let Justice Be Done, Though
the Heavens May Fall": The Law of Freedom, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 325, 354-57 (1994) (tracing the
adoption of the "black codes" in the post-war South).
107. See Michael O'Malley, Specie and Species: Race and the Money Question in Nineteenth-
Century America, 99 AM. Hisr. REv. 369, 391 (noting that "[tihe Constitution upheld the sanctity of
intrinsic difference when it legitimated racial slavery"); see also Lea VanderVelde & Sandhya
Subramanian, Mrs. Dred Scott, 106 YALE L.J. 1033, 1036 (1997) (demonstrating mutability of identity
classifications within constitutional advocacy and adjudication through evidence of the intersectionality
of gender and racial categories).
108. See JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE: How RACISM UNDERMINED THE WAR ON
POVERTY (1994).
109. See GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT AND
MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (1993); Richard H. Pildes, The Politics of Race, 108 HARV.
L. REV. 1359 (1995) (book review).
110. See Paul Gewirtz, Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law, in LAW'S STORIES, supra note 69, at
2.
111. Compare Mark Tushnet, The Degradation of Constitutional Discourse, 81 GEO. L.J. 251,
263-71 (1992) (expressing skepticism toward certain academic strands of narrative and storytelling),
with Gary Peller, The Discourse of Constitutional Degradation, 81 GEO. L.J. 313, 319-29 (1992)
(castigating critics of racial narratives for ideological maneuvering).
112. Compare Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques ofLegal Academia, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1745
(1989) (assailing academic and experiential claims of minority scholars to a racially distinctive voice),
with Colloquy, Responses to Randall Kennedy's Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1844 (1990) and Richard Delgado, When a Story Is Just a Story: Does Voice Really Matter?, 76
VA. L. REV. 95 (1990) (repudiating Kennedy's approach to race scholarship); see also Alex M.
Johnson, Jr., The New Voice of Color, 100 YALE L.J. 2007 (1991) (rebuffing opponents of Critical
Race Theory for applying hierarchical and majoritarian evaluative standards).
113. Compare Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on
Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807, 809 (1993) (discounting epistemological and empirical claims
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autobiography," 4  and identity"5  in that discourse. The turbulence
extends to narratives in advocacy and in adjudication.
Both advocacy and adjudication narratives declare fact and law. To
muster support, the declarations appeal to arguments from nature and
necessity. Arguments invoking a natural or a necessary narrative order of
things act to compel juridical results, whether or not legal decisionmakers
fully comprehend the situation of litigants. Toni Massaro mentions that
narratives "can be especially effective in enabling legal decisionmakers to
comprehend the situation of litigants unlike themselves."116 Conversely,
they can be equally effective in disabling decisionmakers and, thereby,
encouraging mistaken conclusions."17
In advocacy, narrative appeals come from lawyers. Wielding power
over the form, content, and sequence of narrative, they fashion arguments
out of natural and necessitarian rhetoric. This exercise of power rests on
the functionalist premise that lawyers possess unsurpassed expertise in law
and in narrative. Logically extended, this premise produces the centraliza-
tion of strategic decisionmaking power in the hands of lawyers. Their
charge is to deliver the best possible substantive outcome.
Conflating legal and narrative expertise and subsequently cabining
decisionmaking power may in fact best serve the client in obtaining sub-
stantive benefits. The delivery of benefits confers legitimacy on traditional
lawyer-client arrangements and narrative claims. However, when those
claims assert a natural state or necessary logic of racial inferiority through
of "legal storytelling" scholars), with Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories Out in School: A Reply to
Farber and Sherry, 46 VAND. L. REv. 665 (1993) (discouraging evaluative criteria and emphasizing
the difficulty in evaluating outsider scholarship).
114. Compare Anne M. Coughlin, Regulating the Self: AutobiographicalPerformances in Outsider
Scholarship, 81 VA. L. REv. 1229 (1995) (criticizing the autobiographical style of outsider
scholarship), with Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Telling a Black Legal Story: Privilege, Authenticity,
"Blunders," and Transformation in Outsider Narratives, 82 VA. L. REV. 69 (1996) (defining auto-
biography as a legitimate tool for instruction and insight into the lives of outsiders); Richard Delgado,
Coughlin's Complaint: How to Disparage Outsider Writing, One Year Later, 82 VA. L. REV. 95 (1996)
(explaining the important role of autobiography to progress in scholarship and politics); see also
Douglas E. Litowitz, Some Critical Thoughts on Critical Race Theory, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 503,
505, 520-23 (1997) (detecting "fundamental errors or confusions about the proper role of argumentation
within the law and the proper methodology of legal scholarship" embodied in the literature of Critical
Race Theory).
115. Compare Jim Chen, Unloving, 80 IOWA L. REV. 145, 149 (1994) (criticizing "racial
fundamentalism" in legal scholarship), with Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal
Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L. REv. 1241,
1245, 1245-46(1993) (announcingan "Asian American Moment" in the legal academy). See generally
Colloquy, The Scholarship of Reconstruction and the Politics of Backlash, 81 IOWA L. REv. 1467
(1996).
116. Toni M. Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick and Thin, 49 STAN. L. REV. 45, 103 (1996).
117. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Disabled Clients, Disabling Lawyers, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 769, 794-
811 (1992) (describing the intermixing of ideology and narrative in disability determinations).
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color-coded inferences or color-conscious stereotypes, they cast doubt on
the quality of racial interest representation. More specifically, they tarnish
the notion of the lawyer as a "true interest representative." " '
Interest representation in race trials requires attorney-client negotiation
of racial power and reality." 9 Narrative claims of racial inferiority
describe only a segment of that sociolegal reality. That segment is itself
vulnerable to interpretive contest. Interpretive vulnerability arises from the
socially constructed character of inferiority. Contrary to naturalistic
reasoning, narratives of racial inferiority carry no inherent meaning. What
meaning exists is constructed under a necessitarian guise. To the extent
that an alternate measure of meaning exists, call it true meaning, it lies
narrowly situated in public and private racial contexts largely inaccessible
to lawyers' ways of knowing.
The epistemological and interpretive barriers to racial understanding
foster a belief in the generalizability of black inferiority across the
landscape of individual clients and client communities." For lawyers,
judges, and other legal agents struggling with the practical exigencies of
advocacy, adjudication, and enforcement, this belief may enjoy its own
force of logic. At the same time, that logic exemplifies what Margaret
Radin calls the problem of "bad coherence.... According to Radin, this
problem surfaces when theorists endorse conceptions of truth or goodness
and their attendant value systems for reasons of coherence, but fail to
recognize that the conceptions condone pervasive systems of institutional-
ized racism or sexism.
The coherence of black inferiority narratives depends on the construc-
tion of racial character and conduct."2  Subordinating constructions of
118. The phrase belongs to Christopher Peters as applied to the context of electoral politics. See
Peters, supra note 87, at 366 (defining a "true interest representative" in terms of someone "who is
enough like them that it is probable she shares many of their core viewpoints and interests").
119. On attorney-client negotiation of power and reality, see Margaret M. Russell, Beyond
"Sellouts" and "Race Cards": Black Attorneys and the Straitjacket of Legal Practice, 95 MICH. L.
REV. 766 (1997); David B. Wilkins, Straightiacketing Professionalism: A Comment on Russell, 95
MICH. L. REV. 795 (1997). See generally William L.F. Felstiner & Austin Sarat, Enactments of
Power: Negotiating Reality and Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
1447, 1459-66 (1992); see also AUSTIN SARAT & WILLIAM L.F. FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND
THEIR CLIENTS: POWER AND MEANING IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 17-23, 53-84 (1995).
120. See Alfieri, supra note 2, at 1306-20.
121. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 29-30 (1993); see also William
A. Edmundson, The Antinomy of Coherence and Determinacy, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1, 10-19 (1996)
(dismantling coherence theories of justification).
122. See RADIN, supra note 121, at 30.
123. See HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 50, at 7-67 (tracing the history and nature of the "precept
of inferiority"); see also Reginald Leamon Robinson, The Racial Limits of the Fair Housing Act: The
Intersection ofDominant White Images, the Violence of Neighborhood Purity, and the Master Narrative
of Black Inferiority, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 69, 71-84 (1995) (showing that a "master narrative"
invokes whites' power over blacks).
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black character and conduct sometimes avoid reference to political and
socioeconomic forms of subjugation" in part out of deference to white
superiority narratives."2  This reflexive deference frequently receives
articulation in the narrative histories of race trials. John Witt comments
that "the trial history can provide a narrative that links local histories to a
broader public sphere in which issues of power and meaning are actively
negotiated."'l6 Criticism of this particularized view has been lately heard
elsewhere.1"7 Witt acknowledges as much, conceding that while narrative
histories "contribute enormously to our understanding of particular
collections of people at particular moments, they may leave us with a series
of abstracted, unconnected stories that cannot link the particular to the
general.""2 The larger answer to that criticism depends on the discovery
of a common cord connecting racialized trial stories, a cord traceable
through historical periods of changing racial status representation. The
next subpart explores the historical configuration of race-neutral
representation.
C. Race-Neutral Representation
The claim of race-neutral representation derives from the principle of
neutrality in adjudication. 29 Central to Legal Process theories of
124. See Regina Austin, The Black Public Sphere and Mainstream Majoritarian Politics, 50 VAND.
L. REV. 339, 345 (1997) ("A complete understanding of the mechanisms by which blackness is tied
to and associated with socioeconomic inferiority is crucial to comprehending the political importance
of the black public sphere and to effectuating blacks' notions of the good life.").
125. Racialized superiority narratives reinforce forms of socioeconomic subjugation. See Kathleen
Neal Cleaver, The Antidemocratic Power of Whiteness, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1375, 1376-77 (1995)
(reviewing DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE
AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (1991)).
126. John F. Witt, Book Note, The Klan on Trial, 106 YALE L.J. 1611, 1611 (1997) (reviewing
Lou FALKNER WILLIAMS, THE GREAT SOUTH CAROLINA KU KLUX KLAN TRIALS, 1871-1872(1996)).
127. See Joel F. Handler, Postmodernism, Protest, and the New Social Movements, 26 L. & SOC'Y
REV. 697, 712-16 (1992) (noting the scholarly tendency to atomize and isolate individual stories rather
than connect such stories to larger movements or collective identities).
128. Witt, supra note 126, at 1615. Witt asserts:
The trial narrative has the potential to resolve the problem of parochialism in local
narrative. To be sure, a potential for distortion necessarily accompanies attempts to
extrapolate broad conclusions from narrow premises, and the trial history cannot entirely
avoid this danger. Yet the trial narrative has a double capacity to describe history's
particularities while mediating between the particular and the general because it tells a
local story at a cultural space in which the central concern is the negotiation of political
power broadly construed.
Id.
129. Compare Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 26-35 (1959) (criticizing the Supreme Court for failing to adjudicate neutrally in segregation
cases), with Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421
(1960) (endorsing the Court's segregation decisions), and Louis H. Pollack, Racial Discrimination and
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adjudication 3 ' noteworthy in the field of federal jurisdiction,'3 the
neutrality principle anchors the liberal vision of the rule of law.' This
colorblind vision animates Anglo-American jurisprudence. 33  Current
debates in legal scholarship reflect the continuing vitality of that vision,"
in spite of the protests of Critical Race theorists. 35
The renewed controversy engulfing the colorblind vision of neutrality
in adjudication 36 and in legislation37 signals the revival of the Legal
Process movement.138  That controversy pertains directly to the lawyering
process and its transformative potential. Brian Leiter mentions that
relevance in gleaning "a certain long-standing attitude towards lawyering"
from the writings of the Legal Process school. 13  The attitude translates
into a race-neutral stance toward advocacy.
Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 33 (1959) ("[Jludicial
neutrality... does not preclude the disciplined exercise... of [a] Justice's individual and strongly
held philosophy.").
130. Modem Legal Process theories of adjudication derive principally from the writings of Henry
Hart and Albert Sacks. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERTM. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey
eds., 1994); Anthony J. Sebok, Reading The Legal Process, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1571 (1996) (book
review).
131. The Legal Process theory of jurisdiction comes from the work of Henry Hart and Herbert
Wechsler. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM (1953); Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, 102 HARV. L. REV. 688 (1989) (reviewing
PAUL M. BATOR, Er AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
(3d ed. 1988)).
132. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 18-21 (1997) (summarizing various neutrality-oriented conceptions undergirding
Legal Process scholarship).
133. See Barry Friedman, Neutral Principles: A Retrospective, 50 VAND. L. REv. 503, 507-25
(1997); Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950's, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 561 (1988); see also
G. Edward White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social
Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279, 290 (1973) (equating institutional conservatism of Legal Process ideals
with political conservatism in the area of race relations).
134. See Mary I. Coombs, Outsider Scholarship: The Law Review Stories, 63 U. COLO. L. REv.
683 (1992) (contrasting traditional neutrality-oriented legal scholarship with outsider scholarship);
Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship, 80 CAL. L. REV.
889, 891 (1992) (discussing the treatment of scholarship "grounded on the phenomenologicalexperience
of the individual evaluator").
135. See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Narrative and Giving Content to the Voice
of Color: Rejecting the Imposition of Process Theory in Legal Scholarship, 79 IOWA L. REV. 803, 822-
30 (1994).
136. See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind", 44 STAN. L. REV. 1
(1991).
137. See Neil Gotanda, Failure ofthe Color-Blind Vision: Race, Ethnicity, andthe California Civil
Rights Initiative, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1135, 1138-41 (1996).
138. See Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the
Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1393, 1403-11 (1996); Edward L. Rubin, Legal
Reasoning, Legal Process and the Judiciary as an Institution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 265, 271-78 (1997)
(reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT (1996)).
139. See Brian Leiter, Is There an 'American' Jurisprudence?, 17 OXFoRD J. LEGAL STUD. 367,
379 (1997) (reviewing NEIL DUXBURY, PATrERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1995)).
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The stance of race-neutrality inspired by the Legal Process movement
confers legitimacy on the colorblind practice of advocacy. Legal Process
theory offers legitimacy in both strong and weak senses. The strong sense
involves client engagement in a participatory process of strategic decision-
making guided by the liberal axiom of autonomy."n In this sense, client
participation serves as a democracy-promoting device consistent with the
process ideal of reasoned deliberation.' 4' The weak sense entails client
inclusion in communication sufficient to establish the objectives of
representation. In this limited sense, client participation works as a goal-
checking mechanism in accord with the process ideal of informed
consent.4a The next subpart reviews the additional contextual factors
shaping race trials.
D. Race-ing Factors
To move ahead in the definitional assembly of race trials, the theoreti-
cal backdrop of racial identity, racialized narrative, and race-neutral
representation must be set down against the practical contexts of law, legal
institutions, and sociolegal relations. The grounded contexts of practice
implicate procedural and substantive laws, judges and juries, parties,
victims, and attorneys, and finally, politics, culture, and society.
1. Race-ed Law.-Law is race-ed in the texts of speech and conduct.
Race inscribes oral and written texts. Additionally, it scripts social texts.
Both procedural and substantive law give meaning to race trials. That
meaning comes from narrative. 1"' Substantive law stocks the ingredients
of racialized narrative. Consider the field of civil rights law. In
employment discrimination, for example, doctrinal narratives unleash
traded accusations of racial animus and race-inferred occupational
inadequacy.'" 4 Similarly, in the field of criminal law, doctrinal narra-
tives speak of racial guilt and innocence as well as racial mercy and
desert. 145
In the same way, procedural law supplies racialized narrative. The
rules governing class actions, for example, deal with the commonality of
racial community and the adequacy of racial representation. Hansberry v.
140. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) cmt. (1997).
141. On the operation of democracy-promotingdevices, see Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court
1995 Term-Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 27 (1996).
142. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4(b) cmt. (1997).
143. See Jane B. Baron & Julia Epstein, Is Law Narrative?, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 141 (1997).
144. See BARBARA J. FLAGG, WAS BLIND, BUT NOW I SEE: WHITE RACE CONSCIOUSNESS AND
THE LAW 39-65, 117-48 (1998).
145. See PAUL HARRIS, BLACK RAGE CONFRONTS THE LAW 59-80, 12546 (1997).
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Lee, " an acutely formalistic opinion on the preclusive effect of state
court judgments enforcing racially restrictive covenants, marks an early
realization of the discontinuities of racial community and the conflicts of
racial representation. 47 Narratives of racial discontinuity and interest
conflict also emerge in the rules regulating intervention.s Here again,
consider Martin v. Wilks. Despite evidence of shared history, geography,
and occupation, Wilks finds no ground for establishing common racial
interest or representation between black and white firefighters, whether
designated as original parties or proposed intervenors.
With regard to procedural and substantive rules, lawyers join legisla-
tors and judges in race-ing law. Lawyers' motives, however, may be more
profoundly mixed. For their motivation may stem from rent-seeking'49
and justice-seeking 5 ' impulses. Either impulse may contribute to doc-
trinal development. Yet that development is constrained by the findings
and conclusions of judges and juries.
2. Race of Judges and Juries.-The race of judges and the racial
composition of juries contribute to the meaning of race trials. The
literature of judging often focuses on ideology,"1 rather than race. When
racial identity is brought forward,'52 discussion tends toward substantive
preference 53 or bias. 1" But little is said of either racial identity, and
its derivative ethic, or of emotion in judging. 55 Even the significant
work of feminist theorists in developing an ethic of care in judging grants
146. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
147. Hansberry suggests that the white-black schism undermines cross-racial representation of a
racially distinct class. See Allen R. Kamp, The History Behind Hansberry v. Lee, 20 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 481, 496-98 (1987).
148. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24.
149. See Frank B. Cross, The Role of Lawyers in Positive Theories of Doctrinal Evolution, 45
EMORY L.J. 523, 527 (1996) (assessing doctrinal impact of lawyer financial interests).
150. See JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS
FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1994) (describing racial justice-based litigation strategies
of civil rights lawyers throughout the mid- to late-twentieth century.
151. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADjUDICATION: FIN DE SIECLE (1997); Duncan
Kennedy, Strategizing Strategic Behavior in Legal Interpretation, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 785; Duncan
Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication:A Critical Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518
(1986).
152. See, e.g., Mark V. Tushnet, The Jurisprudence of ThurgoodMarshall, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv.
1129; Thomas M. Uhlman, Black Elite Decision Making: The Case of Trial Judges, 22 AM. J. POL.
SCi. 884 (1978); Susan Welch et al., Do Black Judges Make a Difference?, 32 AM. J. POL. SCI. 126
(1988).
153. See Penda D. Hair, Justice Blackmun and Racial Justice, 104 YALE L.J. 7, 7 (1994)
(discussing the impact of Justice Blackmun's "struggle for racial justice").
154. See Martha Minow, Stripped Down Like a Runner or Enriched by Experience: Bias and
Impartiality of Judges and Jurors, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1201 (1992).
155. See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, Emotion in the Language of Judging, 70 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 23 (1996); Benjamin Zipursky, Deshaney and Jurisprudence of Compassion, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1101 (1990).
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meager attention to the subject of race. '56  Oddly, the feminist call for
degendering the ethic of care through "the extension of its norms and
prescriptions to men as well as to women and to the traditionally male
domains of our social world"'57 overlooks the equally important task of
race-ing or derace-ing that ethic. This oversight seems doubly perplexing
because racialized compassion may kindle political attack.' 8
Litigants, by contrast, seem keenly aware of the pivotal role of a
racialized judicial ethic in the determination of outcomes. That awareness
shaped post-Brown school desegregation strategy' 9 and even now influ-
ences litigation tactics, for instance in voting rights cases.'6 Litigant
belief in a racialized ethic of judging seems unshaken by the apparent
weakening of the criminal-civil distinction in applicable forms of punish-
ment and procedure, 16' though the belief appears counterintuitive in
certain state settings. 62
The literature on juries also discloses strong litigant views on the
subject of racialized judgment.'6  Recent calls for jury reform'" show
that the meaning of the representative jury in a multicultural society is
sharply contested.' s Diversity is at the crux of the contests over the
meaning of jury representation.' 6 Yet it is a diversity of black and
156. See Martha L. Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, Passion for Justice, 10 CARDOzO L. REV.
37 (1988); Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our Judges,
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877 (1988); Robin L. West, Justice and Care, 70 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 31 (1996).
157. Alisa L. Carse & Hilde Lindemann Nelson, Rehabilitating Care, 6 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS
J. 19, 32 (1996).
158. See Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice Be Done Amid Efforts
to Intimidate and Remove Judgesfrom Office for UnpopularDecisions?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 308, 312-
24 (1997). See generally Symposium, On Judicial Independence, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 703 (1997).
159. See J.W. PELTASON, 58 LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION (1978).
160. See Michael E. Solimine, The Three-Judge District Court in Voting Rights Litigation, 30 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 79, 101-04 (1996).
161. See Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil
Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 782-97 (1997) (reviewing challenges to the criminal-civil
distinction).
162. See Herbert Jacob, The Governance of Trial Judges, 31 L. & SOC'Y REV. 3 (1997).
163. See, e.g., Andrew G. Deiss, Negotiating Justice: The Criminal Trial Jury in a Pluralist
America, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 323 (1996) (discussing justifications for a racially
representative jury).
164. See, e.g., Douglas G. Smith, The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform, 25
HOFsrTA L. REV. 377 (1996) (proposing various reforms in the selection, conduct, and powers of
juries).
165. See, e.g., Douglas Gary Lichtman, The Deliberative Lottery: A Thought Experiment in Jury
Reform, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 133 (1996) (outlining a proportional jury voting scheme); Tanya E.
Coke, Note, Lady Justice May Be Blind, But Is She a Soul Sister? Race Neutrality and the Ideal of
Representative Juries, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 327 (1994) (describing the Supreme Court's retreat from
the ideal of the representative jury).
166. See Kenneth S. Klein, Unpacking the Jury Box, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1328-34 (1996)
(assessing the impact of diversity upon the predictability and perceived legitimacy of jury verdicts).
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white, historically a diversity juxtaposing black innocence and white
judgment. 167  Developments in the law governing jury selection
procedures, 68 particularly concerning the use of peremptory
challenges, 169  highlight the enduring presence of a black-white
dichotomy. That dichotomy pervades the Supreme Court's decision in
Batson v. Kentucky 7 ' and its racial progeny.7' and pushes remedial dis-
cussion toward colorblind procedures' 72 and racial quotas.7
Neither colorblind nor racialized remedies seem likely to enhance jury-
defined truth'74 nor to improve juror conduct in matters of
delinquency or nullification. 76  The remedies in fact seem more
167. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Blacklnnocenceandthe White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1611,1616-
51 (1985) (surveying the research data on jury racial prejudice).
168. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory
Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153 (1989); Jeffrey S. Brand, The
Supreme Court, Equal Protection, and Jury Selection: Denying That Race Still Matters, 1994 Wis. L.
REV. 511.
169. See Shed Lynn Johnson, The Language and Culture (Not to Say Race) of Peremptory
Challenges, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 21 (1993); Kenneth B. Nunn, Rights Held Hostage: Race,
Ideology and the Peremptory Challenge, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 63 (1993); Charles J. Ogletree,
Just Say No!: A Proposal to Eliminate Racially Discriminatory Uses of Peremptory Challenges, 31 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 1099 (1994).
170. 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (invalidating race-based peremptory challenges); see also Jere W.
Morehead, When a Peremptory Challenge Is No Longer Peremptory: Batson's Unfortunate Failure to
Eradicate Invidious Discrimination from Jury Selection, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 625 (1994) (calling for
the elimination of peremptory challenges).
171. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995) (per curiam) (approving allegedly race-neutral
explanations for peremptory strikes that are neither persuasive nor even plausible); Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (extending Batson to civil trials); Stephen R. Diprima,
Note, Selecting a Jury in Federal Criminal Trials After Batson and McCollum, 95 CoLUM. L. REV.
888 (1995) (urging increased scrutiny of peremptory challenge explanations).
172. See Susan N. Herman, Why the Court Loves Batson: Representation-Reinforcement,
Colorblindness, and the Jury, 67 TUL. L. REv. 1807 (1993); Jean Montoya, The Future of the Post-
Batson Peremptory Challenge: Voir Dire by Questionnaire and the "Blind" Peremptory, 29 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 981 (1996); Pam Frasher, Note, Fulfilling Batson and Its Progeny: A Proposed
Amendment to Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to Attain a More Race- and Gender-
Neutral Jury Selection Process, 80 IOwA L. REV. 1327 (1995).
173. See Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Quotas and the Jury, 44 DuKE L.J. 704 (1995).
174. Remedial futility notwithstanding, colorblind and color-conscious prescriptions continue to
be advanced. See Franklin Strier, Making Jury Trials More Truthful, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 95
(1996).
175. The racial motive behind juror delinquency-based misconduct remains clouded. For a
thorough inquiry of the general subject, see Nancy J. King, Juror Delinquency in Criminal Trials in
America, 1796-1996, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2673, 2708-51 (1996).
176. Compare Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullification Within the Rule of Law, 81 MINN. L. REv.
1149 (1997), and Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice
System, 105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995), with Andrew D. Leipold, The Dangers of Race-Based Jury
Nullification: A Response to Professor Butler, 44 UCLA L. REV. 109 (1996), and Richard St. John,
License to Nullify: The Democratic and Constitutional Deficiencies ofAuthorized Jury Lawmaking, 106
YALE L.J. 2563 (1997) (all debating the legal, political, and historical status of jury nullification).
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likely to distract judicial reformers from the principal issue of jury fact-
finding competence."77 At bottom, jury truth-seeking competence turns
on the eradication of cognitive bias'78 and, more specifically, racially
discriminatory bias. 79  Race-based cognitive bias infects parties, victims,
and attorneys alike.
3. Race of Parties, Victims, and Attorneys.-The race of parties,
victims, and attorneys helps calibrate the meaning of race trials. At
trial, meaning is a function of position. The notion of positionality1"°
suggests a diversity of meanings linked to status and the conduct emanat-
ing from status. Conceding this diversity does not negate that the
sociolegal relationships of party, victim, and counsel are bound up in
positions of racial dominance and subordination.' Consider first the
race of the party. Party racial identity may influence the scope of
the lawyer-client relationship with respect to both the means and the
ends of representation. Lucie White discovers means-related conflicts in
the mixed context of gender, race, and poverty." 2 William Simon finds
ends-related conflicts in the more punitive context of race and crime."'
Clark Cunningham encounters both sets of conflicts in debates over the
nature, wisdom, and satisfaction of intrinsic, non-instrumental client
goals. '4
177. For a comparative analysis of jury fact-finding competence emphasizing substantive law
variation, see Darryl K. Brown, Structure and Relationship in the Jurisprudence of Juries: Comparing
the Capital Sentencing and Punitive Damages Doctrines, 47 HASTINGs L.J. 1255, 1291-97 (1996).
178. On cognitive distortions in juror decisionmaking, see Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A
Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519 (1991).
179. For studies of race-based jury deliberative bias, see Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review
of Jury Discrimination: Measuring the Effects of Juror Race on Jury Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 63
(1993); Clem Turner, Note, What's the Story? An Analysis of Juror Discrimination and a Plea for
Affirmative Jury Selection, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 289, 292-307 (1996).
180. See Amartya Sen, Positional Objectivity, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 126, 143 (1993) (noting the
positional nature of ethical reasoning and rationality).
181. See Mary Kay Thompson Tetreault & Frances A. Maher, "They Got the Paradigm and
Painted It White": Maximizing the Learning Environment in Higher Education Classrooms, 4 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL'Y 197, 198 (1997). Tetreault and Maher note:
While always defined by gender, race, class, and other significant dimensions of societal
domination and oppression, position is also always evolving, context-dependent, and
relational, in the sense that constructs of maleness create and depend on constructs of
femaleness, and blackness and the term "of color" are articulated against ideas of
whiteness.
Id.
182. See generally Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes:
Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990).
183. See generally William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's Case,
50 MD. L. REV. 213 (1991).
184. See Cunningham, supra note 15, at 1366-87.
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Next consider the race of the victim."s Discussion of victim racial
identity arises in civil as well as criminal law situations. The experience
of claimant revictimization, along the lines of race and gender, reported in
civil rights litigation confirms the relevance of this discussion.16  The
same experience extends to the criminal prosecution of rape."s  The
expanding victims' rights movement, and associated legislation, may pro-
vide an opportunity to diminish that experience."' 8 At the same time, it
may enlarge the opportunity to inject race into the courtroom and, hence,
distort racial identity. Evidence gleaned from prosecution and sentencing
practices in rape 89 and capital 1"° cases where white victims accuse
black defendants shows the serious potential for such distortion. The
resurgence of victim impact statements in capital cases, 9 ' fueled in part
by the Supreme Court's recent reversal of field in Payne v. Tennessee,"9
increases the likelihood of racial distortion.
Finally consider the race of counsel. In spite of the limited
acknowledgement of the importance of counsel identity in the early
literature on race and law, 93 more recent work demonstrates a
growing interest in the racial identity of counsel. Derrick Bell ignited
this work by divulging the substantive conflicts dividing lawyers,
clients, and communities in the litigation of school desegregation
185. Cf. Devon W. Carbado, The Construction of O.J. Simpson as a Racial Victim, 32 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 49 (1997) (explaining the sociolegal construction of racial and gender categories
in the public process of victimization).
186. See KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY (1988) (reporting that civil rights litiga-
tion may reinforce plaintiff victimization and powerlessness).
187. See Kristin Bumiller, Fallen Angels: The Representation of Violence Against Women in Legal
Culture, 18 INT'L J. SOC. L. 125 (1990); Patricia Yancey Martin & R. Marlene Powell, Accounting
for the "Second Assault": Legal Organizations' Framing of Rape Victims, 19 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 853
(1994); see also Elizabeth Anne Stanko, The Impact of Victim Assessment on Prosecutors' Screening
Decisions: The Case of the New York County District Attorney's Office, 16 L. & SOC'Y REV. 225,229
(1981-1982) (noting the pivotal role of victim credibility assessments in prosecutorial charging
decisions).
188. For a careful parsing of the legislative byproduct of the victims' rights movement, see Robert
P. Mosteller, Victims' Rights and the United States Constitution: An Effort to Recast the Battle in
Criminal Litigation, 85 GEo. L.J. 1691 (1997).
189. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (invalidating the application of a state death
penalty for the crime of rape).
190. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (requiring a factual showing of defendant-
specific discrimination in spite of extensive evidence of state-wide systemic racial bias).
191. See Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
361 (1996).
192. 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (overruling Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), and South
Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), and concluding instead that the Eighth Amendment contains
no per se bar on the use of victim-impact evidence).
193. See JACK GREENBERG, RACE RELATIONS AND AMERICAN LAW 22 (1959) (discussing briefly
the role of black lawyers).
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cases." 9 Clark Cunningham uncovered similarly vexing conflicts in the
white defense of black criminal defendants. 195 Inverting the white-black
paradigm so often steering the attorney-client relationship, David Wilkins
later exposed tensions in the black defense of white defendants. 196
Subsequently moving to widen Bell's antecedent investigation of the civil
rights movement, Wilkins recently disclosed long standing tensions in the
black bar's vision of client and community obligation."9 Together, these
conflicts and tensions establish that racial identity influences the status and
interaction of parties, victims, and attorneys. Fixed by their place in the
legal system, each set of actors is ensnared in the strife of racial politics,
racialized culture, and racist society.
4. Racial Politics, Culture, and Society.-Politics, culture, and
society mold the larger context of race trials. Together they mirror and
distort the legal interpretation of racial status and discourse. Consider, for
example, the culture of racism surrounding the trials of the Scottsboro
Boys, 9' Emmett Till,' and the Ku Klux Klan.2°  Like the culture
of anti-semitism,"' the culture of racism recognizes but fails to appreci-
ate "cultural otherness"' in society.
Appreciation of the cultural other dictates an alternative conception of
social responsibility encouraging reconciliation of the self and other.
Urging reconciliation, Leon Trakman proposes an expanded category of
responsibility directed toward others that inheres in rights under standard
194. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
195. See Cunningham, supra note 15, at 1366-87.
196. See David B. Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment: Should a Black Lawyer
Represent the Ku Klux Klan?, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1030 (1995).
197. See David B. Wilkins, Two Paths to the Mountaintop? The Role of Legal Education in
Shaping the Values of Black Corporate Lawyers, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1981, 1984 (1993) (discerning
competing claims of racial community and professional commitment); see also David B. Wilkins, Social
Engineers or Corporate Tools? Brown v. Board of Education and the Conscience of the Black
Corporate Bar, in RACE, LAW, & CULTURE 137, 138 (Austin Sarat ed., 1997) (seeking to balance the
.moral obligations to advance the cause of racial justice" against the "legitimate professional
commitments" of advocates in particular cases).
198. See supra note 68.
199. See CLENORA HUDSON-WEEMS, EMMETr TILL: THE SACRIFICIAL LAMB OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1994); STEPHEN J. WHITFIELD, A DEATH IN THE DELTA: THE STORY OF EMMETT
TILL (1988).
200. See Lou FAULKNER WILLIAMS, THE GREAT SOUTH CAROLINA Ku KLUX KLAN TRIALS,
1871-1872(1996); Kermit L. Hall, Political Power and Constitutional Legitimacy: The South Carolina
Ku Klux Klan Trials, 1871-1872, 33 EMORY L.J. 921 (1984).
201. See generally Heribert Adam, Anti-Semitism and Anti-Black Racism: Nazi Germany and
Apartheid South Africa, 108 TELOS 25, 32-38 (1996).
202. Leon E. Trakman, Native Cultures in a Rights Empire: Ending the Dominion, 45 BUFF. L.
REV. 189, 193 (1997) (emphasis in original).
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liberal accounts of possessive individualism. 3 Trakman explains that
"individuals, cultural communities and the State all assume responsibilities
to respect the adverse interests of others that are not protected by
countervailing rights." 2' The goal of advocacy "is to demonstrate that
rights are not simply legal advantages that individuals exercise, sometimes
at the expense of others."'2 5  Rather, Trakman contends, rights also
function as a "means towards social cohesion, while responsibilities
facilitate that cohesion. "2' 6 To what extent an enlarged conception of
rights, moored in reconfigured notions of community harm,2' 7 may cure
or alleviate a culture of racism remains to be answered.
The above discussion presents a tentative framework for the analysis
of race trials. The analysis deploys Critical Race Theory in the practice
contexts of law, legal institutions, and sociolegal relations to demonstrate
the mutability of racial identity, the instability of racialized narratives, and
the variability of colorblind, color-coded, and color-conscious claims under
race-neutral representation. The analysis also takes account of procedural
and substantive laws, judges and juries, parties, victims, and attorneys, and
the politics of race expressed in culture and society. The next Part engrafts
this multi-pronged analysis on the trials of Lemrick Nelson.
III. The Trials of Lemrick Nelson
This Part describes the double trial of Lemrick Nelson in state and
federal court on charges of attempted murder and civil rights deprivation
instigated by four days of interracial violence in the Crown Heights section
of Brooklyn, New York during August, 1991. The description encom-
passes both prosecutorial and defense strategies. Because of the unavail-
ability of jury selection records, that description is confined to pretrial
motion practice and trial conduct. Notable pretrial motions include the
federal prosecution team's adult status transfer motione° and the federal
defense team's recusal motion based on mixed race and religious
203. The source of this responsibility lies in the appreciation of the vulnerability of others.
Trakman asserts: "Responsibilities arise because the interests of those to whom they are owed are not
adequately protected in law, and because rightholders would be free to ignore them in the absence of
such responsibilities." Id. at 193.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. On controverted notions of community harm professed by Critical Race theorists, see GROUP
DEFAMATION AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (Monroe H. Freedman & Eric M. Freedman eds., 1995);
SPEAKING OF RACE, SPEAKING OF SEX: HATE SPEECH, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (Henry
Louis Gates, Jr. et al. eds., 1994); WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE
SPEECH, AND THE FIRsT AMENDMENT (Mari J. Matsuda et al. eds., 1993).
208. See infra notes 266-91 and accompanying text.
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grounds.' Significant trial tactics include race-contaminated opening
statements, witness examinations, and closing arguments.
A. Crown Heights
Crown Heights is a racially mixed neighborhood located within the
Brooklyn borough of New York City.z"' Of its 207,000 residents, 80
percent are black and approximately 10 percent are Hasidic Jews.",'
Long standing tensions divide the Orthodox Lubavitcher Hasidim and the
black community, especially over perceived preferential police
treatment.212 On August 19, 1991, a car traveling in a motorcade
escorting Lubavitcher leader Menachem Schneerson through Crown
Heights collided with another car, jumped a curb, and struck two black
children playing on the sidewalk. The collision killed one child, a seven-
year-old boy named Gavin Cato, and seriously injured another. 13
Within several hours, rumors spread throughout the black community
that the emergency medical crew called to the scene of the accident treated
and evacuated the Lubavitcher driver of the car rather than the injured
children pinned beneath the car. Gathering to protest the neglect of the
children, a large crowd of black residents formed, some throwing rocks
and bottles. Incited by shouts of "no justice, no peace" and "let's go to
Kingston Avenue and get a Jew," a group composed of ten to fifteen young
black men broke from the crowd and marched toward Kingston Avenue,
a predominantly Jewish enclave five blocks away. Along its path, the
group threw rocks and bottles at homes and vandalized cars. Near
Kingston Avenue, the group encountered Yankel Rosenbaum, a twenty-
eight-year-old Australian Hasidic scholar. Shouting "there's a Jew, get the
Jew," the group chased Rosenbaum across the street, then kicked, beat,
and stabbed him." 4
209. See infra notes 334-36 and accompanying text.
210. For historical background on Crown Heights and the events in controversy, see GEORGE P.
FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 69-106 (1996); RICHARD
H. GIRGENTI, A REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR ON THE DISTURBANCES IN CROWN HEIGHTS: AN
ASSESSMENT OF THE CITY'S PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE TO CIVIL DISORDER, VOL. I (1993)
[hereinafter GIRGENTI I]; RICHARD H. GIRGENTI, A REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR ON THE
DISTURBANCES IN CROWN HEIGHTS: A REVIEW OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE DEATH
OF YANKEL ROSENBAUM AND THE RESULTING PROSECUTION, VOL. II (1993) [hereinafter GIRGENTI
II]; JEROME R. MINTz, HASIDIC PEOPLE 328-47 (1992).
211. See GIRGENTI I, supra note 210, at 39-41.
212. See FLETCHER, supra note 210, at 87.
213. See John Kifner, A Boy's Death Ignites Clashes in Crown Heights, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21,
1991, at B4.
214. United States v. Nelson, 68 F.3d 583, 585-86 (2d Cir. 1995). For additional factual sum-
maries of the events in dispute, see United States v. Nelson, 90 F.3d 636, 637-38 (2d Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 1259 (1997); Rosenbaum v. City of New York, No. 92-5414, 1997 U.S. Dist. WL
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Police officers alerted to the attack quickly apprehended Lemrick
Nelson, at the time a sixteen-year-old black male with no prior arrest
record, in flight down a fenced alley. Searching Nelson's pockets, they
discovered a bloody knife and related trouser stains, later found to match
Rosenbaum's blood type. Having detained him, the police then shackled
Nelson's hands behind his back and presented him to Rosenbaum for
identification." 5
Laying mortally wounded atop the hood of a police car, Rosenbaum
positively identified Nelson. After spitting blood at Nelson, he asked:
"Why did you stab me?" Rosenbaum died of four stab wounds early the
next morning.2 6 Shortly thereafter, Nelson orally confessed to the
stabbing, though he admitted wounding Rosenbaum only once. Four days
of unrest, marred by rock and bottle-throwing, followed the deaths of Cato
and Rosenbaum.217
B. Prosecution Strategies
Critical Race theorists view law as an instrument of racial subordina-
tion and emancipation. Along with others, they conceive of state and
federal trial courts to be operating to facilitate that subordination, 218 for
example, in the criminal prosecution of rape.2 9  Grave social meaning
attaches to subordination of this kind.' For criminal prosecution and
punishment convey a community's "moral condemnation"', censuring
criminal behavior as wrong and conduct as blameworthy even when that
conduct betrays indifference, ' or when individual culpability and fault
fall unclear.'
528584, at *1-4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 1997); and People v. Nelson, 647 N.Y.S.2d 438, 439-40 (N.Y.
Crim. Ct. 1995).
215. Record at 492-94, People v. Nelson (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) (No. 10358/91); see also Edward
Frost, Crown Heights Defense Hits Inconsistencies-ProsecutorEmphasizes Statements in Summation,
N.Y.L.J., Oct. 27, 1992, at 1; Patricia Hurtado, Jurors Grilled in Hasid Slaying, NEWSDAY, Sept. 21,
1992, at 21.
216. See GIRGENTI 11, supra note 210, at 46-47; Patricia Hurtado, Cop: Teen Blamed Beer for
Stabbing, NEWSDAY, Oct. 3, 1992, at 11.
217. See Crown Heights Notebook, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1991, at 37.
218. For inquiry into the racially subordinating role of trial courts in the antebellum South, see
Thomas D. Russell, South Carolina's Largest Slave Auctioneering Firm, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1241
(1993).
219. See Katharine K. Baker, Once a Rapist? Motivational Evidence and Relevancy in Rape Law,
110 HARV. L. REv. 563, 596 (1997) (mentioning the ongoing exploitation of racist stereotypes in rape
prosecution and sentencing).
220. On the production of social meaning in criminal law generally, see Dan M. Kahan, Social
Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REv. 349, 362-65 (1997).
221. Id. at 383.
222. See Samuel H. Pillsbury, Crimes of Indifference, 49 RUTGERS L. REv. 105, 151-52 (1996)
(discussing the punishment of crimes evincing a general indifference to the value of others).
223. See John L. Diamond, The Myth of Morality and Fault in Criminal Law, 34 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 111, 131 (1996) (distinguishing evidentiary categories of defendant culpability).
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1. Charging Decisions. -Prosecutorial charging decisions represent
the site of conscious and unconscious racism. An expanding literature
documents the role of conscious and unconscious racism in law
generally22 4 and in the criminal justice system specifically.2 5
Curiously, the initial contributions to this literature scarcely address the
influence of race on prosecutorial discretion and restraint in charging.'
Unhappily, this scarcity cannot be taken to suggest the absence of racial
calculus from charging decisions. 227 Like any act of legal agency in a
racialized context, the act of naming a black defendant in the body of a
criminal indictment carries racial significance.'
At first blush, the Nelson case suggests the exercise of racial restraint.
The record offers no palpable evidence of conscious racism in the inten-
tional conduct 29 of state and federal prosecutors or evidence of a
disparate racial impact"3 in the discernable pattern of cases spearheaded
by prosecutors. This paucity of hard evidence leaves only the potential
inference of unconscious racism for review.231
224. See DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM
(1992); RICHARD DELGADO, THE COMING RACE WAR? AND OTHER APOCALYPTIC TALES OF AMERICA
AFTER AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND WELFARE (1996); JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, THE COLOR LINE:
LEGACY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1993).
225. See JEROME G. MILLER, SEARCH AND DESTROY: AFRICAN-AMERICAN MALES IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1996); Joseph F. Sheley, Structural Influences on the Problem of Race,
Crime, and Criminal Justice Discrimination, 67 TUL. L. REV. 2273 (1993).
226. See FRANK W. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A CRIME
174-76 (1970); Richard S. Frase, The Decision to File Federal Criminal Charges: A Quantitative Study
of Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 246 (1980); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of
Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521 (1981) (all briefly addressing the-role of race in pro-
secutorial discretion).
227. See Lisa Frohmann, Convictability and Discordant Locales: Reproducing Race, Class, and
Gender Ideologies in Prosecutorial Decisionmaking, 31 L. & SOC'Y REV. 531, 552-54 (1997).
228. Compare Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A
Comment, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1255 (1994) (cautioning the critical view of the criminal justice system
as an instrument of racial oppression), with David Cole, The Paradox of Race and Crime: A Comment
on Randall Kennedy 's "Politics of Distinction," 83 GEO. L.J. 2547 (1995), and Janai S. Nelson, Note,
Disparate Effects in the Criminal Justice System: A Response to Randall Kennedy's Comment and Its
Legacy, 14 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 222 (1997) (both criticizing Kennedy for underestimating the extent of
institutionalized racial bias in the criminal justice system).
229. On the handling of intent standards in race cases, see Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn
Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151,
1178-93 (1991).
230. On the application of disparate impact tests in race cases, see Matthew F. Leitman, A
Proposed Standard of Equal Protection Review for Classifications Within the Criminal Justice System
That Have a Racially Disparate Impact: A Case Study of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines'
Classfication Between Crack and Powder Cocaine, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 215 (1994); Pamela L. Perry,
Two Faces of Disparate Impact Discrimination, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 523 (1991).
231. For discussion of unconscious racism, see Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the
Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1016 (1988); Charles R. Lawrence Il, The Id, the Ego, and
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); see also David
A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1307-11 (1995) (finding
evidence of congressional unconscious racism in crack cocaine sentencing legislation).
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Building on the work of Paul Brest, 2 Carol Steiker defines uncon-
scious racism in terms of the "unconscious inability or unwillingness to
accord blacks 'the same recognition of humanity, and hence the same sym-
pathy and care, given as a matter of course to [whites].' " 3 The
strongest ground for inferring unconscious racism in Nelson involves the
naming or selection of the defendant himself. Prosecutors enjoy broad,
though not unfettered, discretion in making this selection. Nevertheless,
under Wayte v. United States,' selectivity in the decision to prosecute
and in the enforcement of criminal laws stands subject to constitutional
constraints "according to ordinary equal protection standards." 5  The
standards in Wayte require a dual showing of discriminatory prosecutorial
effect and purpose. 36
Tested against these standards, the Nelson record falls short. The
constitutional standards of proof established in Wayte and reaffirmed in
McCleskey v. Kemp,237  and more recently in United States v.
Armstrong,"8 set the evidentiary bar high. In McCleskey, the Supreme
Court recapitulated the basic principle that a criminal defendant alleging an
equal protection violation in the form of state misconduct carries the
burden of proving not only purposeful discrimination but specific discrimi-
natory effect.3 9 To prevail under McCleskey, Nelson would have to
prove that he suffered the discriminatory effect of an indictment motivated
by prosecutorial racial animus.
In Armstrong, the Court revisited the issue of selective prosecution,
reiterating that the applicable constitutional standard "is a demanding
one." 240 Armstrong erects a "'background presumption'""4 that pros-
ecutors ordinarily pilot the "passive enforcement system"24 of criminal
justice to avoid violations of the equal protection component of the Due
232. See Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the
Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976) (exploring the "unconscious" workings of
"racially selective sympathy and indifference").
233. See Carol S. Steiker, Remembering Race, Rape, and Capital Punishment, 83 VA. L. REV.
693, 710 (1997) (book review) (quoting Brest, supra note 232, at 8).
234. 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
235. Id. at 608.
236. See id.
237. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
238. 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996).
239. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292, 297 (rejecting statistical evidence of race-based sentencing
disparity as insufficient to support an inference that state capital decisionmakers acted with a specific
discriminatory purpose).
240. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1486.
241. Id. (quoting United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 203 (1995)).
242. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985).
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Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 43 Rebutting that presumption
requires the presentation of "clear evidence"2 " demonstrating that the
prosecutorial "administration of a criminal law is 'directed so exclusively
against a particular class of persons . . . with a mind so unequal and
oppressive' that the system of prosecution amounts to 'a practical denial'
of equal protection of the law."'245 Here, as in Wayte, a claimed denial
of equal protection would center on proof of discriminatory purpose and
effect. 2 6 Armstrong teaches that, in a race case, evidence of a discrimi-
natory effect "must show that similarly situated individuals of a different
race were not prosecuted."2 47
Although the Armstrong Court's announcement of an absolute require-
ment of a "similarly situated" showing in race cases does not render a
selective prosecution claim "impossible to prove," 2' it heightens
the obstacles already posed by the existing jurisprudence of intent
applicable to race-based attacks on prosecutorial charging decisions 49
Admittedly, similar barriers rise up against claims of race-based
discrimination in employment"0 and in commercial transactions, such as
banking and insurance."' Yet, pressing such claims in a commercial or
a workplace setting seems less daunting than in a criminal context where
defense teams may be thwarted in adducing evidence of intent due to the
unavailability or unreliability of discovery.252 The frequent
insurmountability of these evidentiary barriers indicates a constitutional
indifference to conscious and unconscious racism in the criminal justice
system. For additional evidence of indifference, turn to the Nelson
prosecution itself.
243. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1486.
244. Id. (quoting United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926)).
245. Id. (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886)).
246. Id. at 1487.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. See Steven Alan Reiss, Prosecutorial Intent in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 135 U.
PA. L. REV. 1365, 1370-74 (1987) (assessing the doctrinal and evidentiary burdens of marshaling
selective prosecution claims); see also Drew S. Days III, Race and the Federal Criminal Justice System:
A Look at the Issue of Selective Prosecution, 48 ME. L. REv. 181 (1996) (citing the federal constitu-
tional duty to take corrective action regarding race-based selective prosecution); Robert Heller, Selective
Prosecution and the Federalization of Criminal Law: The Need for Meaningful Judicial Review of
ProsecutorialDiscretion, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1315-25 (1997) (urging meaningfuljudicial review
of the federal charging decision given accusations of unconstitutional selective prosecution).
250. See Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 961-69 (1993).
251. See Willy E. Rice, Race, Gender, "Redlining" and the Discriminatory Access to Loans,
Credit, and Insurance: An Historical and Empirical Analysis of Consumers Who Sued Lenders and
Insurers in Federal and State Courts, 1950-1995, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 583 (1996).
252. See Tobin Romero, Note, Liberal Discovery on Selective Prosecution Claims: Fulfilling the
Promise of Equal Justice, 84 GEO. L.J. 2043 (1996) (urging broad discovery of documents material
to claims of selective prosecution).
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a. State prosecution.-On August 26, 1991, Brooklyn District
Attorney Charles Hynes indicted Nelson charging him with four counts of
second degree murder and manslaughter." Originally, Nelson was the
only member of the Crown Heights group of young black males identified
to be arrested, indicted, and tried for Rosenbaum's murder.' In
September 1992, Brooklyn Supreme Court Justice Edward Rappaport
impaneled a jury composed of twelve Brooklyn residents-six blacks, four
Hispanics, two whites-to hear the criminal case.'
In October 1992, after a four-week trial 6 and four days of
deliberation s7 in Brooklyn Supreme Court, the state jury acquitted
Nelson on all four counts of the criminal indictment." The acquittal
provoked widespread protests by the Jewish community in Crown Heights
and throughout New York City enlisting thousands of Hasidic Jews as well
as many local and state politicians.5 9  On September 13, 1993, the
Brooklyn District Attorney submitted a brief to the U.S. Department of
Justice urging Attorney General Janet Reno to prosecute Nelson under
federal civil rights public accommodation statutes upon a theory of bias-
motivated crime.' °
b. Federal prosecution.-After initially declining to
prosecute, the Justice Department launched a civil rights investiga-
tion into the Rosenbaum murder.26 In August 1994, a federal grand
jury indicted Nelson and Charles Price, a forty-three-year-old black
man, for civil rights violations (for example, stabbing and
incitement) under section 245 of the federal public accommodations
253. United States v. Nelson, 68 F.3d 583, 586 (2d Cir. 1995).
254. Following Nelson's state criminal acquittal, the Brooklyn District Attorney convened a new
state grand jury to consider charges against another suspect, Ernesto Edwards, age 24, alleging that
Edwards continued the knife attack upon Rosenbaum. See Craig Wolff, Another Suspect Named in
Slaying in Crown Heights, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1993, at Al.
255. The jury held no Jews. See Joseph P. Fried, This Time, Diversity in Crown Heights Jury,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1997, at B3.
256. See Robert D. McFadden, Teen-Ager Acquitted in Slaying During '91 Crown Heights Melee,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1992, at Al.
257. See Paul Leavitt, N.Y. Jews Protest Black Teen's Acquittal, USA TODAY, Oct. 30, 1992, at
A9.
258. See McFadden, supra note 256.
259. See James C. McKinley, Jr., Crown Heights Resolution Splits Council, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
13, 1992, at BI; Joe Sexton, Appeal Urged in Ruling on Crown Heights Figure, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14,
1995, at B8.
260. See Joseph P. Fried, Hynes Urges Reno to Bring Charges on Crown Heights, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 14, 1993, at B3. The brief advanced the novel theory that the private use of a public street is a
constitutionally protected activity under § 245 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. See Government's
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Pre-Trial Motions at 1-19, United States v. Nelson
(No. 94-823).
261. See Stephen Labaton, Reno to Take Over Inquiry into Slaying in Crown Heights, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 26, 1994, at Al.
1998] 1329
Texas Law Review
statute. 262 Brought by the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of New
York, the indictment charged Nelson and Price with religion-based
interference with Rosenbaum's federally protected activities on a public
street.263
In January 1997, having rejected a defense motion for recusal alleging
his disqualifying religious and social affiliation with the Jewish community,
United States District Judge David Trager convened the federal jury
trial.' On February 10, 1997, following a 24-day trial, the federal jury
convicted Nelson and Price of violating Rosenbaum's civil rights.265
2. Pretrial Motions.-At the pretrial stage of the federal indictment,
the U.S. Attorney moved to transfer Nelson to stand trial for adult criminal
prosecution, insisting that he defied rehabilitation.266 The adult status
transfer motion sought an order removing Nelson from the purview of the
juvenile court system. The change of status would subject Nelson to the
harsher sanctions of the federal sentencing guidelines. 267  Finding Nelson
potentially susceptible to rehabilitation, Judge Trager denied the
motion.268 On appeal taken by the U.S. Attorney's Office, the Second
Circuit vacated that decision and remanded the case for a redetermination
of Nelson's prospects for rehabilitation.269 On remand, Judge Trager
reversed his prior decision and ordered Nelson transferred to adult status,
citing his unlikely chance of rehabilitation.' On subsequent appeal,
taken up by Nelson, the Second Circuit affirmed, finding neither an abuse
of discretion nor an error of law.27'
The transfer motion rests on familiar presuppositions regarding age,
race, violence, and crime. Those presuppositions infuse juridical assess-
ments of juvenile status with racial meaning. The motion, for example,
262. See 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B) (1994); Jane Fritsch, Using Laws from Reconstruction Era,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1993, at B1.
263. See United States v. Nelson, No. 94-823 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
264. The federal jury consisted of three blacks, four Hispanics, and five whites of whom two were
Jewish. See Record at 944, United States v. Nelson (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (94-823).
265. The jury convicted Nelson of civil rights violations for inflicting at least two of the four stab
wounds Rosenbaum suffered. The jury also convicted Price of civil rights violations for inciting the
attack upon Rosenbaum. See Joseph P. Fried, 2 Guilty in Fatal Crown Heights Violence, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 11, 1997, at Al.
266. See Alison Mitchell, Adult Count to Be Sought in Crown Heights Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
13, 1994, at 25.
267. The transfer increased the relevant sentencing guidelines from juvenile detention for a max-
imum of five years to adult imprisonment for life. See Abraham Abramovsky, An Adult in State Court;
A Juvenile in Federal Court, N.Y. L.J., June 2, 1995, at 3.
268. See Joe Sexton, Trial as Juvenile Ordered for Crown Hts. Defendant, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13,
1995, at B3.
269. See United States v. Nelson, 68 F.3d 583, 591 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Joseph P. Fried,
Ruling Voids Juvenile Status of Crown Heights Case Defendant, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1995, at B4.
270. United States v. Nelson, 921 F. Supp. 105 (E.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 90 F.3d 636 (2d Cir. 1996).
271. United States v. Nelson, 90 F.3d 636 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1259 (1997).
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reiterates the "bad kids" trope2' common to male and female
delinquency.' 3  Tantamount to profile evidence,274  this trope also
emerges in the context of battered children.275 A similar notion of
"dangerousness" surfaces in state prosecutorial accounts of adult
offenders. 6
The record indicates no attempt by prosecutors to consider alternative
explanatory variables or risk factors in the Nelson case. Given Nelson's
historical circumstances, this absence seems puzzling. Nelson's personal
and family history clearly presents a number of risk factors, including an
unstable and unsupportive family, an unstable social environment, a mother
beset by severe emotional problems from the time of his birth, economic
deprivation, and academic underachievement.2' The literature of juve-
nile delinquency enumerates parental distress as a risk factor in explicating
the criminal behavior of children." Additional risk factors incorporate
evidence of a persistently poor parenting role model, 7 9 family
disruption,210  and diminished resources.2"' Nelson's diagnosed
disability' and his evident immaturity contribute to his high risk
272. See Cecelia M. Espenoza, Good Kids, Bad Kids: A Revelation About the Due Process Rights
of Children, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 407 (1996).
273. See Rachel Devlin, Female Juvenile Delinquency and the Problem of Sexual Authority in
America, 1945-1965, 9 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 147, 154-77 (1997) (discussing delinquency and the
trope of the "wayward girl").
274. Cf. generally Myrna S. Raeder, The Better Way: The Role of Batterers' Profiles and Expert
"Social Framework" Background in Cases Implicating Domestic Violence, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 147
(1997) (discussing the use of profiles in domestic violence cases).
275. See Hope Toffel, Note, Crazy Women, Unharmed Men, and Evil Children: Confronting the
Myths About Battered People Who Kill Their Abusers, and the Argument for Extending Battering
Syndrome Self-Defenses to All Victims of Domestic Violence, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 337, 363-67 (1996).
276. See Richard Collier, After Dunblane: Crime, Corporeality, and the (Hetero-) Sexing of the
Bodies of Men, 24 J.L. & Soc'Y 177, 179-84 (1997); see also Mike Nash, Dangerousness Revisited,
20 INT'L J. Soc. L. 337, 348 (1992) (citing the categorical blurring and factual unreliability of statutory
"dangerousness" assessments).
277. See United States v. Nelson, 921 F. Supp. 105, 109, 112, 114 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
278. Distress often accompanies adolescent motherhood. See Daniel S. Nagin et al., Adolescent
Mothers and the Criminal Behavior of Their Children, 31 L. & SOC'Y REV. 137 (1997); see also Frank
L. Mott, Teen Parenting: Implications for the Mother and Child Generations, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 469,
472-73 (1996) (pointing to the negative impact of teen parenting on children's long-term intellectual
development and career possibilities).
279. See Nagin et al., supra note 278, at 143-45; see also Nancy A. Naples, The New Consensus
on the Gendered "Social Contract": The 1987-1988 U.S. Congressional Hearings on Welfare Reform,
22 SIGNS 907, 937 (1997) (noting the "racist constructions of Black men's inadequacy as breadwinners
and Black women's deficiency as caretakers").
280. For historical roots of black family disruption, see Thomas D. Russell, Articles Sell Best
Singly: The Disruption of Slave Families at Court Sales, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 1161 (documenting the
legal norm of slave family disruption in spite of Southern discursive practices of paternalism).
281. See Nagin et al., supra note 278, at 145-47.
282. Lewis maintained that Nelson "was an immature youth" stunted by "an emotional age of [an]
11- or 12-year-old" and "an IQ that ranges around 84." Record at 3042-43, United States v. Nelson
(E.D.N.Y. 1994) (94-823).
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profile.2" Evidence of community violence manifested in neighborhood
gun 4 and drug markets' underscores that risk profile.
Prosecutorial conduct in bringing the transfer motion in the face
of Nelson's risk profile demonstrates indifference to the juvenile
court system and its accompanying theory of rehabilitation. z 7  In
taking the motion up on appeal to the Second Circuit, prosecutors seemed
to adopt a punitive theory of adult incarceration288 and a primitive theory
of culpability. 9  Adoption of that litigation posture occurred without
apparent consideration of community psychology issues of system-wide
prevention and early intervention strategies29 and without reference to
rehabilitative strategies of education and learning.29'
3. Trial Conduct.-The elevation of the Nelson trial to full federal
stature presents an acid test for the deference and obedience of nonjudicial
public officials to constitutional norms.29 But the trial does more than
283. On the racial underpinnings of high risk evaluations, see Glennon, supra note 97, at 1334.
Glennon observes: "[A]ccounts of unconscious and structural racism in schools should lead us to
consider connections between the overrepresentation of African-American students in special education
to other disturbing school practices, including racial disparities in student discipline, ability grouping
and school financing." Id.
284. On the behavioral influence of guns, see David M. Kennedy et al., Youth Violence in Boston:
Gun Markets, Serious Youth Offenders, and a Use-Reduction Strategy, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
147, 149-55 (1996).
285. On the behavioral impact of drugs, see Alfred Blumstein & Daniel Cork, Linking Gun
Availability to Youth Gun Violence, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 8-12 (1996).
286. For critiques of and reform proposals for the juvenile court system, compare Janet E.
Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the
Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083 (1991), with Lawrence L. Koontz, Jr., Reassessment Should
Not Lead to Wholesale Rejection of the Juvenile Justice System, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 179, 181-82
(1997) and Irene M. Rosenberg, Leaving Bad Enough Alone: A Response to the Juvenile Court
Abolitionists, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 163 (all debating the merits of juvenile court system abolition).
287. On rehabilitation in the juvenile context, see Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the
Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference it Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821
(1988); Gordon A. Martin, Jr., The Delinquent and the Juvenile Court: Is There Still a Place for
Rehabilitation?, 25 CONN. L. REV. 57 (1992).
288. On punitive theories of juvenile incarceration, see Kristina H. Chung, Note, Kids Behind
Bars: The Legality of Incarcerating Juveniles in Adult Jails, 66 IND. L.J. 999 (1991).
289. On theories of juvenile culpability, see Lee E. Teitelbaum, Youth Crime and the Choice
Between Rules and Standards, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 351.
290. For a discussion of the value of intervention strategies, see Ronald Roesch, Creating Change
in the Legal System: Contributions from Community Psychology, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 325, 330-31
(1995).
291. For an assessment of rehabilitative methods, see Rachel J. Littman, Adequate Provocation,
Individual Responsibility, and the Deconstruction of Free Will, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1127, 1166-67 (1997).
Littman asserts: "Humans can be taught how to be self-reflective and to train their passions. By
presuming and encouraging human weakness and environmentally-caused determinism, laws only
perpetuate the commonly held idea that individuals are powerless to change themselves or the world
around them." Id. at 1167 (footnote omitted).
292. On the competing logics of deference and non-deference, see generally Larry Alexander &
Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997).
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subject federal prosecutors to constitutional scrutiny. Like previous race
trials, the trial stands out as a "cultural icon" and the courtroom as an
arena for the creation of meaning.2 93 Robert Cover envisions the court-
room as the site for the creation and the destruction of meaning.' For
Cover, legal interpretation that creates meaning is jurisgenerative, while
interpretation that kills meaning is jurispathic.295 Here, the meaning con-
structed is racially tinged.
Fathoming the jurisgenerative and jurispathic tendencies of trial courts
requires the study of "trial talk" as discourse.2 96 The meaning of trial
talk is embedded in oral arguments, 29 witness examinations, 2" and
closing statements. 2' Like any jury trial, the Nelson trial exhibits struc-
tural and discursive constraints that impinge on the full and fair pres-
entation of the facts of a case."° Noting these constraints at work
elsewhere, George Fisher finds "an inherent limit to the subtlety of the
evidence and of the argument-and a limit to the effectiveness of the search
for truth""1 at any jury trial. Echoing this finding, Debora Threedy
comments that "[a] trial necessarily involves multifarious relativism. " '°2
Indeed, whether before a judge or jury, the parties put forward "multiple,
293. See Debora L. Threedy, The Madness of a Seduced Woman: Gender, Law, and Literature,
6 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 1, 34 (1996) (exploring the cultural significance of trials).
294. See Cover, supra note 23, at 11-44; Robert M. Cover, The Bonds of Constitutional
Interpretation: Of the Word, the Deed, and the Role, 20 GA. L. REv. 815 (1986).
295. See Cover, supra note 23, at 11-19, 40-44.
296. On the cultural meaning of trial discourse, see John Fiske, Admissible Postmodernity: Some
Remarks on Rodney King, O.J. Simpson, and Contemporary Culture, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 917, 918
(1996). Fiske explains:
Discourse is not a secondary representation of an independent reality, but partakes in that
reality. The nature or truth of an event is determined in part by the discourse into which
it is put, and no event contains its own prescription for the correct discourse by which to
know and communicate it. To put it another way, any event can be put into discourse in
different ways, so the critical relationship is between the different discursive constructions
of that event, rather than between a representation of an event and the event itself.
Id.
297. Cf. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Telling Stories and Stories About Them, I CLINICAL L. REv.
9 (1994); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Thurgood Marshall's Image of the Blue-Eyed Child in Brown, 68
N.Y.U. L. REV. 226 (1993).
298. See Gregory M. Matoesian, Language, Law, and Society: Policy Implications of the Kennedy
Smith Rape Trial, 29 L. & SOC'Y REV. 669 (1995); Gregory M. Mateosian, "You Were Interested in
Him as a Person?": Rhythms of Domination in the Kennedy Smith Rape Trial, 22 L. & SOC. INQUIRY
55, 74-89 (1997). See generally GREGORY M. MATOESIAN, REPRODUCING RAPE: DOMINATION
THROUGH TALK IN THE COURTROOM 98-188 (1993).
299. See Anthony G. Amsterdam & Randy Hertz, An Analysis of Closing Arguments to a Jury,
37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 55 (1992); Philip N. Meyer, "Desperate for Love 11: Further Reflections on
the Interpenetration of Legal and Popular Storytelling in Closing Arguments to a Jury in a Complex
Criminal Case, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 931 (1996); Philip N. Meyer, "Desperate for Love": Cinematic
Influences upon a Defendant's Closing Argument to a Jury, 18 VT. L. REv. 721 (1994).
300. See George Fisher, The O.J. Simpson Corpus, 49 STAN. L. REV. 971, 992-97 (1997).
301. Id. at 996.
302. Threedy, supra note 293, at 34.
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contradictory narratives."3 3  At a jury trial, Threedy explains, "the
verdict is the authoritative version of what happened." 3" At the same
time, "it is as contingent as anyone else's version; a jury verdict only
reflects a consensus as to what is most likely to have happened."3 5 The
discursive limits and narrative contingency of jury trials hamper efforts to
construe the full meaning of trial talk.
a. State prosecution.-At the state trial, Assistant Brooklyn
District Attorneys Sari Kolatch and James Leeper 3° portrayed Nelson as
a knife-wielding youth caught up in the frenzy of religious hatred and
violence. In her opening statement, citing the forthcoming testimony of
nine police officers concerning the extent of mob violence, Kolatch asserted
that Nelson "got caught up in the frenzy of the moment." 3°  On direct
examination, she bolstered this assertion by eliciting police witness
testimony describing a black male making the following statements to an
angry mob: "We don't get any justice. They're killing our children. We
have to stop this. . . . Jews get preferential treatment, we don't get any
justice.... If the police aren't going to do anything, we'll do something
ourselves. Let's go to Kingston Avenue and get the Jews." 8 In her
closing argument, Kolatch claimed that "[Nelson] is sitting here not
because he is the product of a police frame-up .... He is sitting here
because he stabbed Yankel Rosenbaum." 319  Indeed, she insisted:
"Nelson was exactly the type of person to get caught up in all of this mob
violence." 31  To buttress this claim, she characterized Nelson as a per-
son prone to "getting violently angry, as a person who doesn't see a reason
for rules, as a person who makes his own rules."31' On this basis,
Kolatch concluded, "Nelson was exactly the type of person who you would
expect to get caught up in the mindless mob violence." 31
b. Federal prosecution.-At the federal trial, the U.S. Attorney,
represented by Valerie Caproni and Alan Vinegrad,3 3 focused on racial
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Both Kolatch and Leeper are white. See Telephone Interview with Valerie Caproni, Chief,
Criminal Division, U.S. Attorney's Office, Eastern District of New York (Mar. 11, 1998) [hereinafter
Caproni Interview].
307. Brooklyn Trial Opens in Stabbing of Hasidic, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 24, 1992, at 2.
308. Record at 75-76, United States v. Nelson (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (94-823).
309. See Edward Frost, Crown Heights Defense Hits Inconsistencies, Prosecutor Emphasizes
Statements in Summation, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 27, 1992, at 1.
310. Record at 3101-02, United States v. Nelson (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (94-823).
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Both Caproni and Vinegrad are white. See Caproni Interview, supra note 306.
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animus, relying on about a dozen residents from both the black and Hasidic
communities to establish motive.3"4 In her opening statement, Caproni
"drew a chilling portrait of race hatred run amok," accusing Charles Price
of "whipping a crowd of black teenagers into a bloodthirsty frenzy."3 5
She adverted to evidence demonstrating that Price "'found, cultivated and
nurtured' raw hatred." 36  Caproni added that Price "'pumped up' the
mob's fury and told them to go to the main commercial street in Crown
Heights 'to get a Jew.'"317 In his closing argument, Vinegrad asserted:
Charles Price preached and prodded and provoked that crowd and
turned their anger into action. It was not, as the defense would have
you believe, a message of pain or sorrow or of seeking justice. It had
nothing to do with justice.... No, Charles Price did not preach
any of that because his message that night was not about getting
justice, his message was about getting revenge .... He turned them
from an angry crowd into a vigilante mob ... chanting, no justice
no peace, and kill the Jews. And Charles Price would have you
believe that he was just some pitiful heroin addict that no one would
bother paying attention to .... Charles Price set that crowd off
that night. Heroin user or not, he did. You saw it and heard it at
this trial. 38
C. Defense Strategies
Criminal defense strategies involve weak commitments to the liberal
ideals of personhood and community. This weakness is doubtless attribut-
able to the nature of legal training. Standard training regimens, Peter
Goodrich observes, draw legal subjects "into a network of relations and an
institutional environment modeled upon legal definitions and valuations of
persons, actions, and things."3 19 That environment, Goodrich insists, "by
its nature, is competitive, antagonistic, and frequently destructive."'
Born of a deformed adversarial environment, defense strategies may
be best described as the practice of informal justice.32 This practice,
Richard Ford explains, "uses legal argument as a strictly tactical device,
314. Record at 3101-02, United States v. Nelson (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (94-823).
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 2753-56.
319. Peter Goodrich, Law in the Courts of Love: Andreas Capellanus and the Judgments of Love,
48 STAN. L. REV. 633, 675 (1996) (emphasis in original).
320. Id.
321. See Richard Thompson Ford, Facts and Values in Pragmatism and Personhood, 48 STAN.
L. REV. 217, 238 (1995) (book review).
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with no regard for the formal purposes underlying the law." 322 Tactical
considerations give little credence to the search for client or community
authenticity. Customarily, authenticity is connected to the notion of the
self and subjectivity. 3 3  Premised on modern psychology and
psychiatry,324 this notion informs the structure of personhood and
relationship. Intersubjectivity, here construed as a constituent of love,
occurs in the "space and language of relationship." 32 The public expres-
sion of an authentic, loving relationship provides the foundation for
community. The notion of community authenticity goes largely unnoticed
in criminal defense practice, except in the evidentiary context of the
hearsay rule when counsel may seek to classify syndrome evidence as a
declaration against social interest.326
The postmodern embrace of intersubjectivity is unaccompanied by a
claim of truth.327  Under this embrace, claims of client innocence, wit-
ness perjury, or judicial bias must establish merely a pretense of
authenticity, rather than an actual or absolute sense of truth. Nonetheless,
in some circumstances at least, truth may be a prerequisite for or the
product of intersubjectivity. The unsettling of truth claims and standards
in the legal academy 32 fails to extinguish the yearning for truth
expressed in the public response to the conduct of criminal defense
strategies.3 29 Moreover, it fails to silence the clamoring for racial truth.
Leonard Baynes reports on the perverse crusade for black identity truth in
322. Id.
323. On the development of subjectivity, see Maureen A. Mahoney & Barbara Yngvesson, The
Construction of Subjectivity and the Paradox of Resistance: Reintegrating Feminist Anthropology and
Psychology, 18 SIGNS 44 (1992).
324. See Richard E. Redding, Socialization by the Legal System: The Scientific Validity of a
Lacanian Socio-Legal Psychoanalysis, 75 OR. L. REv. 781, 802-03 (1996).
325. Goodrich, supra note 319, at 661; see also Jessica Benjamin, The Shadow of the Other
(Subject):Intersubjectivity and Feminist Theory, 1 CONSTELLATIONs231, 244,243-50 (1994) (positing
reciprocity as a condition of conceiving the ethical relationship defined by the mutual recognition of
the self and other).
326. For trenchant discussion of this hearsay rule exception, see Edward J. Imwinkelried,
Declarations Against Social Interest: The (Still) Embarrassingly Neglected Hearsay Exception, 69 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1427 (1996); see also David Furlow, Note, Sin, Suffering, and "Social Interest": A
Hearsay Exceptionfor Statements Subjecting the Hearsay Declarant to "Hatred, Ridicule, orDisgrace",
4 REV. LmG. 367 (1985) (discussing the history, purpose, and decisional law of the social interest
hearsay exception).
327. See Pierre Schlag, Hiding the Ball, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1681, 1686 (1996) (claiming that "in
saying what the law is, or what it requires, the legal actor must always maintain the aura of
authenticity, even if it means faking it" (emphasis in original)).
328. See George A. Martinez, On Law and Truth, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 883, 896 (1997)
(reviewing DENNIS PATrERSON, LAW AND TRUTH (1996)) (discussing the deficiencies of epistemic
theories of truth).
329. See Craig M. Bradley & Joseph L. Hoffmann, Public Perception, Justice, and the "Search
for Truth" in Criminal Cases, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1267, 1271 (1996).
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law school minority faculty hiring pursued through the careful parsing of
color.33 Like Christopher Ford, 331 Baynes points to the changing con-
struction of race and racial identity in law and society.332  The unsteady
quality of contemporary racial status frustrates the categorical pursuit of an
individual or community sense of racial authenticity.
1. Pretrial Conduct.-Prior to the federal trial, in September 1994,
the Nelson defense team filed a motion to recuse Judge Trager from presid-
ing over the jury proceedings.333 The defense maintained that Judge
Trager suffered a conflict of interest because "the screening committee that
recommended him for the [flederal bench was headed by a lawyer [Judah
Gribetz] who also heads the Jewish group that joined the call for a federal
investigation" of the Crown Heights violence.334 On October 11, 1994,
Judge Trager denied the motion without explanation.335
2. Trial Conduct.-The conduct of the defense teams in the Nelson
trials reveals intriguing commonalities. Throughout the trials, both sets of
defense teams assailed the racial credibility of police witnesses. Having
disputed the evidentiary basis of the indictment, particularly the factual
predicate of probable cause, the teams challenged the colorblind legitimacy
of the prosecutions and, indeed, the criminal justice system as a whole.
Further, the teams depicted Nelson, and later Price, as hapless, ill-fated
victims of a racist society.
a. State trial.-At the state trial, Nelson's defense attorney,
Arthur Lewis Jr.,336 accused police officers of lying and fabricating a
case against Nelson.337 Deriding the credibility of police witnesses and
the impartiality of the criminal justice system, Lewis claimed that Nelson
was "the victim of a frame-up" invented by "a bunch of cops who can't
330. See Leonard M. Baynes, Who Is Black Enough for You? An Analysis of Northwestern
University Law School's Struggle over Minority Faculty Hiring, 2 MICH. J. RACE & L. 205, 212-21
(1997).
331. See Christopher A. Ford, Administering Identity: The Determination of "Race" in Race
Conscious Law, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1232 (1994).
332. See Baynes, supra note 330, at 215, 212-15 (asserting that racial meaning implicates
appearance, documentation, and self-identification" and combines with "ideological and political
considerations and with national identity issues").
333. See Joseph P. Fried, Crown Hts. Defense Team to Ask Judge to Step Down, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 8, 1994, at B3.
334. Id.
335. See Crown Hts. Judge Won't Step Down, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1994, at B5 (noting that
Judge Trager said "he would state his reasons later").
336. Lewis is black. See Caproni Interview, supra note 306.
337. See Alison Frankel, Offending the Judge May Not Offend the Jury, AM. LAW., Jan./Feb.
1993, at 89, 90.
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even lie straight. "338 During cross examination, in an effort to build a
claim of justification, Lewis insinuated that Rosenbaum was a member of
a "Jewish security force . . . out there with others on patrol" during the
escalating violence. 39  He declared: "my defense is that Yankel
Rosenbaum was part of this patrol."' Tempering this declaration, he
added: "My point is that this was not a retaliation killing. This was a
police riot. And it had something to do with the young kids and the
police. Not Jews, not whites, or anybody else. That's my
defense."3" At closing argument, Lewis asserted:
This case is one of the biggest foul-ups imaginable. [The police]
couldn't have done worse if they intended to do so .. .no two
officers told the same thing about a given occurrence ... you got
some damn dum [sic] cops ... they have lied in this case from
beginning to end; and I think they've tried to play people for being
foolish. 42
b. Federal trial.-At the federal trial, Nelson's attorney, Trevor
Headley,343 characterized the indictment as a "rush to judgment."'
In his opening statement, Headley "attacked the prosecution as catering to
political pressures." 345  Inveighing against "[t]he forces that 'were
unhappy with [Nelson's] acquittal in state court,"' he complained to the
jury that "now [they] want you to bring him to justice and convict
him. " He also condemned the confession as coerced, mentioning the
police failure to determine Nelson's "emotional stability" prior to taking
his statement. 7 In his closing argument, Headley reiterated the defense
team's earlier denunciation of the U.S. Attorney for selective prosecution,
claiming that "they want Lemrick Nelson, that's who they want. So, now,
it is a bias crime. Now he did it because [Rosenbaum] was Jewish. "I
Price's attorney, Anthony Ricco,1 9 "portrayed his client as a hapless
drug addict who had neither the credibility nor ability to get the mob 'in
338. Record at 3055-56, People v. Nelson (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) (10358/91).
339. Id. at 362, 364-65.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 716, 723.
342. Id. at 3024-25, 3053-54, 3055-56.
343. Headley is black. See Daniel Wise, Racial Hatred Key Issue of Nelson Trial, N.Y. L.J., Jan.
17, 1997, at 1. The defense team also included Christine Yaris and Michael Warren. Yaris is white;
Warren is black. See Caproni Interview, supra note 306.
344. See Wise, supra note 343, at 1.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Record at 2920, United States v. Nelson (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (94-823).
349. Ricco is black. See Wise, supra note 343. The defense team additionally included Darrell
Paster. Like Ricco, Paster is black. See Caproni Interview, supra note 306.
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the palm of his hand.' '' 5 Ricco described Price as incapable of racial
vitriol.3 51 He remarked that Price "lives in the neighborhood. People
know who he is. When was the last time an addict set you off? 352
Taken together, the proceedings comprising the Nelson "double trial"
seem to bear all the earmarks of a race trial. Both prosecution and defense
teams constructed racial identity in terms of the hate-motivated deviance of
the individual defendants and the color-coded prejudice infecting their
surrounding communities. Moreover, both teams articulated racialized
narratives to describe the culture and social structure of those communities.
Even at their best, the narratives maintained only a thin veneer of race-
neutral representation. More pronounced in its application on the prosecu-
torial side, that veneer cracks under the weight of race talk disputing the
impartiality of the Nelson judges, the composition of its juries, the deviance
of the parties, the innocence of afflicted victims, the bias of attorneys, and
the inflammatory posturing of American politics. The next Part examines
the regulation of such forms of racialized advocacy.
IV. Regulating Race
This Part surveys the current regulation of racialized advocacy under
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct,353 the ABA Model Code
of Professional Responsibility54 and the ABA Standards Relating to the
Administration of Criminal Justice.5  The survey analyzes the regulation
of racial bias specific to the prosecution and the defense function. For the
prosecution, it examines the prohibition against bias in charging decisions,
evidentiary presentation, jury selection, and trial conduct. For the defense,
it explores the defense opportunities for bias in advising the accused,
controlling and directing the case, advancing claims and contentions, and
in making statements to the tribunal, opposing party, and counsel.
A. Prosecution Function
The ABA rules governing the prosecution function are guided by
adversarial and institutional norms. The norms charge the prosecutor with
the responsibility of acting as a "minister of justice."3 56 Under the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, that "responsibility carries with it
specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice
350. Record at 2920, United States v. Nelson (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (94-823).
351. See id.
352. Id.
353. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1997).
354. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1980).
355. STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMIN. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1992).
356. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 cmt. (1997).
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and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence." 5 7
Consistent with strict evidentiary sufficiency guidelines, ABA Standards
prohibit intentional misrepresentation of fact, bad faith or unreasonable
allusion to evidence, knowing offers of false or inadmissible evidence, and
misstatements of evidence." In addition to evidentiary presentation, the
Standards regulate extrajudicial public statements that will have a
substantial likelihood of prejudicing a criminal proceeding. 359 Most
important, the ABA Standards ban invidious discrimination on the basis of
race in exercising the discretion to investigate or to prosecute.3' 6  That
ban apparently extends to jury selection, witness examination, and jury
argument.36'
Despite ABA and state regulation, the troubling legacy of race trials
ingrains the prosecutorial function with a sense of moral crisis. The crisis
enmeshes prosecutors in the debate over the place of race in law,
lawyering, and ethics. This debate goes beyond the measure of constitu-
tional challenges to prosecutorial charging decisions and peremptory
strikes. It goes to the very duty of federal and state governmental officers
to hold to a colorblind constitutional faith in the wake of increasing
pressure to engage in color-coded stereotypes to obtain right or just results.
The temptation to breach the allegedly higher duty of colorblind constitu-
tionalism in advocacy and ethics for reasons of individual justice or the
common good introduces doubt into the moral certitude normally guiding
the prosecutorial function. This sense of crisis warrants contemplation of
new moral dimensions and perspectives in advocacy. Instead of simply
ratcheting up moral rhetoric, the task is to revise the moral baseline of
prosecution. Revision flows out of the transformative potential inherent in
the moral imagination. Tapping that potential requires a renewed pedagogy
and practice of faith and spirituality in law.362 The law, Kenneth Karst
reminds us, possesses "expressive power and educative power."363
The expression of faith and spirituality in law provides a means to
regain moral authority and credibility in the criminal justice system.'64
357. Id.; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103(A) (1980); STANDARDS
RELATING TO THE ADMIN. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 3-3.9(a) (1992).
358. See STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMIN. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standards 3-2.8(a), 3-5.5,
3-5.6(a)-(b), 3-5.8(a) (1992).
359. See id. 3-1.4(a); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8(g) (1997).
360. See STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMIN. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 3-3. 1(b) (1992).
361. See id. 3-5.3, 3-5.7(a), 3-5.8(c).
362. See THOMAS L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER: LAW FOR THE INNOCENT
(1981); Gordon J. Beggs, Laboring Under the Sun: An Old Testament Perspective on the Legal
Profession, 28 PAC. L.J. 257 (1996).
363. Kenneth L. Karst, The Coming Crisis of Work in Constitutional Perspective, 82 CORNELL
L. REV. 523, 570 (1997).
364. For commentary decrying the credibility of the criminal justice system, see Thomas D.
Barton, Violence and the Collapse of Imagination, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1249, 1263 (1996) (book review);
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Establishing the credibility of the criminal justice system depends in
substantial part on our vision of the moral lawyer. Defined here, moral
lawyering works to empower legal agents and institutions, as well as clients
and communities, to act morally, indeed to make moral choices in the face
of violence and emotionally charged conflicts.365 Lawyering in this sense
is a process of engendering action in others through other-exerted
power."6 The flourishing literature on the lawyering process illustrates
empowerment strategies applied in civil rights and poverty law
contexts.367
Of necessity, moral lawyering contemplates virtue. 368 Robert Araujo
finds virtue in the individual quality of discernment employed in assessing
where a case should go and in attaining a just end.69 Discernment of
this sort, Tanina Rostain remarks, involves the ability to mediate between
public commitments and individual values,370 whether one is representing
a private citizen or an arm of the state.
Prosecutors may define virtue in terms of "an overriding commitment
to doing one's duty."371 In this way, Tracy Isaacs and Diane Jeske
contend, virtue "need not be equated straightforwardly with the
moral."' 3' Rather, it "may also include a responsibility to the reality of
one's situation. "373 The situational allowance of nonmoral considerations
to guide deliberations, Isaacs and Jeske explain, arises when moral con-
siderations seem insufficient to yield a judgment of resolution. 374  The
situation of the prosecutor in a race trial gives rise to competing moral
considerations of public retribution, victim restitution, and defendant
Stephen B. Bright, Casualties of the War on Crime: Fairness, Reliability and the Credibility of Criminal
Justice Systems, 51 U. MiAmi L. REv. 413 (1997).
365. See Linda G. Mills, On the Other Side of Silence: Affective Lawyering for Intimate Abuse,
81 CORNELL L. REV. 1225, 1260 (1996).
366. See E. Michelle Rabouin, Walking the Talk: Transforming Law Students into Ethical
TransactionalLawyers, 9 DEPAULBUS. L.J. 1, 61-62 (1996) (exploring cognitive dimensions of ethical
training).
367. See Melanie B. Abbott, Seeking Shelter Under a Deconstructed Roof. Homelessness and
Critical Lawyering, 64 TENN. L. REV. 269, 309-10 (1997); Ruth Buchanan & Louise G. Tmbek,
Resistances and Possibilities: A Critical and Practical Look at Public Interest Lawyering, 19 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 687 (1992).
368. See Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Lawyers and Virtues, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 707 (1996)
(book review); Lorie M. Graham, Artistotle's Ethics and the Virtuous Lawyer: Part One of a Study on
Legal Ethics and Clinical Legal Education, 20 J. LEGAL PROF. 5, 27-48 (1995-1996).
369. See Robert Araujo, The Virtuous Lawyer: Paradigm and Possibility, 50 SMU L. REV. 433,
479 (1997).
370. See Rostain, supra note 15, at 1031.
371. See Tracy Isaacs & Diane Jeske, Moral Deliberation, Nonmoral Ends, and the Virtuous
Agent, 107 ETHics 486, 493, 495 (1997) ("Virtue will differ from person to person, but at its core will
be an overriding commitment to doing one's duty.").
372. Id. at 493.
373. Id.
374. See id. at 493-94.
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culpability. It also touches on the obligation of constitutional community
and the matching duty of public citizenship. Balancing the norms of just
punishment, constitutional community, and public citizenship dictates
consideration of race and racial status in a multiracial context. Even if
community, citizenship, and status norms fail to rise above the level of
nonmoral consideration, integrating race into a virtue-based situationalist
ethic requires contextualized racial judgment.375
Teaching virtue376 in the prosecutorial judgment of race and racial
status proceedings3" demands both an individual and a community
account of virtue. The community account unites public and private
conceptions of virtue378 by linking the prosecutorial function to race and
citizenship. By connecting race and citizenship,3 79 the account tries to
rescue the meaning of black citizenship from the deformed characteriza-
tions of American law found in cases such as Dred Scot?' and Plessy v.
Ferguson."' Concretely, the account directs prosecutors to protest
stigmatizing racial representations of victims and defendants, and their
related communities. This directive envisages victims and defendants as
clients, rather than antagonists or historical witnesses, of the state.
Without protest, prosecutorial representations will foster a sociolegal
environment that denies communities of color a full chance at economic
and political participation in civil society. Neither economic opportunity
nor political power flows from historically subordinated status.
The individual account of virtue urges prosecutors to reject the same
stigmatizing representations because they offend the racial dignity and self-
respect of victims and defendants of color. Of course, as Bernard Boxill
points out, blacks "do not need whites to approve of them to be able to
375. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique
of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 891 (1997) (book review).
376. See Robert P. Bums, Legal Ethics in Preparation for Law Practice, 75 NEB. L. REv. 684
(1996). Bums asserts:
[V]irtues can be taught through a program that compels students to act in contexts that
require the ethical exercise of lawyering skills and to receive critiques by experienced
practitioners who are masters of the virtuous exercise of those skills and are willing to
demonstrate and recommend that exercise... to their students.
Id. at 691 (footnote omitted).
377. On the determination of racial status, see Sharon Elizabeth Rush, The Heart of Equal
Protection: Education andRace, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1, 39-57 (1997) (exploring racial
status in the context of children's education).
378. See Christian G. Fritz, Alternative Visions of American Constitutionalism: Popular
Sovereignty and the Early American Constitutional Debate, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 287, 298-304
(1997) (examining the historical merger of public and private virtues).
379. See Stuart A. Streichler, Justice Curtis's Dissent in the Dred Scott Case: An Interpretive
Study, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 509, 512-28 (1997).
380. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
381. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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sustain their self-respect."" )While conceding the legitimacy of stigma
protest, Boxill notes that such protest strays outside regular efforts of
persuasion. More extraordinary in purpose, stigma protest sustains self-
respect by pronouncing "a defiant oath of allegiance to morality." 383
Neither account of prosecutorial virtue will erase the problem of moral
error. Often the commission of error stems from an insensitivity to the
race-based experience of moral diversity. Ronald Dworkin cautions that
"[m]oral diversity is sometimes exaggerated." 3" He observes that "the
degree of convergence over basic moral matters throughout history is both
striking and predictable. ' 3" For Dworkin, morality stands as an
"independent dimension" of human experience, outside diversity.386
Moral error, however, often springs from the failure to comprehend diver-
sity in light of past errors of moral essentialism. This failure encourages
a misplaced sense of moral infallibility. 3 7 The notion of moral reciproc-
ity may cure this errant sensibility.
Reciprocity, Robert George contends, ought to "govern moral debate
whenever cultural circumstances or other factors make it possible for
reasonable people of goodwill to be mistaken about a putative moral
evil. ",3' George explains that "reasonable people of goodwill can be
mistaken about even serious moral evils when ignorance, prejudice, self-
interest, and other factors that impair sound moral judgment are prevalent
in a culture or subculture." 389  Moral reciprocity in this way implies
mercy. Stephen Garvey ties mercy to the criminal law,3" offering both
382. Bernard R. Boxill, Washington, Du Bois and Plessy v. Ferguson, 16 LAw & PHIL. 299, 305
(1997).
383. Id. at 309.
384. Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 87,
113 (1996).
385. Id.
386. Id. at 128 (defining morality as a "distinct, independentdimension of our experience" capable
of exercising "its own sovereignty").
387. Larry Alexander notes that "we operate morally in the world as we find it-a world in which
many of its features are the residue of past moral mistakes." Larry Alexander, Bad Beginnings, 145
U. PA. L. REv. 57, 81 (1996). Contemporary moral action, according to Alexander, requires us to
take account of those mistakes. See id. at 81.
388. Robert P. George, Law, Democracy, and Moral Disagreement, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1388,
1400 (1997) (book review).
389. Id.
390. See Stephen P. Garvey, "As the Gentle Rain from Heaven ": Mercy in Capital Sentencing,
81 CORNELL L. REV. 989 (1996); see also Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions
of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 269, 366-72 (1996) (examining the role of the mercy
tradition in the moral assessments deployed in the criminal law); Martha C. Nussbaum, Equity and
Mercy, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 83, 115-22 (1993) (exploring the implications of the mercy tradition in
death penalty jurisprudence). Feminists make a similar connection, tying gender to mercy. See
Lorraine Schmall, Forgiving Guin Garcia: Women, the Death Penalty and Commutation, 11 Wis.
WOMEN'S L.J. 283, 319-22 (1996); see also Jenny Carroll, Note, Images of Women and Capital
Sentencing Among Female Offenders: Exploring the Outer Limits of the Eighth Amendment and
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strong and weak conceptions of merciful compassion. 391  The strong co-
nception "allows the sentencer to consider only those facts and
circumstances that are likely to elicit a merciful response." 39  The weak
conception "allows the sentencer to consider facts and circumstances that
weigh against granting mercy. "393  Integration of each of these concep-
tions into the exercise of the prosecutorial function enhances recognition
of the criminal defendant as a fellow citizen instead of an alien other.
Deploying the reciprocal morality of citizenship that binds communities
through norms of dignity and mutual respect, prosecutors may recognize
the devastation of historical segregation inscribed in the tragic behavior and
circumstances of Lemrick Nelson. The recognition of tragic citizenship,
of citizenship squandered in hate-motivated violence invites at least a sense
of sympathy, and with it, an opening for the sentiment of mercy and the
possibility of reconciliation. The next subpart considers the issue of race
in the discharge of the defense function.
B. Defense Function
ABA rules regulating the defense function are also rooted in adver-
sarial and institutional norms. The norms emphasize the defendant's right
to put on a defense.3" This right correlates with the duty of zealous
defense.395  That defense duty translates into the requirements of compe-
tent and adequate representation. Under the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, these conditions urge criminal defense counsel to "require that
every element of the case be established."' 96 ABA Standards amplify this
requirement stressing the basic duty "to serve as the accused's counselor
and advocate with courage and devotion and to render effective, quality
Articulated Theories of Justice, 75 TEXAS L. REV. 1413 (1997) (inspecting gender-based explanations
in death penalty jurisprudence and in women's capital trials). This tie avoids the biological and cultural
baggage of gender determinism. See Susan H. Williams & David C. Williams, A Feminist Theory of
Malebashing, 4 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 35, 70-81 (1996).
391. See Garvey, supra note 390, at 1015-16.
392. Id. Garvey continues: "This conception is strong because the sentencer never hears anything
about the character of the offender or circumstances of the offense that might persuade her not to
extend mercy." Id. (emphasis in original).
393. Id. at 1016. Garvey adds: "Under this conception, mercy is a gift the defendant can seek,
but it is also one the state can rightly urge the jury to withhold." Id. (emphasis in original).
394. See Donald A. Dripps, Relevant But Prejudicial Exculpatory Evidence: Rationality Versus
Jury Trial and the Right to Put on a Defense, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1389, 1402-04 (1996).
395. See Charles M. Sevilla, Criminal Defense Lawyers and the Search for Truth, 20 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 519 (1997). Sevilla declares:
The task of defense lawyers is to defend their clients honestly and zealously under the
constitutional mandate of the Sixth Amendment. This insures that the innocent are
protected, that the state's search for truth is monitored, and that a balanced system results.
Only in this way will society accept the end result as just.
Id. at 520.
396. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1997).
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representation." 3  Cognizant that the duty of effective representation is
not absolute, the Standards enjoin prejudicial speech and conduct occurring
in the form of intentional misrepresentation, extrajudicial public statements,
inadmissible reference, bad faith or unreasonable evidentiary allusion, false
evidence, or misstated and misleading evidence.39'
Notwithstanding these constraints, racial narrative dictates the
reconsideration of traditional conceptions of effective representation.' 9
Reconsideration demands inquiry into the racial content of narrative.
Conventional definitions of competence and adequacy condone stigma
narratives. Race, criminal defense lawyers argue, acquires special
relevance when a defendant is charged with a bias crime' or an inter-
racial crime of violence. 4"' The argument for the probative value of race
makes nothing of truth. For defense lawyers, truth is undiscoverable and,
moreover, immaterial. Crudely postmodern, they claim a situated
truth4' linked only to standpoint-the standpoint of judge and jury."°3
The standpoint theory of truth implied by the criminal defense model
in race cases engenders opposition to speech regulation manifested in the
form of restrictions on pretrial and trial publicity. That opposition stays
clear of the speech-equality tension arising out of the norm of
egalitarianism.' 5 Instead, it aims at the use of the gag order,'
rejecting the argument for content-based restrictions on the free speech
397. See STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMIN. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-1.2(b) (1992).
398. See id. at 4-1.2(f, 4-1.4, 4-7.2(c), 4-7.4, 4-7.5(a)-(b), 4-7.7(a)-(b) (1992).
399. For criticism of the adequacy of representation in complex civil and criminal law contexts,
see Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80
CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1086-1104 (1995); Patrick Woolley, Rethinking the Adequacy of Adequate
Representation, 75 TExAS L. REV. 571 (1997).
400. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392-94 (1992) (noting the racial message in
striking down an anti-cross burning statute).
401. See Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 422-24 (1991) (citing the need to ask venire
members for their racial views).
402. On postmodernist views of situated knowledge, see Dick Pels, Strange Standpoints: Or, How
to Define the Situation for Situated Knowledge, 108 TELOS 65 (1996).
403. Oddly, this claim carries a vaguely feminist connotation. For penetrating discussion of
feminist standpoint analysis, see Nancy C.M. Hartsock, The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the
Ground for a Specifically Feminist Historical Materialism, in DISCOVERING REALITY: FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES ON EPISTEMOLOGY, METAPHYSICS, METHODOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 283-
310 (Sandra Harding & Merrill B. Hintikka eds., 1983); and Susan Hekman, Truth and Method:
Feminist Standpoint Theory Revisited, 22 SIGNS 341 (1997).
404. Seejohn a. powell, Worlds Apart: Reconciling Freedom of Speech and Equality, 85 KY. L.J.
9, 70-76 (1996-1997) (using situated knowledge theory to reconcile the competing ideologies of free
speech and equality).
405. See Steven G. Gey, The Case Against Postmodern Censorship Theory, 145 U. PA. L. REV.
193, 281-85 (1996) (examining competing claims of free speech and egalitarianism).
406. See generally Symposium, The Sound of Silence: Reflections on the Use of the Gag Order,
17 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 305 (1997).
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rights of trial participants. 47 Advancing a fair trial justification,"°
opponents denounce the gag order as an unconstitutional infringement on
lawyer free speech rights.'
The Nelson case illustrates the lawyer free speech exercise of stigma
narratives. Here the stigma of an American black narrative, the narrative
of Lemrick Nelson, rises from segregation in education, housing, health
care, indeed in the very geography of an urban landscape gerrymandered,
redlined, and neglected. Here, in an impoverished segregated
neighborhood, stigma narratives take on an almost natural quality
approaching neutrality. Here, when they portray a young black man so ill-
equipped for civil society that he must tried and sentenced as an adult, we
nearly forget that this portrait describes a generation or more of young
black men. We forget that the stigma of boyhood mental and physical
segregation lies in the incarceration of an adult. We forget that stigma
narratives may be undeserving of protected speech.
Examples of racial stigma permeate the trial in the defense teams'
substantive law claims and in their statements to the tribunal, opposing
party witnesses, and counsel.410 The stigma of racial accusation and
stereotyping is everywhere defensively. It is found explicitly in the federal
motion to recuse and in the state and federal charges of police bias. It is
found implicitly in the heated exchange with government counsel and in the
opposition to the original indictment and status transfer motion.
Opportunities for race-ing narrative with stigmatizing rhetoric and
imagery derive in part from attorney-client power inequality. Power
directs the allocation of decisionmaking authority over means and ends. a"'
407. See Eileen A. Minnefor, Looking for Fair Trials in the Information Age: The Need for More
Stringent Gag Orders Against Trial Participants, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 95 (1995); Mark R. Stabile, Note,
Free Press-Fair Trial: Can They Be Reconciled in a Highly Publicized Criminal Case?, 79 GEO. L.J.
337 (1990).
408. See Charles H. Whitebread & Darrell W. Contreras, Free Press v. Fair Trial: Protecting the
Criminal Defendant's Rights in a Highly Publicized Trial by Applying the Sheppard-Mu'Min Remedy,
69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1587, 1589-99 (1996).
409. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Lawyers Have Free Speech Rights, Too: Why Gag Orders on Trial
Participants Are Almost Always Unconstitutional, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 311 (1997); Michael E.
Swartz, Note, Trial Participant Speech Restrictions: Gagging First Amendment Rights, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 1411 (1990).
410. See supra notes 333-52 and accompanying text.
411. See Stephen Ellmann, Lawyering for Justice in a Flawed Democracy, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
116, 159-61 (1990) (book review) (urging reforms in legal services for the powerless due to inadequacy
in the current government monopoly); Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717,
718-21 (1987) (identifying factors causing inequality in attorney-client bargaining power); see also
Committee on Professional Responsibility, The Evolving Lawyer-Client Relationship and Its Effect on
the Lawyer's Professional Obligations, 51 THE RECORD (Bar Ass'n of New York City) 443, 451-65
(1996) (noting the traditionally paternalistic professional discretion lawyers exercise in controlling the
means of representation); Judith L. Maute, Allocation of Decisionmaking Authority Under the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1049, 1058-60 (1984) (comparing paternalist
and instrumentalist models of lawyer-client decisionmaking authority).
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In this way, it shapes the definition of client interest. Conventional rules
of defense ethics construe client interests narrowly in terms of physical
freedom. This construction carries intuitive appeal. It also garners support
in anecdotal and empirical evidence. Put simply, criminal defendants want
to stay out of jail. Alternatively, they want to get out of jail. These
preferences accord with a common sense version of ordinary
rationality. 12
The power of rationality implies moral decisionmaking capacity.
Within liberal theory, moral capacity is often equated with the operation
of self-regarding logic and self-interested preference. 43  The logic of
moral self-interest competes against the public-regarding incentives of the
common good. 414  Belief in a common or collective good rests on partici-
patory norms of citizenship.415  Participatory norms protect clients and
client communities against lawyer intervention in judgments of means and
ends. The promotion of participatory norms in civil rights& 6 and crim-
inal defense417 contexts offers a method of staving off unwanted
412. Self-interested claims of ordinary rationality animate public choice theory. See David A.
Skeel, Jr., Public Choice and the Future of Public-Choice-Influenced Legal Scholarship, 50 VAND. L.
REV. 647, 651 (1997) (contending that "public choice assumes that all of the relevant players tend to
act in their own self-interest").
413. Drawing on the idea of political liberalism, John Rawls endows rational agents "with the
powers of judgment and deliberation in seeking ends and interests peculiarly [their] own." See JOHN
RAWLs, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 50, 280 (1993) (interpreting the freedom of moral persons in terms of
the "ab[ility] to control and revise their wants and desires, and as circumstance requires, they accept
the responsibility for doing so"). The rational, according to Rawls, "applies to how these ends and
interests are adopted and affirmed, as well as to how they are given priority." Id. at 50. It applies
equally, he adds, "to the choice of means, in which case it is guided by such familiar principles as: to
adopt the most effective means to ends, or to select the more probable alternative, other things equal."
Id. Of course, Rawls cautions, rational agents are neither "limited to means-ends reasoning" nor
"solely self-interested." Id. at 50-51.
414. Rawls notes that rational agents lack "the particular form of moral sensibility that underlies
the desire to engage in fair cooperation as such, and to do so on terms that others as equals might
reasonably be expected to endorse." Id. at 51, 279 ("The sum of an individual's entitlements, or even
of their uncompensated contributions to associations within society, is not to be regarded as a
contribution to society.").
415. This view of democratic citizenship echoes Rawls. Expanding the liberal position, Rawls
reconceives the foundational meaning of the notion of a "social union" from "a conception of the good
as given by a common religious faith or philosophical doctrine" to "a shared public conception of
justice appropriate to the conception of citizens in a democratic state as free and equal persons." Id.
at 304.
416. See LUBAN, supra note 9, at 317-57 (advocating community participation in lawsuits with
political objectives and in class actions); see also William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate:
Addressing Disputes Among Group Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J.
1623, 1625-27, 1668-80 (1997) (canvassing lawyer-client and intra-group conflicts in traditional and
contemporary civil rights litigation); Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN.
L. REV. 1183, 1232-42(1982) (providing examples of directparticipation mechanisms in class actions).
417. See Jeff Brown, Disqualification of the Public Defender: Toward a New Protocol for
Resolving Conflicts of Interest, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 32-33 (1996) (introducing participatory norms
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lawyer intervention and resolving difference-based lawyer-client
conflicts.418
Criminal defense discourse is replete with difference-based narratives.
These racialized narratives arise out of lawyer interpretative efforts to grasp
and to exploit racial identity and difference. Discourse, Andrew Stark
points out, "tends to exhibit a range of interpretive approaches contending
over how to understand one particular feature of identity. "419 The
discourse of criminal defense theories of excuse4' pinpoint racial
difference. Difference-based narratives emerge in group-specific cultural
defenses.4"' Each set of defensive narratives uses essentialist racial
rhetoric and imagery to satisfy client acquittal objectives.4'
The defensive maneuver of unleashing racially essentialist narratives
bears reference to the field of Women's Studies. Gayatri Spivak describes
the maneuver as a form of "strategic essentialism. '' 41 In this move,
defense counsel imputes a particular character trait to the defendant. The
trait normalizes the conduct at issue, characterizing it as natural. For
young black males, as here, the trait of violence is commonly assigned to
excuse criminal wrongdoing. The turn to strategic essentialism, according
to Katherine Franke, entails "consciously choosing to essentialize a
particular community for the purpose of a specific political goal."424
Borrowing from the work of Leti Volpp, Franke adds that "[s]trategic
essentialism ideally should be undertaken by the affected community, which
through the implementation of informed consent procedures regulating the disclosure of client secrets
and confidences in defense representation).
418. See Mary Maxwell Thomas, The African American Male: Communication Gap Converts
Justice into "Just Us" System, 13 HARV. BLAcKLETrER J. 1, 16 (1997) (noting that black defendants
face lawyers who "normally have no concept of the lives or language of the defendants affected by their
decisions, leaving defendants with little or no control over how or whether their true story is told").
419. Andrew Stark, Limousine Liberals, Welfare Conservatives: On Belief Interest, and
Inconsistency in Democratic Discourse, 25 POL. THEoRY 475, 496 (1997).
420. For an overview of criminal defense theories of excuse, see generally Stephen J. Morse,
Brain andBlame, 84 GEO. L.J. 527, 529-37 (1996); Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress:Modern Law
Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331 (1997).
421. See, e.g., Nilda Rimonte, A Question of Culture: Cultural Approval of Violence Against
Women in the Pacific-Asian Community and the Cultural Defense, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1311 (1991).
422. See Linda L. Ammons, Mules, Madonnas, Babies, Bathwater, Racial Imagery and
Stereotypes: The African-American Woman and the Battered Woman Syndrome, 1995 Wis. L. REV.
1003, 1068-78 (exploring the tensions arising out of the battered woman defense and certain traits
commonly attributed to black women); Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a
Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367, 398-452 (1996) (discussing racial
stereotypes in the context of self-defense claims).
423. See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography, in
SELECTED SUBALTERN STUDIES 3, 13 (Ranajit Guha & Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak eds., 1988)
(remarking on the strategic use of essentialism to advance political interests).
424. Katherine M. Franke, Homosexuals, Torts, and Dangerous Things, 106 YALE L.J. 2661,
2679 (1997) (book review) (quoting Leti Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture: Asian Women and the
'Cultural Defense', 17 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57, 95 (1994)).
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is best situated to undertake the process of selecting the appropriate
circumstances in which to offer cultural information."'
Franke's derivative notion of strategic essentialism implies an
individual and a community capacity for narrative autonomy. Liberal
theory defines the meaning of autonomy in terms of deliberative self-
governance. 426 Discursively, autonomy may find deliberative expression
in narrative freedom and authenticity.427 Kathryn Abrams points out that
narrative freedom "combines an element of integrity-we act in a way that
honors our conception of ourselves-with an element of creativity-we are
not constrained to accept the version of ourselves that dominant culture
offers us, but are able to engage in subtle acts of reinterpretation."'
Susan Williams outlines a narrative model of autonomy that comprises
three elements of human capacity. 429  The first concerns self-
knowledge. 430  The second involves "a basic sense of self-trust and self-
esteem." 43' The third entails "the ability to understand and appreciate
the evaluative standards of others. "432 For each of these necessary
capacities, Williams explains, "there will in turn be social conditions that
either contribute to or hinder the development or exercise of that
capacity. 433
In matters of race, social conditions invite segregated community. For
many people of color, only the experience of segregated community affords
self-knowledge, trust, and mutual understanding. Williams anticipates the
invitation of community, observing that "[t]he narrative model of autonomy
incorporates a conception of the self as fundamentally defined by its
425. Id. (citation omitted).
426. See generally James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1
(1995). See also David Nyberg, Noble Lies, Narrative Truths, and the Art of Voice: Thoughts on
Pragmatic Language and the First Amendment, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 1203, 1219, 1219-20 (1996)
(construing autonomy to mean self-governing-i.e., it "signifies that a person's wants and purposes are
related to each other in a hierarchy ordered on the basis of held values and commitments, that the
person is internally organized, has reasons, and chooses accordingly").
427. See Susan H. Williams, A Feminist Reassessment of Civil Society, 72 IND. L.J. 417, 430-40
(1997) (describing a narrative model of autonomy emphasizing cultural interpretation).
428. Kathryn Abrams, Redefining Women's Agency: A Response to Professor Williams, 72 IND.
L.J. 459, 459 (1997).
429. Williams explains:
In this narrative model, autonomy is neither a pre-existing condition to be assumed
for all persons, nor is it an end-state that can be taken for granted once achieved. Instead,
it is a process, a process that must be continually ongoing in order for a person to be
autonomous. Moreover, that process is only possible if the person has developed certain
capacities and if her circumstances allow her both the opportunity to exercise those
capacities and the resources necessary to act on them.
Williams, supra note 427, at 432 (footnotes omitted).
430. See id.
431. Id.
432. Id. at 433.
433. Id.
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relations to others. 4 34  To Williams, "autonomy itself is dependent on
those relations."'435 Indeed, "the capacities necessary to autonomy can
be conceived only within such relations: they are not, even in theory,
describable as the characteristics of isolated individuals. "436 In sum, for
Williams, the content of the identity used to construct the narrative model
of autonomy "is itself composed of socially generated concepts and
relations."437 Deterioration in social conditions and relations brought on
by segregation, however, erodes client autonomy and compromises lawyer-
client deliberation of community. Autonomy erodes from the deprivations
of political and socioeconomic life accompanying segregation. Community
deliberation deteriorates from the scarcity of opportunity to consider racial
equality and reciprocity in the context of democratic citizenship.
Racialized narratives and racial inequality signal this erosion.
Consider race-based deviance theories of excuse. Such theories emphasize
passion and provocation. An early antecedent lies in the black rage
defense.438 Racial deviance narratives fit the general category of syn-
drome evidence.439  This evidence may encompass abuse,' 0 diminished
capacity," t and socioeconomic deprivation.' 2  The erosion of delibera-
tive autonomy norms under these conditions is inevitable.
Yet, race trials may operate under alternative conditions issuing from
racial conceptions of identity that honor individual and collective capacities
for narrative autonomy and authenticity. Racial conceptions of identity
434. Id. at 435.
435. Id. Williams links narrative discourse to social relations existing in context. She comments:
"[The capacities necessary to exercise narrative autonomy are the product of certain sorts of social
relations... and require a particular social context in order to be maintained." Id.
436. Id. Williams notes that "unlike the older model [of autonomy], one cannot be an autonomous
person in isolation; one can only be autonomous in relationship with other persons." Id.
437. Id.
438. See HARRIS, supra note 145, at 2-7; Kimberly M. Copp, Note, Black Rage: The Illegitimacy
of a CriminalDefense, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 205, 227-29 (1995); Patricia J. Falk, Novel Theories
of Criminal Defense Based Upon the Toxicity of the Social Environment: Urban Psychosis, Television
Intoxication, and Black Rage, 74 N.C. L. REV. 731, 748-57 (1996) (all describing defense theories
based on race-informed behavior).
439. See Robert P. Mosteller, Syndromes and Politics in Criminal Trials and Evidence Law, 46
DUKE L.J. 461, 463 (1996) (defining syndrome evidence in terms of "a claim that physical or
psychological markers reveal its cause, that it has significant and predictable effects on perceptions and
behaviors, or that experts can accurately identify individuals who fit within its boundaries").
440. See Peter Arenella, Demystifying the Abuse Excuse: Is There One?, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 703 (1996); Richard J. Bonnie, Excusing and Punishing in Criminal Adjudication: A Reality
Check, 5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (1995) (both exploring abuse-related defense strategies used
mainly as a form of mitigation).
441. See Richard L. Nygaard, On Responsibility: Or, the Insanity of Mental Defenses and
Punishment, 41 VILL. L. REv. 951, 975-85 (1996) (proposing bifurcation of diminished capacity trial
proceedings into performative and remedial phases).
442. See Richard Delgado, "Rotten Social Background": Should the Criminal Law Recognize a
Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAw & INEQ. J. 9 (1985) (discussing the role of
socioeconomic deprivation in the cause and defense of criminal behavior).
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containing the capacity for racial respect, trust, and social cooperation
potentially may be found within certain collaborative norms of litigation
governing fields of practice largely untainted by racialized rhetoric.'
An authenticity-based conception of identity connects up race with aspira-
tional principles of deliberative autonomy and democracy. That connection
works to reconcile the racialized self and community. Reconciliation urges
a biracial conception of citizenship that revives the rhetoric of the public
interest.' 4 Biracial citizenship offers a better account of race relations
normatively and historically. The account defines the African-American
community by "the prevalence of extended care networks."' The net-
works refer to "circles of commitment that extend beyond immediate kin
to people related by ties of friendship, community, culture and shared
oppression."'s Those networks introduce a related conception of the
neighborhood as a political entity.'47 The task is to reconstruct the black
community as a political entity entitled to protection.
Lisa Kelly asserts that race "transcends place, creating a community
that has little to do with geography but everything to do with the larger
political and cultural community of color."" This larger community,
Kelly insists, "generally recognizes the reality of racism, the pleasure of
a common culture, and the need to act together to effectuate common inter-
ests and to remedy common problems that repeat themselves across
geographical divides."" 9  The notion of a common culture intimates
443. See Rachel Croson & Robert H. Mnookin, Does Disputing Through Agents Enhance
Cooperation?: Experimental Evidence, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 331, 344-45 (1997); Ronald J. Gilson &
Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in
Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509 (1994).
444. On the instability of even prosaic definitions of the public interest, see Patricia M. Wald,
Whose Public Interest Is It Anyway?: Advice for Altruistic Young Lawyers, 47 ME. L. REV. 3 (1995).
445. Peggy Cooper Davis, "So Tall Within"--The Legacy of Sojourner Truth, 18 CARDOZO L.
REV. 451, 466 (1996).
446. Id. at 466. Davis remarks: "Since the days of slavery, extended care networks have linked
African-American people in kinship and friendship groups committed to mutual sustenance, values of
nurturance, and social responsibility." Id. at 467.
447. See Georgette C. Poindexter, Collective Individualism: Deconstructing the Legal City, 145
U. PA. L. REv. 607, 648-53 (1997) (envisioning a political neighborhood functioning politically and
legally autonomously from municipal government).
448. Lisa A. Kelly, Race and Place: Geographic and Transcendent Community in the Post-Shaw
Era, 49 VAND. L. REV. 227, 234 (1996).
449. Id. at 234-35. Kelly adds:
Transcendent community interests should not be confused with a simplistic belief
that the African-American community is a monolithic entity in which all people of color
live identical lives in every respect, agree with one another, or even like one another.
Nevertheless, color is an immutable psychological fact packed with cultural, historical,
and sociological significance that shapes the contours of individual daily lives in ways
sometimes subtle and sometimes all too brutally clear. Rhetorical devices that label the
recognition of transcendent community interests as "stereotyping" or "stigmatizing" are
often used to silence important discussions of race that need to be had ....
Id. at 235.
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Regina Austin's notion of the "black public sphere.""45  To Austin, the
black public sphere "consists of all the markets and audiences that consume
the fruits of black creativity, productivity, and sensitivity to the material
and moral order of things in America."451 In this way, according to
Austin, the black public sphere "encompasses both politics and
economics. " " Recontextualizing racialized defense strategy in terms of
community locates race trials in their appropriate social context. 453 The
appeal of local context, however, proves short-lived, for the context of
community is multi-faceted. Spurred by historical fragmentation, racial
community now appears fatally riven by fissures marked by ethnicity,
gender, and sexual orientation. For reasons peculiar to race trials, those
fissures recede in the Nelson case covered over by simplified expressions
of hate. The next Part considers the principal elements of a contextualized
racial ethics garnered from Critical Race Theory.
V. Race-ing Ethics
This Part applies the main jurisprudential themes of Critical Race
Theory to the issues of racial identity, racialized narrative, and race-neutral
representation arising in the Nelson trials. The application maps the
contingencies of and the tensions internal to racial status and racialized
narrative illustrated in the pleadings, motions, and courtroom tactics of the
prosecution and defense teams, and in the trial and appellate court rulings
adjudicating those strategic practices.
A. Racial Inferiority
Despite differences in the nature of the charges, the conduct of the
proceedings, and the ultimate results obtained, both the state and federal
trials of Lemrick Nelson constitute race trials. Critical Race Theory helps
explain this commonality. At stake in the trials is the symbolic and
narrative status of race and racial inferiority. In race trials, the precept of
450. Austin, supra note 124, at 340.
451. Id.
452. Id. Austin notes:
The most salient feature of the black public sphere is that it "puts engagement,
competition and exchange in the place of resistance, and uses performativity to capture
audiences, Black and White, for things fashioned through Black experience."
It is in the black public sphere that black public opinion and a black political agenda
are formed. It is in the black public sphere that a conception of the black "good life" is
formulated and debated.
M. (citation omitted).
453. For a deft correlation of context and narrative in the legal construction of race and gender,
see Jody Armour, Just Deserts: Narrative, Perspective, Choice, and Blame, 57 U. Prrr. L. REv. 525
(1996); Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and
Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REv. 781 (1994).
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inferiority infects the form and substance of the legal process. The
defendant in this process is an object of hate. Here Nelson, guilty of the
sin of blackness, falls beyond the redemptive powers of religion and
civilization. Hence, he is deserving only of punishment.
The prosecution of Nelson articulates a vision of blackness as original
sin. That vision evokes an image of Nelson not only as an object of hate,
but also as a deformed subject. Both state and federal prosecutors depicted
Nelson and other young black males as enslaved by deviant pathologies of
race hatred and mob violence without hope of cure or rehabilitation 4
The political posturing of local and national lawmakers left this vision of
inferiority unchallenged.455 Federal court construction of the relevant
adult transfer statute enacted a similar betrayal, legitimizing the reasonable-
ness of the factual finding of irredeemable black racial inferiority.456
The Nelson and Price defense teams reproduced the inferiority precept
in their representation. The teams described Nelson as stunted457 and
Price as incompetent.4 8 At the same time, they deployed the precept of
inferiority to contest the motive, credibility, and neutrality of arresting
officers, prosecutors, and federal as well as state judges. 9 The deploy-
ment of racialized credibility assessments' indicates a hierarchical view
of objectivity and truth. On this view, white political and socioeconomic
superiority distorts objectivity and deforms truth. Hierarchies of dominant-
subordinate race relations, therefore, intimate inherent bias. The next
subpart considers whether racial bias gives rise to individual or community
harm.
B. Racial Harm
The Nelson and Price defense teams' trumpeting of the rhetoric of
inferiority suggests that racialized narratives at times may be wielded
strategically to acquit young black males of charges of interracial violence.
454. See supra notes 306-17 and accompanying text.
455. See Bob Liff, Cuomo: Heights Probe to Eye Dinkins' Role, NEWSDAY, Dec. 18, 1992, at 42
(reporting that New York GovernorMario Cuomo, after meeting with "Jewish leaders," stated: "There
is no doubt in my mind that there is in the larger Jewish community, far beyond the Hasidim of Crown
Heights or the Jews of Brooklyn or the Jews of the city, a feeling of insecurity, a feeling of disappoint-
ment that somehow they are being shunned or worse.").
456. United States v. Nelson, 921 F. Supp. 105 (E.D.N.Y.), af'd, 90 F.3d 636, 640-41 (2d Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1259 (1997); United States v. Nelson, 68 F.3d 583, 589-91 (2d Cir.
1995).
457. See Brief for Defendant-Appellee Lemrick Nelson, Jr. at 16-18, United States v. Nelson, 68
F.3d 583 (2d Cir. 1995) (No. 95-1271).
458. See Wise, supra note 343, at 1.
459. See notes 333-352 and accompanying text.
460. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Color of Truth: Race and the Assessment of Credibility, 1
MICH. J. RACE & L. 261, 266-317 (1996) (recounting the historical influence of race on witness
credibility).
13531998]
Texas Law Review [Vol. 76:1293
Acquittal, however, provides no answer to the individual and collective
experience of racial stigma-based harm. The proposition that racialized
narratives cause harm requires a theory of harm. Civil rights doctrine
propounds several theories of harm germane to this inquiry.
Consider first the concept of stigma injury. Embodied in affirmative
action,461 school desegregation, 462  and voting rights463  doctrine,
stigma injury is founded on a classification theory of harm. Under this
model, the injury of racial stigma ensues from the state-sanctioned enact-
ment of racial classification. The model of classificatory injury also
extends to the color-coded and color-conscious exercise of peremptory
challenges under Batson v. Kentucky.4  But extending the substantive
parameters of stigma injury fails to cure its conceptual vagueness, 65 or
its uncertain etiology.' Moreover, the strain of extension fails to sever
the tie binding status harm to the narrative of black inferiority.' 67
Narratives of inferiority portray black defendants as the deviant or
deformed representatives of future black generations .468
Next consider the notion of expressive or representational harm.49
Predicated on colorblind principles of participatory citizenship and state
regulation of the electoral process, this notion defines injury based on the
461. See Andrew F. Halaby & Stephen R. McAllister, An Analysis of the Supreme Court's
Reliance on Racial "Stigma" as a Constitutional Concept in Affirmative Actions Cases, 2 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 235,240-47 (1997) (analyzing the constitutional concept of stigma in the context of affirma-
tive action).
462. See John D. Casais, Note, Ignoring the Harm: The Supreme Court, Stigmatic Injury, and the
End of School Desegregation, 14 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 259, 262-64 (1994) (reviewing stigmatic
injury in school desegregation cases).
463. See Samuel Issacharoff & Thomas C. Goldstein, Identifying the Harm in Racial
Gerrymandering Claims, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 47, 51-54 (1996) (noting the inclusion of stigma harm
in voting rights cases).
464. See also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (extending Batson to gender-
based classifications).
465. See David Flickinger, Standing in Racial Gerrymandering Cases, 49 STAN. L. REV. 381,
395-96 (1997).
466. Diagnostic uncertainty plagues attempts to trace the cultural and social etiology of stigma
injury. Compare Stanislaw Pomorski, On Multiculturalism, Concepts of Crime, and the "De Minimis"
Defense, 1997 BYU L. REV. 51, 53-69 (examining theories of bias injury), with Katheryn K. Russell,
The Racial Hoax as Crime: The Law as Affirmation, 71 IND. L.J. 593, 607-11 (1996) (exploring
theories of sociological injury).
467. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Race and the New Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 935, 943 (1996)
("To this day, one's social status in America is determined by the presence or absence of a genetic tie
to a Black parent.").
468. See Frankie Y. Bailey, "The Tangle of Pathology" and the Lower-Class African-American
Family: Historical and Social Science Perspectives, in JUSTICE WITH PREJUDICE: RACE AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE IN AMERICA 49-71 (Michael J. Lynch & E. Britt Patterson eds., 1996).
469. For a deft analysis of expressive harm, see Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi,
Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances
After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 506-16 (1993).
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perception of state investment in racial gerrymander.47  On this
definition, the very perception of institutionalized racial bias constitutes
harm. Richard Pildes and Richard Niemi liken this categorical harm to the
conception of expressive harm.47  Constitutionally cognizable under
Shaw v. Reno,'7 expressive harm "results from the ideas or attitudes
expressed through a governmental action, rather than from the more tan-
gible or material consequences the action brings about. 4 7 Under the
model of expressive harm, Pildes and Niemi explain, "the meaning of a
governmental action is just as important as what that action does."'474
Accordingly, state mandated or condoned "policies can violate the
Constitution not only because they bring about concrete costs, but because
the very meaning they convey demonstrates inappropriate respect for rel-
evant public values."'475
For Pildes and Niemi, expressive harms implicate the "interpretive
dimension of public action."476 Composed of public understandings and
collective norms, this dimension may be roiled by governmental action that
conveys the affirmation or rejection of certain commonly held values, 4'
such as racial integration or segregation. To advocates and courts clasping
on to a theory of expressive harm, neither the general purpose of legisla-
tion nor the specific intent of policymakers manifested in the commands of
state action warrants traditional modes of constitutional scrutiny.47 Of
greater importance, Pildes and Niemi assert, "is the social message their
action conveys or, less positivistically, the message courts perceive the
action to convey.'479
Extrapolating from these models of harm to the modalities of race
trials, what matters is attribution, that is, the attribution of "social
meaning"' to state action. Here, state action comprises state actors and
private actors acting in concert with state entities or in accord with state
policies and practices. Consider Shaw v. Reno in this light. Shaw
elucidates the constitutional meaning of voting rights when burdened by
470. See John Hart Ely, Standing to Challenge Pro-Minority Gerrymanders, 111 HARV. L. REV.
576 (1997).
471. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 469, at 506.
472. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
473. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 469, at 506-07.
474. Id. at 507 (emphasis in original).
475. Id. Highlighting the centrality of public values, Pildes and Niemi exclaim: "On this unusual
conception of constitutional harm, when a governmental action expresses disrespect for such values,
it can violate the Constitution." Id.
476. Id.
477. See id. at 507-08.
478. See id.
479. Id. at 508.
480. Pildes and Niemi remark that the subjective intent actually motivating state action and state
actors may be material but not dispositive under an expressive harm approach. See id.
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race-based state legislation creating majority-black districts."' The North
Carolina district at issue, containing boundary lines of "dramatically
irregular shape," provoked a white claim of unconstitutional racial
gerrymander.' Concededly designed in a state effort to benefit mem-
bers of historically disadvantaged racial minority groups, the redistricting
plan induced suspicion of race-conscious classificatory decisionmaking."1
Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor declares express racial
classifications "immediately suspect" for two reasons: first, because the
classifications "threaten to stigmatize individuals by reason of their
membership in a racial group," and second, because they tend "to incite
racial hostility."" To O'Connor, the intertwining of racial classifica-
tions within race-conscious gerrymandering schemes, whatever the remedial
purposes, "reinforce[s] the belief, held by too many for much of our
history, that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin. "I
It is the noxious history of color-coded judgments that, for O'Connor,
compels the conclusion that race-based classifications "of any sort pose the
risk of lasting harm to our society. , 486 Judged to be of higher magnitude
in the context of voting, the harm risks the descent away from colorblind
aspiration into the balkanized competition of "racial factions.""1
Reasoning from the premise of feared racial factionalism, O'Connor
moves rhetorically to the evocation of segregation and apartheid. That
move opens Shaw to the concept of expressive or representational harm.
Representative democracy infuses the core of that concept. Indeed, for
O'Connor, racial gerrymandering "reinforces racial stereotypes and threat-
ens to undermine our system of representative democracy by signaling to
elected officials that they represent a particular racial group rather than
their constituency as a whole. "488 Condemning that message as
pernicious, O'Connor asserts that "[a] reapportionment plan that includes
in one district individuals who belong to the same race, but who are
otherwise widely separated by geographical and political boundaries, and
who may have little in common with one another but the color of their
skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid."8 9 The
intolerable resemblance to apartheid, O'Connor continues, "reinforces the
perception that members of the same racial group-regardless of their age,
education, economic status, or the community in which they live-think
481. See id. at 633.
482. Id. at 633, 633-34.
483. See id. at 633-34, 642.
484. Id. at 642-43.
485. Id. at 657.
486. Id.
487. Id.
488. Id. at 650.
489. Id. at 647.
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alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates
at the polls. 4 9"
To the extent that it conjures up "impermissible racial stereotypes,"
O'Connor concludes, that perception is constitutionally fatal to a reappor-
tionment plan.49 That same perception is equally fatal when applied to
a redistricting plan plainly "created solely to effectuate the perceived
common interests of one racial group. " " In these circumstances,
O'Connor repeats, "elected officials are more likely to believe that their
primary obligation is to represent only the members of that group, rather
than their constituency as a whole."4 93 Encapsulating this logic, Richard
Briffault delimits representational harm as "the reinforcement of the
stereotype that voters of the same race tend to think and vote alike, and the
signal that elected officials should represent only the racial majority."4'
Stitched together, the Shaw theories of stigma injury and expressive or
representational harm may contribute to the formulation of a new torte9'
based on social contract 4 96 or group defamation497 precepts.
Undergirding this formulation is a reconfigured sense of a social contract
binding among racial groups for the purpose of respecting the dignity of
racial identity and of safeguarding against the harm inflicted by infringe-
ments upon the integrity of a racial identity narrative. The next subpart
explores the implications of a theory of racial harm to the development of
a racial ethics.
C. Racial Ethics
Basic to the development of a racial ethics are the issues of scope and
fidelity to precedent. Ethical directives may command a broad or narrow
regulatory field. The narrow ethical range of current racial regulation
stems not only from constitutional commitments to a colorblind faith, but
also from doubts pertaining to the institutional competence of appropriate
regulatory bodies, such as courts and bar associations.49 Whatever the
elected scope of broadened regulation, the directives exert greater efficacy
490. Id.
491. Id.
492. Id. at 648.
493. Id.
494. Richard Briffault, Race and Representation After Miller v. Johnson, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 23, 38 (1995).
495. See Anita Bernstein, How to Make a New Tort: Three Paradoxes, 75 TEXAS L. REV. 1539,
1540-41 (1997) (offering definitional criteria for new torts).
496. See Marshall S. Shapo, A Social Contract Tort, 75 TEXAS L. REV. 1835, 1844 (1997)
(construing tort law "as a catalyst for social cohesion").
497. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Defamation, Reputation, andthe Myth of Community, 71 WASH.
L. REv. 1 (1996) (examining reputational harm as a socially constructed injury).
498. See generally Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, supra note 61.
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when linked to the text, structure, and history of traditional ethics rules.
Finding linkages in the text, structure, and history of ethics rules involves
the discrete interpretive practices of statutory construction, common law
parsing, and moral divination. Conceptual disagreement over the constitu-
ent elements of those practices unsettles governing rules producing a
juridical environment of interpretive chaos. 499  Both linguistic"°  and
rule-based5°' indeterminacy contribute to this sense of interpretive chaos.
Nonetheless, ethical rules perform a kind of "mystic function ' 502 in
matters of race. Espousing race-neutral rhetoric, the rules impose order
on the interpretive chaos of color-coded and color-conscious discourse
inside the courtroom. To discharge this performative function, the rules
embrace "identity speech." 0 3  That speech, shown here in the form of
racialized narrative, effectively stabilizes legal discourse.
Race brings a fixed coherence to legal discourse by associating color-
coded and color-conscious narratives with objectivity."° Frederick
Gedicks explains this association, asserting that "[v]alidity in interpretation
depends at some point on a demonstration of objective meaning in the
interpretive process. '"50 5  Absent this demonstration, he adds,
499. Paul Campos discovers chaos in the most basic interpretive practices of advocacy and
adjudication. See generally Paul F. Campos, The Chaotic Pseudotext, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2178 (1996).
He explains:
[I]f the participants in an interpretive practice cannot agree on the basic constitutive
elements of that practice-if they disagree about whether when they are "interpreting" a
"text" they are searching for a text's author's intentions, or deploying formal rules of
meaning, or disputing what constifiutes a legitimate author for a certain kind of text, or
contesting which texts count for how much in the production of the system's meaning-
then this lack of conceptual agreement concerning the nature of the constitutive elements
of the practice will itself tend to have a pseudotextualizing effect on those texts the
practice is attempting to interpret. And lack of such conceptual agreement, coupled with
an insistence on both the absolute necessity and the assumed existence of such agreement,
is precisely what identifies an interpretive practice as a chaotic discourse.
Id. at 2224.
500. See Timothy A.O. Endicott, Linguistic Indeterminacy, 16 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 669
(1996) (defining linguistic indeterminacy as "unclarity in the meaning of linguistic expressions").
501. On ethics rule indeterminacy, see generally David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers,
104 HARV. L. REV. 468 (1990).
502. This phrase is taken from Bickel. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH 29-33 (2d ed. 1986) (pointing to the legitimation function of Supreme Court review and
adjudication); see also Scott E. Gant, Judicial Supremacy and Nonjudicial Interpretation of the
Constitution, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 359, 401, 401-03 (1997) (comparing the "mystic function"
of the Supreme Court with the myth that courts are authoritative arbiters of the Constitution).
503. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of "Coming Out": Religion, Homosexuality,
and Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2411, 2442 (1997)
(assessing the value of identity speech to the gay community).
504. On the earmarks of narrative coherence in legal decision-making and legislative rnle-making,
see Jan M. Van Dunn6, Narrative Coherence and Its Function in Judicial Decision Making and
Legislation, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 463, 465 (1996).
505. Frederick M. Gedicks, Conservatives, Liberals, Romantics: The Persistent Questfor Certainty
in Constitutional Interpretation, 50 VAND. L. REV. 613, 643 (1997).
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"interpretive method cannot designate as valid one among differing
interpretations without being random or arbitrary."5"
Changing accounts of racial identity expressed in racialized narratives
fail to weaken the claim of objectivity contained in the ethics rules.
Objectivity holds constant because the accounts accrue from the same base-
line of racial bias and prejudice. Stretched along this baseline, only the
circumstances of bias change. The meaning attached to these circum-
stances is predictable, not random. Predicting the exact form of narrative,
of course, involves the acknowledgement of contingency. For Gedicks,
interpretive forms "are contingent and local, peculiar to the case, the
judge, and the tradition."5 7 As a consequence, the objectivity of racial-
ized narratives articulated under ethics rules exists in a closed interpretive
field of the courtroom and the law office.
Surprisingly, the structure of the rules militates against interpretive
closure. The structure of the rules opens up the interpretive field of
racialized narratives by inscribing unresolved conflicts in lawyer commit-
ments to the law, to the client, and to the tribunal. The conflicts arise
from public axioms of lawyer obligation implied in the rules.
Unfortunately, racialized narratives describe what Sanford Levinson calls
"a singular public.""' The depiction of a singular racial public survives
in spite of the presence of "various publics ' '"" 9 within communities of
color. Reference to a pluralist racial community"0 is a threshold obliga-
tion of a racial ethics.
In this preliminary design of a racial ethics, it is appropriate to mark
the continuities and discontinuities of racialized advocacy inlaid within
conventional rules. Like racialized narratives, racialized practice traditions
vary over time and place. Stephen Feldman cautions that "while the
concept of a tradition helps us to grasp or understand the social
construction of reality-our being-in-the-world-we should not attempt to
reify or reduce any actual tradition (or even the concept of a tradition) into
a single linguisti6 formulation or a fixed object."5 '' The diverse
506. Id.
507. Id. at 645.
508. See Sanford Levinson, They Whisper: Reflections on Flags, Monuments, and State Holidays,
and the Construction of Social Meaning in a Multicultural Society, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1079, 1118-
19 (1995) (emphasis in original).
509. Id. at 1118.
510. On community diversity and divergence, see Glen 0. Robinson, Communities, 83 VA. L.
REV. 269, 333-46 (1997).
511. See Stephen M. Feldman, The Politics of Postmodern Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L. REv. 166,
198 (1996) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). Feldman asserts: "Traditions are neither fixed
and precisely bounded entities nor are they passed on to individuals through some precise method or
mechanical process. The boundaries of any tradition are always contested, always constituted and
reconstituted, and this constant reconstitution always is simultaneously constructive and destructive."
Id.
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traditions of racialized practice, fragmenting into colorblind, color-coded,
and color-conscious forms, resist reductionist tendencies of this sort. Yet,
continuities of racialized practice may be discerned in numerous settings.
In the criminal setting, for example, continuity runs to the designation
of the defense lawyer as the appropriate decisionmaker in determining the
means to attain specified client objectives, namely freedom. 2
Determinations entailing issues of racial identity and racialized narrative,
however, demand an element of professional competence that lawyers may
lack. That incompetence is aggravated by differential lawyer-client
normative positions, risk-taking attitudes, and access to information. The
transactional inefficiency of an alternative decisionmaking arrangement
persuades lawyers to ignore evidence of their own incompetence in the
strategic exercise of racial judgment and enunciation of racialized narrative.
A second point of continuity pertains to client consent. The notion of
informed consent pervades the ethics rules. Although the rules contemplate
a range of consent options of varying transactional cost," 3 all cite to a
fundamental client right to direct a choice of outcomes structured on
implied liberty and due process interests. 4 Yet, none seriously consider
the circumstances and conditions of the "moment of choice '' 51 5 in race
cases, even given the ordinary risk of undue influence caused by inequali-
ties of power or circumstance. 6 Racial difference at the level of
lawyer-client interaction heightens the element of risk. Moreover,
difference may generate special racialized effects, exacting a chilling effect
on speech. 17
A third point of continuity concerns client fidelity. The notion of
client fidelity or loyalty is fundamental to the conditions of race-neutral
representation. Despite historical variation, such conditions include the
presumptions that client self-interest and decisionmaking integrity exist
apart from considerations of community harm or politics. These
512. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) cmt. (1997).
513. On the range of consent under coercive circumstances, see Joshua Cohen, The Arc of the
Moral Universe, 26 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 92, 101-11 (1997) (explicating symbolic, distributive, and
productive uses of force under slavery).
514. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) cmt. (1997).
515. Scott FitzGibbon & Kwan Kew Lai, The Model Physician-Assisted Suicide Act and the
Jurisprudence of Death, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 127, 149 (1996) (examining the conditions
impinging on the exercise of personal autonomy in seeking assisted suicide).
516. See generally Ray D. Madoff, Unmasking Undue Influence, 81 MINN. L. REV. 571, 578-92
(1997) (discussing the presumption of undue influence in fiduciary relationships).
517. Compare Deborah Epstein, Can a "Dumb Ass Woman"Achieve Equality in the Workplace?
Running the Gauntlet of Hostile Environment Harassing Speech, 84 GEO. L.J. 399 (1996), andDeborah
Epstein, Free Speech at Work: Verbal Harassment as Gender-Based Discriminatory (Mis)Treatment,
85 GEO. L.J. 649 (1997), with Eugene Volokh, What Speech Does "Hostile Work Environment"
Harassment Law Restrict?, 85 GEO. L.J. 627 (1997) (all debating the intersection of harassment law
and free speech).
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presumptive conditions prohibit client coercion applied in the name of
community, politics, or social utility."' David Luban notes that coercion
of this sort "affronts deep-seated intuitions about human dignity."519
Paradoxically, the rule-decreed advancement of client self-interest may
entail the use of self- or community-subordinating racialized narrative.
Failure to use such narrative may constitute ineffective assistance or even
malpractice.
Confronting the compelled use of racialized narrative recommends
devising a racial ethics that contains, if not a release option freeing lawyers
from such use, then at least a remediation option limiting racialized
narrative to situations where it may rectify adversarial advantage or deter
adversarial deployment, even through retaliation. Failing that, the
invention of a racial ethics must break from the text, structure, and history
of the ethics rules. Departing from these traditions enables alternative code
system designers, whether bar associations or state courts, to build on the
discontinuities of client-community interest in favor of an antifidelity
position. This position reimagines an "ethic of responsibility" for lawyers
in race trials. The ethic is based on a notion of legal and political
responsibility to an other-an individual, group, or community connected
to but standing apart from the client."2 Adoption of that ethic requires
provocative value judgments based on an as yet inchoate politics of group
and community representation. These moral judgments dictate the aban-
donment or modification of the norms governing client autonomy and
lawyer conflicts of interest in race trials. In their place, designers must
uncover alternative norms that will mediate the tension between individual
client and collective group interests21
The mediation of client and community interests commences through
the forging of links between individual and collective deliberation:.5
518. See David Luban, What's Pragmatic About Legal Pragmatism?, 18 CARDOZO L. REv. 43,
63 (1996) (discussing the tension between pragmatic and dignitary claims in the context of coercion).
519. Id.
520. Simon Chesterman mentions a new ethic of "responsibility to justice." See Simon
Chesterman, Beyond Fusion Fallacy: The Transformation of Equity and Derrida's 'The Force of Law',
24 J.L. & Soc'Y 350, 364 (1997). He adds:
Not only is every case a hard one, in every case the law must be reinvented.
Responsibility to justice is in this sense a manifestation of the relation to the other, the
conditions for which intersubjectivity lie in the to-come. And it is here, in the face of this
impossible demand to "address oneself to the other in the language of the other," that the
condition of all possible justice lies.
Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
521. See Kevin C. McMunigal, Of Causes and Clients: Two Tales of Roe v. Wade, 47 HASTINGS
L.J. 779, 805-07, 810-18 (1996) (citing encroachment on client autonomy in public interest reproduc-
tive rights advocacy).
522. Cf. Kenneth Ward, The Allure and Danger of Community Values: A Criticism of Liberal
Republican Constitutional Theory, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 171, 197-203 (1996). Ward observes:
"Liberal republicans link individual and collective deliberation. The political community emerges as
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The goal is to engender a "politics of presence"5" for individuals,
groups, and communities that overcomes racially essentialist narratives.2 4
Kathryn Abrams defines this politics "as a society-wide conversation about
the political consequences of conceiving people as members of groups
rather than as unmarked individuals.""z Because that conversation may
be quickly subverted by the indeterminacy of individual-group boundaries,
transforming the antifidelity position into practice requires client-
community dialogue. Both trust and mutual respect serve as prerequisites
for dialogue 26 employed in reconciling the competing rights of clients
and communities.527  Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson define mutual
respect in a manner that "requires a favorable attitude toward, and
constructive interaction with, the persons with whom one disagrees. "528
Basic to this attitude is a sense of reciprocity 29 grounded in the idea of
mutual client-community accountability. 3
Reciprocity is realized in the practice of deliberative democracy.53'
Distilling the notion of mutual respect put forward by Gutmann and
Thompson, Robert George argues that "reciprocity is realized in practice
people discover values that are consistent with their private interests. Because the community results
from individuals' ordering their private interests, political institutions must respect rights that promote
individual and collective deliberation." Id. at 203.
523. ANNE PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF PRESENCE 5 (1995).
524. See Note, The Myth of Context in Politics and Law, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1292 (1997)
(discussing essentialist and antiessentialist tensions in visions of group rights).
525. Kathryn Abrams, The Supreme Court, Wisibility, and the "Politics of Presence", 50 VAND.
L. REV. 411, 411 (1997) (footnote omitted); see also PHILLIPS, supra note 523, at 1-26.
526. On dialogue as an element of pragmatic moral problem solving, see Joseph J. Fins et al.,
Clinical Pragmatism: A Method of Moral Problem Solving, 7 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 129, 140
(1997) (using a medical case study to demonstrate the effectiveness of dialogue for moral problem
solving).
527. See Georgia Warnke, Law, Hermeneutics, and Public Debate, 9 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 395,
406-08 (1997) (discussing the potential for mutual learning in constitutional debates).
528. AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 79 (1996).
529. Robert George remarks:
Reciprocity is above all a constitutive moral value of deliberative democracy, something
that democratic citizens owe to one another as a matter of justice. It is what might be
called a "common good" of the political community, a mutual moral benefit to all
concerned, even (or perhaps especially) when people find themselves in irresolvable
disagreement over fundamental moral issues. As such, the mutual respect citizens owe
to one another provides a kind of moral bond between them, their substantive moral
disagreements notwithstanding; and it requires them to search for moral accommodation
whenever possible.
George, supra note 388, at 1394.
530. See Stephen K. White, Weak Ontology and Liberal Political Reflection, 25 POL. THEORY
502, 518 (1997).
531. See Robert P. George, Public Reason and Political Conflict: Abortion and Homosexuality,
106 YALE L.J. 2475, 2503 (1997) ("[It seems at least possible for citizens who differ fundamentally
over certain basic moral questions to share a 'deliberative' conception of democracy that includes the
mutually recognized obligations of citizens to treat those with whom they disagree with civility and
respect.").
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when, or to the extent that, citizens understand and accept the obligation
to justify their positions to those fellow citizens who reasonably
disagree."532 George adds that "people ought to respect the principle of
reciprocity whenever they find themselves in disagreement with reasonable
people of goodwill, regardless whether they find the position (or even the
arguments) advanced by such people to be worthy of respect. 5 33 To be
sure, reciprocity holds no guarantee of client-community interest mediation.
Both criminal prosecution and defense regimes privilege client and govern-
ment interests over community and third party considerations. Yet, reci-
procity introduces a new mode of dialogue expressly tied to the creation
and recollection of community. In this way, it promises hope of interest
convergence and, at the same time, anticipates the protest of interest
divergence and ultimate conflict. Whether the application of new forms of
race-conscious community-guided regulation to prosecutorial and defense
models of legal advocacy produces a sense of interest convergence suffi-
cient to overcome the radical individualism of the adversarial model
remains unclear. Nevertheless, reaching out to achieve that result is
plainly the ambition of a racial ethics. The next Part considers objections
to that ambition.
VI. Objections
This part enumerates objections to the alternative regulatory concept
of a race-conscious community ethic of advocacy. Three such objections
seem especially powerful. The first goes to the claim of client-community
goal correspondence. The second deals with the nature of the attorney-
client relationship. The third cuts to the causal connections linking law,
culture, and society.
Historically, the claim of client-community goal consensus may be
insupportable. Jurisprudentially, it may be unworkable. The historical
record of client-community consensus in communities of color is mixed.
Instead of concordance, the record is one of conflict and fragmentation.
Worse, the claim of deliberative dialogue as a means of building consensus
532. George, supra note 388, at 1394.
533. Id. at 1397. George comments:
By observing the principle of reciprocity in moral and political debate, one is not
necessarily indicating respect for a position (which one perhaps reasonably judges to be
so deeply immoral as to be unworthy of respect), but for the reasonableness and goodwill
of the person who, however misguidedly, happens to hold that position. The point of
observing the requirements of reciprocity is to fulfill one's obligations in justice to one's
fellow citizens who are, like oneself, attempting to think through the moral question at
issue as best they can.
Id. at 1398.
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seems unworkable. The claim more nearly suggests a misguided jurispru-
dence of democracy predicated on a rebuttable presumption of collective
or other-directed deliberation. 34
The historical and jurisprudential obstacles to achieving client-
community goal consensus are in part a function of the adversarial system.
Critical Legal Studies scholars and others have long noted the system-wide
adversarial tendency to isolate, narrow, and juxtapose the interests of indi-
vidual litigants against and in competition with collective group or com-
munity interests .5  This incongruency inheres in the liberal conception
of adversarialism spawning inconsistencies between the systemic goals of
group representation and the functions of individual advocacy. Strategic
analysis of this internal inconsistency or weakness indicates that race-
conscious community advocacy may produce serious "system-unintended"
consequences 536 by operating to subordinate clients in order to meet the
goal of collective representation. Most serious of these unintended conse-
quences is the provision of ineffective assistance to the detriment of the
client.
A second objection speaks to the unsatisfactory nature of the account
given of the attorney-client relationship. According to this objection, the
attorney-client relationship can support neither an ethos of "democratic
self-perfection, 537  nor a pursuit of client high-risk preferences in
litigation strategy.538 By any measure, the advocacy relationship already
suffers the inequities of paternalism in counseling. 39 The potential
deception of clients and communities of color in counseling and negotiation
534. For sharp criticism of deliberative regimes, see Lynn M. Sanders, Against Deliberation, 25
POL. THEORY 347 (1997).
535. See Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the
Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEXAS L. REv. 1563, 1569-99 (1984).
536. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 479, 507, 506-09
(1997). LoPucki explains:
In essence, strategic analysis is a modem-day adaptation of Oliver Wendell Holmes's "bad
man" theory of the law. Holmes argued that the meaning of a law might be best
understood by the use that a bad man might make of it. In systems terms, Holmes's bad
man is replaced by a strategist. The strategist may be either a real person, whose actual
strategies are observed by the system analyst, or a hypothetical person. The strategist
modifies his or her conduct to seek advantages from the system. If the strategist is able
to bring about "system-unintended" results, the strategist thereby demonstrates the need
for changes in the system.
Id. at 507.
537. On the ethos of this democratic ideal, see Richard Shusterman, Putnam and Cavell on the
Ethics of Democracy, 25 POL. THEORY 193, 208 (1997).
538. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L.
REV. 113, 122-30 (1996).
539. See David Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 454; William
H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1083 (1988); Mark Spiegel, The Case
of Mrs. Jones Revisited: Paternalism and Autonomy in Lawyer-Client Counseling, 1997 BYU L. REV.
307, 313-20.
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aggravates these inequities.'" Conceiving of the attorney-client
relationship as a "play'' "4 of roles and identities, and of shared interests
and commitments, fails to mitigate the inequities of differential power and
status. Whether this differential, or state bar efforts to control its
ideological manifestation, carries the risk of liability is unclear. 42
A third objection runs to the alleged crisis that afflicts race, lawyering,
and ethics. From the standpoint of this objection, the cause and cure of the
crisis vexing race trials pose a problem of politics, culture, and society, not
law.' 4  Robin Barnes, for example, argues that race trials show the
troubling entanglements of culture and society with the law, rather than the
cataclytic force of law itself.5 But simply acknowledging the majority
cultural perception of a lawless black communityl5 or the minority per-
ception of an ignorant white community 54 leaves untouched the assertion
of the political and social limits of law.5' The deterioration of civil
rights practice 48  and the weakening of cross-racial or biracial
coalitions5" testifies to those limits.
VII. Conclusion
Having mapped the general structure of race trials, studied an exem-
plar of such trials, and contemplated the race-conscious community-guided
540. See Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 659 (1990). Compare Sandra
D. Nicks et al., The Rise and Fall of Deception in Social Psychology and Personality Research, 1921
to 1994, 7 ETHICS & BEHAV. 69, 73-76 (1997) (discussing the use of deception in social psychological
and personality research).
541. Barbara Stark, The Practice of Law as Play, 30 GA. L. REV. 1005, 1018 (1996).
542. See Ralph H. Brock, Giving Texas Lawyers Their Dues: The State Bar's Liability Under
Hudson and Kellerfor Political and Ideological Activities, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 47, 83-92 (1996).
543. See Robin D. Barnes, Interracial Violence and Racialized Narratives: Discovering the Road
Less Traveled, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 788 (1996).
544. Id. at 789-93.
545. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fourteenth Chronicle: American Apocalypse, 32 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 275 (1997); Kofi Buenor Hadjor, Race, Riots and Clouds ofIdeological Smoke,
38 RACE AND CLASS 15, 30 (1997); cf. Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Public Law 280 and the Problem
of Lawlessness in California Indian Country, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1405, 1412 (1997) (discussing the
nineteenth century non-Indian understanding of tribes as "lawless").
546. See Tracy Isaacs, Cultural Context and Moral Responsibility, 107 ETHICS 670, 683 (1997)
(analyzing the moral standing of cultural practices and their influence on individual responsibility).
547. See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE
7 (1987) (enumerating sociolegal barriers to racial equality); RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC,
FAILED REVOLUTIONS: SOCIAL REFORM AND THE LIMITS OF LEGAL IMAGINATION 1 (1994) (delineating
a narrow range of reform options available to judges and attorneys).
548. See Julie Davies, Federal Civil Rights Practice in the 1990"s: The Dichotomy Between Reality
and Theory, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 197, 207-37,243-48 (1997) (discussing the factors reducing the viability
of civil rights litigation).
549. See Pamela S. Karlan, Loss and Redemption: Voting Rights at the Turn of a Century, 50
VAND. L. REV. 291, 320-21 (1997) (noting the squandering of historical opportunities to build cross-
racial coalitions in American politics).
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regulation of participating lawyers, return once more to the question of
how to accomplish the tasks of reconstructing racial identity, reimagining
racialized narrative, and reforming race-neutral representation while
respecting the freedom of legitimate advocacy. Begin with the threshold
task of reconstructing racial identity. Some contend that it is possible to
destabilize racial identity. Further, they claim that destabilization imposes
a liberating effect on the subordinated. Alex Johnson, for example, argues
that "[d]estabilizing the marks of 'black' and 'blackness' will have a
liberating effect on those previously classified as blacks who have
internalized the supremacy and metric of whiteness as the mediating value
in determining the worth of an individual based on skin color."550 This
Article offers a less sanguine view about destabilizing the categories of
racial identity. It in fact views the search for a "liberating effect" to be
perhaps futile. Nevertheless, the futility of manipulating racial identity in
order to force an encounter with the racial other should not give rise to a
postmodern call for a "less rational, less normative, less 'objective"'
sociolegal consciousness.55' Instead, the call, if it is heard, should go out
for racial dialogue.
Calling for racial dialogue without consideration of ethics-rule
implementation and enforcement seems fruitless. But enforcement requires
the sanction of prosecution. Judith Butler points out that "when political
discourse is fully collapsed into juridical discourse, the meaning of political
opposition runs the risk of being reduced to the act of prosecution. 552
Prosecution in this sense signals both an act of racial resistance and an
admission of racial tragedy. Drawing on the work of Max Weber,553
Louis Wolcher suggests "an ethic that is inextricably connected to the
'knowledge of tragedy with which all action, but especially political action,
is truly interwoven."' 554 The acknowledgement of tragedy, Maeve
Cooke asserts, "is itself a form of moral recognition."555 Yet, Cooke
remarks, "it also suggests that nothing can be done."556
550. Johnson, supra note 77, at 931 (footnote omitted).
551. On this call, see Kathryn Temple, Law's Hidden Face: Reading Narrative Jurisprudence and
Its Critics, in LAW AND LITERATURE PERSPECTIVES 352, 373 (Bruce L. Rockwood ed., 1996).
552. Judith Butler, Burning Acts: Injurious Speech, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 199, 205
(1996).
553. See MAX WEBER, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77,
117 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1958) ("The final result of political action often,
no, even regularly, stands in completely inadequate and often even paradoxical relation to its original
meaning."); see also ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, MAX WEBER 166, 175-82 (1983) (amplifying Weber's
view concerning the tragic nature of political action).
554. Louis E. Wolcher, Pavwnik's Theory of Legal Decisionmaking: An Introduction, 72 WASH.
L. REV. 469, 479 (1997) (quoting WEBER, supra note 553, at 117, 120).
555. Maeve Cooke, Authenticity and Autonomy: Taylor, Habermas, and the Politics of
Recognition, 25 POL. THEORY 258, 281 (1997).
556. Id.
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Even the call to dialogue holds limited promise that something can be
done. Racial dialogue, Richard Banks notes, is "channelled by prevailing,
though rarely explicitly stated, beliefs about black Americans. 55 7  To
Banks, "[t]he extent to which individuals, both black and white, gain entry
into public debate depends in part on the extent to which they accept, or
at least fail to challenge, prevailing views about blacks and the underlying
assumptions that frame racial debate."558 Historically, he notes, "[w]hen
those beliefs and assumptions posit black inferiority or justify racial
inequality, black participation serves to legitimate the very state of affairs
that the involvement of blacks suggests has been transformed."559
Accordingly, "interracial dialogue about race, rather than leading to new
understandings, heightened sensitivities, and more nuanced insights, might
perpetuate existing power disparities and entrench racial
subordination. "56
Nonetheless, surely Banks does not rule out the bonds of cross-racial
normative commitment. Shared normative commitment is a precondition
for deliberative community. 6' A further condition, Eric Yamamoto
cautions us, involves interracial justice, specifically "a commitment to
antisubordination among nonwhite racial groups."562 Efforts to press
anti-subordination initiatives thrive in a communicative environment
untainted by racism. The unlikelihood of the emergence of a "racism-free
communicative environment,"563 however, encourages the turn to the
more modest goal of empathy.
Renewed calls for empathy in race-infected contexts are now widely
heard, 5 4 even in contemporary politics. 65  Their recurrence has led to
557. R. Richard Banks, The Political Economy of Racial Discourse, 9 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 217,
237 (1997) (reviewing HARLON L. DALTON, RACIAL HEALING: CONFRONTING THE FEAR BETWEEN
BLACKS AND WHITES (1995)).
558. Id. at 237-38 (emphasis in original).
559. Id. at 238.
560. Id.
561. See Kenneth L. Karst, Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of Expression and the
Subordination of Groups, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 95, 97 (describing the appropriate environment for
effective civic deliberation).
562. Eric K. Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances: Agency, Responsibility and Interracial Justice, 3
UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 33, 34 (1995) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
563. Frank I. Michelman, Must Constitutional Democracy Be "Responsive"?, 107 ETHICS 706,
723 (1997) (book review) (discussing democratic citizenship and the import of content based restrictions
on free speech).
564. See Lucie E. White, Seeking "... The Faces of Otherness ... ": A Response to Professors
Sarat, Felstiner, and Cahn, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1499, 1508-09 (1992); Toni M. Massaro, Empathy,
Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099 (1989);
see also Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1574 (1987); Thomas
Morawetz, Empathy and Judgment, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 517 (1996); Cynthia V. Ward, A Kinder,
GentlerLiberalism? Visions of Empathy in Feminist and Communitarian Literature, 61 U. CHI. L. REv.
929 (1994).
565. See CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, JR., NOT ALL BLACK AND WHITE: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, RACE,
AND AMERICAN VALUES 3-40 (1996).
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a distinction between authentic and inauthentic empathy. Richard Delgado,
for example, points to real empathy, defining such empathy in terms of
"putting the client first and getting fully inside the client's mind and
experience. ' '166 Counterpoised against this teaching is false empathy and
the empathic fallacy. 67 False empathy, Delgado explains, occurs when
"a white believes he or she is identifying with a person of color, but in fact
is doing so only in a slight, superficial way."5 68  For Delgado, empathy
requires a double consciousness realized in the ability to "view[] experience
from two perspectives at once. ,569
Double or multiple consciousness gives rise to the second task of
reforming racialized narratives. Like Kenji Yoshino's gay closet, racial-
ized narrative is "oppressive even in its protective aspects." 7 ° The task
is to search for instrumentally useful, "winning" narratives that avoid the
reification of racial stereotypes. 57' In sum, the goal is to present what
Leti Volpp describes as "more complex and contextualized descriptions"
of the sociolegal world of racial violence. 72
Striving to recontextualize description alters the practice of race-
neutral representation. That practice rationalizes racial subordination under
the norm of color-blindness. Moreover, it sanctions the continuity of racial
subordination under modes of reformist legal rhetoric. 73
Recontextualizing practice in the criminal context requires an epistemic
shift in the symbolic and discursive construction of race that moves toward
a pluralized interpretation of race. The move in this direction involves no
566. Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Eleventh Chronicle: Empathy and False Empathy, 84 CAL. L.
REV. 61, 70 (1996); see also DELGADO, supra note 224, at 4-36.
567. Delgado, supra note 566, at 70-71; see also Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of
the Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77
CORNELL L. REv. 1258, 1261 (1992) (citing the "empathic fallacy") (emphasis in original).
568. See Delgado, supra note 566, at 70. Delgado adds: "[When a white empathizes with a
black, it's always a white-black that he or she has in mind. The white surmises what he would be like
if he were black, but with his same wants, needs, perspectives, and history. All grounded in white
experience of course." Id. at 71 (footnote omitted).
569. Id. at 72; see also Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as
Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 7, 9 (1989).
570. Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays,
96 COLUM. L. REv. 1753, 1801 (1996). Yoshino notes that the protective aspects of the gay closet
hold "sinister long-term implications," particularly in the negative impact on gay political mobilization.
Id. at 1800.
571. See Leti Volpp, Talking "Culture": Gender, Race, Nation, and the Politics of
Multiculturalism, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1573,1616 (1996) (linking sociolegal descriptions and pernicious
cultural stereotypes).
572. Id. at 1616; see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a
Post-Modern, Multi-Cultural World, I J. INST. STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 49, 62 (1996) (envisioning a
legal system denoted by "a greater multiplicity of stories being told, of more open, participatory and
democratic processes, yielding truths that are concrete, but contextualized, explicitly focusing on who
finds 'truth' for whose benefit").
573. On the uses of reformist rhetoric, see Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No LongerProtects:
The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN L. REV. 1111 (1997).
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clear-cut break, but rather a process of subversion intended to destabilize
received interpretations of race. That process lays challenge to the natural
and necessitarian justification for the preservation of racial status
inequality.
The hoped-for consequence of practicing a race-conscious community
ethic is to be left with the plural, contested, and ambiguous meanings of
race in legal discourse. Revealing these meanings is an ongoing process
of narrative and symbolic disclosure. We can commence that process by
following Robert Gordon's direction to liberate the political imagination of
lawyers "by revealing suppressed alternatives" embedded in material condi-
tions and symbolic systems." The resulting upheaval will be marked by
a loss of transcendent truth about racial status and race relations. 75 The
identity distortions of racialized narratives signal lost opportunities for
relations of racial unity. 76 That result would ring tragic were there a
semblance of unity within our reach.
574. Robert W. Gordon, An Exchange on Critical Legal Studies Between Robert W. Gordon and
William Nelson, 6 LAW & HisT. REv. 139, 178 (1988) (emphasis in original).
575. See David M. Adams, Objectivity, Moral Truth, and Constitutional Doctrine: A Comment
on R. George Wright's "Is Natural Law Theory of Any Use in Constitutional Interpretation?," 4 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J., 489, 499 (1995) (contending that transcendent truth "no longer has any real
purchase" for accounts of moral experience).
576. See Leslie Wilson, Lost Opportunity: African-American Populism, 104 TELOS 89, 95 (1995)
(documenting the late nineteenth century collapse of the populist opportunity for racial reconciliation).
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